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Introduction: Disharmonious Allies
In August 1952, delegates from Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States met in Honolulu for the first formal round of discussions over 
how the ANZUS Treaty—a defence alliance signed by these countries 
in September 1951—would work in practice. The treaty required each 
signatory to “respond to the common danger” in the Pacific, and these 
powers indeed saw mutual dangers at the time. The Korean War had 
been raging for over a year and showed no immediate signs of ending. A 
Communist government in China appeared to have aggressive intentions. 
Local revolutionaries in Indochina and Malaya had demanded sovereignty 
from their colonial governments. Framed in this light, a closer strategic 
relationship between the ANZUS powers should have been cooperative 
and rather straightforward.
This was certainly not the case. In advance of Council meetings in 
Hawaii, Percy Spender—architect of the ANZUS Treaty and then Australian 
Ambassador in Washington—accused the Pentagon of purposely 
“diminishing the importance” of the alliance to avoid serious consultation 
with Australia. According to Spender, even Australia’s former enemies—
Germany, Italy and Japan—had “the opportunity of consultation on vital 
matters in a manner which so far has been denied to Australia.”1 Without a 
doubt, refusing to consult seriously with the Australians was an American 
objective. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had advised Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson that joint planning with Australia and New Zealand would 
mean “serious and far-reaching disadvantages to the present and projected 
1 Spender to Casey, 18 March 1952, Spender Papers, Box 1, National Library of Australia 
(hereafter NLA).
© 2018 Andrew Kelly, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0141.10
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state of United States planning for a global war.”2 This position 
aggravated the Australians, yet the New Zealanders did not share this 
view, despite their similar geopolitical circumstances. As one adviser 
told Head of the New Zealand External Affairs Department Alister 
McIntosh, New Zealand “did not share the long-standing Australian 
objective of infiltration into the world’s policy-making hierarchy” after 
claiming that the Australian delegation almost demanded this outright 
at Honolulu.3 McIntosh certainly sympathised with this opinion, and 
even conceded later that New Zealand “never wanted the damn Pacific 
Pact in the first place.”4 
How did three allied powers—which shared a common language, 
similar historical roots and democratic liberal institutions—leave Hawaii 
with such competing views about the practicality of an alliance signed 
less than one year earlier? To some extent, disagreements between the 
ANZUS powers were symbolic of the challenging and divisive time in 
which the treaty was conceived. While in broad terms these countries 
shared similar political objectives in combating Soviet-led Communism 
during the early stages of the Cold War, the underlying purpose of 
this treaty was unique for each signatory and often created complex 
diplomatic tensions in the trilateral relationship. Australia, undeniably 
the most enthusiastic treaty member, viewed ANZUS as a means to 
rebalance its traditional ties with Britain by fostering a closer strategic 
relationship with the United States. The treaty limited the likelihood 
of future existential threats such as those posed by Japan in late 1942, 
and it provided an additional avenue for Canberra to voice its concerns 
about world affairs. 
Across the Tasman Sea, policymakers in New Zealand were more 
reluctant to forge a closer political relationship with the United States 
if it meant damaging relations with Britain. For Wellington, one of the 
major benefits of ANZUS was that it simply allowed New Zealand to 
continue its military commitments to the British cause in the Middle 
East. After all, as Jatinder Mann pointed out about the post-war years, 
2 Marshall to Acheson, 16 January 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States Series 
(hereafter FRUS) 1951 Vol. VI, 141.
3 Memorandum for McIntosh, 25 July 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/1 Part 8.
4 McIntosh to Corner, 3 October 1952, in Ian McGibbon ed., Unofficial Channels: Letters 
Between Alister McIntosh and Foss Shanahan, George Laking and Frank Corner, 1946-
1966 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1999), 106.
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New Zealand “very much identified itself as a British country and an 
integral part of a wider British World, which had the UK at its heart.”5 In 
contradistinction to Australian and New Zealand views on an alliance, 
the United States refused to consider an ANZUS-style arrangement 
until the outbreak of the Korean War necessitated trans-Tasman support 
for a Japanese Peace Treaty. The United States did not want an explicit 
military commitment to defend critical Australian and New Zealand 
interests. US eyes were primarily fixated on the situations in Europe 
and Asia, and did not give much serious thought to strategic issues in 
the South Pacific. That said, the State Department did recognise the 
growing importance of the US alliance with Australia and New Zealand 
as the Cold War began to take shape, especially because they shared 
similar ways of life and political ideologies.6
Looking more broadly, the development of this trilateral 
relationship from the end of World War II to the 1956 Suez Crisis—two 
monumental historical events that bookend a period of great change 
for these countries—provides an interesting and unique case study 
in alliance diplomacy. Much like the conclusion of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949 which formalised the collective 
defence of Western Europe against the Soviet bloc, the ANZUS powers 
faced significant disunity when responding to mutual defence issues 
despite similar geopolitical interests in the Pacific. During these years, 
close Australian and New Zealand ties to Britain caused significant 
friction in their respective relationships with the United States. Despite 
Australian and New Zealand policymakers accepting that their post-
war security relied upon the United States due to the fleeting nature of 
the British presence in the Asia-Pacific region, Canberra and Wellington 
maintained close strategic ties with London. As a result, when British 
decisions clashed with US policies, the Tasman countries were forced to 
choose between aligning their policies with one or the other of its two 
most important allies. 
5 Jatinder Mann, “The End of the British World and the Redefinition of Citizenship 
in Aotearoa New Zealand, 1950s–1970s”, National Identities (2017), 1, https://doi.org
/10.1080/14608944.2017.1369019 
6 Thomas K. Robb and David James Gill, “The ANZUS Treaty during the Cold War: 
A Reinterpretation of US Diplomacy in the Southwest Pacific”, Journal of Cold War 
Studies 17, no. 4 (2015), 109-157, https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00599
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Even then, policymakers in Canberra and Wellington did not always 
agree on how closely to align their respective policies with the United 
States and Britain. This was due in some measure to mutual distrust, 
but it also stemmed from trans-Tasman differences over Britain’s proper 
role in the post-war Pacific and Middle East. Canberra continued to 
cooperate and consult closely with London, yet a global power shift 
in favour of the US caused Australian diplomats to pursue actively a 
much closer relationship with the United States to meet their own 
security requirements. New Zealand also recognised the need for US 
protection but remained sceptical of American intentions and aimed, 
wherever possible, to align their policies with Britain to counteract 
US dominance. In short, while both countries maintained close British 
ties, active Australian efforts to pursue closer US-Australian strategic 
cooperation—often at the expense of cooperation within the British 
Commonwealth—caused significant discord in the trans-Tasman 
relationship. 
Until at least the mid-1950s, the United States also proved 
unwilling to consult seriously with Australia and New Zealand. This 
lack of consultation created significant discord in the relationship. 
In the early years of the Truman Administration, Washington gave 
little consideration to Australia’s and New Zealand’s roles in the US 
containment strategy. Only after the Cold War escalated in Asia during 
the late 1940s and early 1950s did the United States give far more 
attention to developments in Asia and the Pacific, and in so doing, began 
to consider new ways in which to combat the spread of Communism 
in this region. This in turn drew Washington’s gaze to Australian and 
New Zealand shores. ANZUS became possible because of this shared 
desire to respond to mutual security threats in the Pacific theatre, even 
if the three powers disagreed over many strategic issues. As the 1950s 
progressed, the alliance even offered Australia and New Zealand an 
unprecedented—albeit still minor—role in global strategy.
Since ANZUS was forged at such a momentous time in world 
history and subsequently played a significant role in the development 
of Australian and New Zealand foreign policies, historians have 
unsurprisingly devoted considerable attention to its conclusion. Early 
studies were especially critical of the Australian relationship with the 
United States. This was epitomised by Alan Renouf, former Head of 
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the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, who characterised the 
country’s general approach to foreign policy as childish because of its 
marked inclination to stay with “mother” Britain and then the United 
States.7 As more archival records became available, however, it became 
clear that these views were simplistic and did not properly reflect that 
the post-war period was one in which Australian foreign policy actually 
“gained considerable maturity, and its capacity to act independently 
grew with the professionalism of its diplomatic service.”8 Recent 
scholarly developments on Australian foreign policy during the early 
Cold War highlight this evolution, especially in analyses of individual 
diplomats and of the complexities that bedevilled the formulation of 
policy by the Department of External Affairs and the Department of 
Defence.9 
Another theme that presented itself was the ongoing struggle 
Australia faced in managing its relationships with Britain and the 
United States while simultaneously building its own independent role 
in foreign affairs. Christine de Matos aptly described this challenge as 
a “juggling act”, which became a common feature of the Australian 
approach to international crises in the 1940s and 1950s amidst a growing 
rift in Anglo-American relations.10 Given Britain’s complete inability to 
protect Australian interests during World War II and afterwards, a post-
war strategic shift toward the United States was logical and should have 
been quite straightforward. Instead, Canberra still maintained a close 
7 Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1979), 3-14. See also 
Joseph Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence (Melbourne: 
Macmillan, 1980).
8 Joan Beaumont, “Making Australian Foreign Policy, 1941-1969”, in Joan Beaumont, 
Christopher Waters, David Lowe, with Gary Woodard eds. Ministers, Mandarins 
and Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making 1941-1969 (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2003), 3.
9 Examples include Peter Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins (Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin, 2006); David Lowe, Australia Between Empires: The Life of Percy Spender 
(London: Pickering & Chatto, 2010); Cotton, James. “R.G. Casey and Australian 
International Thought: Empire, Nation, Community”, The International History 
Review 33, no. 1 (2011), 95-113, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2011.555380; 
Arthur Tange, Defence Policy-Making: A Close-Up View, 1950-1980, Peter Edwards ed. 
(Canberra: ANU Press, 2008), http://press.anu.edu.au?p=101541 
10 Christine de Matos, “Diplomacy Interrupted? Macmahon Ball, Evatt and Labor’s 
Policies in Occupied Japan”, Australian Journal of Politics and History 52, no. 2 (2006), 
193, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2005.00414.x 
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relationship with London, and, as a result, often had to walk a tightrope 
in times of crisis by balancing its relationships with its two great and 
powerful allies. 
An unwillingness to abandon close ties to Britain, then, speaks 
to something much deeper in the relationship. Australians still saw 
themselves as inherently British-Australians, so much so that when 
Prime Minister Ben Chifley visited London in 1948 to discuss a Western 
Union against the Soviet threat in Europe, he argued that only the 
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand “fully represented the 
British tradition” despite British insistence on including Southeast 
Asian countries as part of Commonwealth strategy in the Middle East. 
This rather embarrassing suggestion, as Neville Meaney argued, points 
out that being British “meant more to the Australian prime minister 
than the British themselves.”11 These types of views still persisted 
through the 1950s, especially as then Prime Minister Robert Menzies—
who had once described himself as British to the “bootheels”—strongly 
supported British actions in the Suez Canal region despite widespread 
international condemnation, including from the United States.12 
Australia’s alliance with the US was indeed important and necessary, 
yet inclinations to support the British line even after the conclusion of 
ANZUS demonstrates the strength of pro-British sentiments in Australia 
as well as the complexities that existed in these relationships.
New Zealand historians have similarly focused on Commonwealth 
relations, but have also stressed the country’s small-power status as 
a key feature of New Zealand’s increasingly the country’s growing 
independent outlook. As W. David McIntyre claimed, “New Zealand 
began to assert an independent voice in international affairs and not 
simply in empire affairs” in the post-war years, despite the United 
States acting as a “more aloof and unpredictable ally” than Britain.13 To 
11 Neville Meaney, “Britishness and Australian Identity: The Problem of Nationalism 
in Australian History and Historiography”, Australian Historical Studies 32, no. 116 
(2001), 80-81, https://doi.org/10.1080/10314610108596148
12 Stuart Ward, “The ‘New Nationalism’ in Australia, Canada and New Zealand: 
Civic Culture in the Wake of the British World”, in Joan Beaumont and Matthew 
Jordan eds., Australia and the World: A Festschrift to Neville Meaney (Sydney: Sydney 
University Press, 2013), 191.
13 W. David McIntyre, “From Dual Dependency to Nuclear Free”, in Geoffrey Rice, 
W. H. Oliver and B. R. Williams eds., The Oxford History of New Zealand (Melbourne: 
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be sure, however, Wellington’s view of its role in the post-war world 
was fundamentally shaped by its place in the British Commonwealth. 
This was because, in the words of Frank Corner, the New Zealand 
Deputy High Commissioner in London, “New Zealand at heart [had] 
always been content with a ‘colonial’ position and had readily accepted 
the leadership of Britain.” Similarly, he suggested in 1954 that “if New 
Zealand entered the American orbit […] this would be a great pity.”14 
Wellington, in short, wanted US protection but was reluctant to align itself 
too closely with Washington in case it damaged relations with London. 
As Australian National University historian T. B. Millar first concluded 
somewhat derisively in 1968, New Zealand was more inclined to “cling 
closer than did Australia to the skirts of Mother England.” As part of 
its clinging, “New Zealand have thus from the beginning looked at the 
world through different eyes, from an increasingly different viewpoint 
than Australians, and have seen an increasingly different world.”15
American historians have already extensively analysed almost all 
aspects of US foreign policy under the first two post-war US Presidents, 
Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. These studies focus on the 
attribution of responsibility for the development of the Cold War, 
the emergence and implementation of global containment strategies, 
examinations of key individuals and their impact on policymaking 
decisions, and explanations of the ways in which post-war US foreign 
policy shaped the international system for the duration of the twentieth 
century and beyond.16 This is well-trodden ground; this book’s focus 
Oxford University Press, 1992), 520-527. Notable works on NZ foreign policy 
during this period include: Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: 
New Zealand in the World Since 1935 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993); 
Ann Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, 1945-1952: The Occupation and the Peace Treaty 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1990); Malcolm Templeton, Ties of Blood and Empire: 
New Zealand’s Involvement in Middle East Defence and the Suez Crisis, 1947-1957 
(Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1994).
14 Frank Corner to Joseph Saville Garner, 27 July 1954, as quoted in James Waite, 
“Contesting ‘the Right of Decision’: New Zealand, the Commonwealth, 
and the New Look”, Diplomatic History 30, no. 5 (2006), 893, https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2006.00583.x
15 T.B. Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1968), 182.
16 More recent examples include Wilson Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: 
Potsdam, Hiroshima and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008); John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York: Penguin, 
2011); William McClenahan, Eisenhower and the Cold War Economy (Baltimore: John 
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lies instead with the roles Australia and New Zealand played in these 
US strategic and policy decisions. Examinations of US relations with 
small overlooked countries, such as the Pacific Dominions, offer a 
new perspective on how Washington managed its alliances as part 
of the broader East-West struggle. To this end, Tony Smith used the 
term “pericentrism” to describe the role of junior members of Cold 
War alliances who “tried to block, moderate, and end the epic contest” 
but also “played a key role in expanding, intensifying, and prolonging 
the struggle between East and West.”17 Fitting neatly within Smith’s 
“pericentric” framework, Australia’s and New Zealand’s small but 
not insignificant role in influencing US foreign policy during the early 
Cold War provides a unique insight into such a significant period of 
international history. 
There were certainly many important dimensions to this early trilateral 
relationship. Some key examples include the impact of these countries’ 
domestic policies on international affairs, increasing trade imports and 
exports, establishing closer cross-cultural ties, and contrasting ways of 
approaching the challenges presented by Communism and the post-war 
international order. This book touches on some of these considerations 
as they became relevant to the development of ANZUS, yet its principal 
focus is on the key strategic and foreign policy issues that impacted 
high-level diplomatic relations. As a secondary theme, it also explores 
the roles of key individuals who shaped the nature of the relationship. 
Notable among them are Australian External Affairs Ministers Herbert 
Evatt, Percy Spender and Richard Casey; New Zealand’s Head of 
External Affairs Alister McIntosh and Minister in the United States Carl 
Berendsen; Chief US negotiator for ANZUS and US Secretary of State 
during the Eisenhower Administration John Foster Dulles; and to a 
lesser extent British prime ministers Winston Churchill and Anthony 
Eden. 
Hopkins University Press, 2011); Hannah Gurman, The Dissent Papers: The Voices of 
Diplomats in the Cold War and Beyond (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
For a recent historiographical examination of these issues, see Frank Costigliola 
and Michael Hogan eds. America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign 
Relations since 1941, 2nd edn. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
17 Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the 
Study of the Cold War”, Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (2000), 567–591, https://doi.
org/10.1111/0145-2096.00237 
 9Introduction: Disharmonious Allies
The book is split into two parts. Part One explores the post-war 
origins of the ANZUS alliance between 1945 and 1951. In this section, 
Chapters One and Two analyse mutual security issues such as defence 
planning after the end of World War II, contestation over control of 
key Pacific island bases, the Japanese occupation, and trans-Tasman 
involvement in British defence strategies and nuclear development. By 
early 1949, trilateral views on these issues left the three countries at odds 
and with no solid foundation for closer cooperation through a regional 
defence arrangement. Diplomatic developments during these years 
also reveal that Australia and New Zealand were not yet prepared to 
abandon their close political ties to Britain in the face of US dominance.
Despite a somewhat acrimonious start to the post-war relationship, 
Chapter Three considers some of the international developments in the 
late 1940s that made concluding a formal defence treaty more viable. 
These include the outbreak of the Korean War, the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the election of new conservative 
governments in Canberra and Wellington. Following on from these 
developments, Chapter Four details negotiations over the ANZUS 
Treaty and highlights the contrasting types of commitment Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States were aiming to conclude with one 
another as well as the underlying reasons for these choices. Again, 
trans-Tasman ties to Britain surfaced as a key factor that complicated 
closer relations with the United States, especially as policymakers 
in London saw the conclusion of ANZUS as a significant blow to its 
international prestige and sought to undermine the treaty’s practicality 
and usefulness.
Part Two explores how ANZUS worked when it came into force 
between 1952 and 1956. Chapter Five touches on a range of post-treaty 
issues, including contrasting views surrounding the treaty’s actual 
scope and machinery, dealing with the question of British membership, 
the development of separate discussions for the joint defence of 
Southeast Asia, and uncertainty surrounding future of ANZUS after 
the election of Dwight Eisenhower in January 1953. These initial post-
treaty developments provide no clear evidence of an alliance that was 
practical or even useful for serious consultation or to respond to issues 
of mutual concern in the Pacific theatre. Then, Chapters Six, Seven, 
and Eight explore trilateral responses to three international crises: the 
10 ANZUS and the Early Cold War
1954 Dien Bien Phu Crisis in Indochina, the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu 
Crisis in the Taiwan Straits, and the 1956 Suez Crisis. These case studies 
provide snapshots of the ways ANZUS worked in practice, as well as 
illuminating the difficulties that threatened the efforts of the ANZUS 
powers to agree on a united response. These chapters also highlight that 
the usefulness of ANZUS often hinged upon British participation when 
responding to mutual dangers in the Pacific.
Each chapter seeks to answer several pertinent questions about the 
nature of the early post-war relationship. How did US global leadership 
impact its post-war relationships with Australia and New Zealand? 
How and why did Britain complicate relations between the ANZUS 
partners? Despite shared geopolitical interests, why did Australia and 
New Zealand disagree so often on fundamental strategic and diplomatic 
issues? Why did Australia, New Zealand and the United States have 
different views toward ANZUS but still commit to its conclusion? Was 
ANZUS ultimately useful in practice? How did the trilateral relationship 
develop over the first decade of the Cold War period, and what were the 
factors and who were the individual policymakers that shaped these 
changes? By including the views, policies and interests of all three 
countries in its pages, this book addresses these questions about the 
ANZUS relationship during the early Cold War.
PART ONE: ORIGINS

1. Defence Problems in the Pacific
While the origins of the Australian-New Zealand-American relationship 
can be traced as far back as the arrival of the US Great White Fleet in 
Sydney and Auckland in 1908, the pragmatic foundations of ANZUS 
lie in the aftermath of World War II. This war—which ended officially 
in September 1945—was the deadliest the world had ever seen, and 
the threat that the Japanese had posed to Australia and New Zealand 
during this conflict prompted diplomats in these countries to reconsider 
how they would safeguard their own security in the post-war world. 
The Tasman countries were too small to protect themselves, and war-
torn Britain was no longer able to provide adequate military support in 
the Pacific. As Historian C. W. Braddick colourfully described, Britain’s 
wartime experience “cruelly exposed its threadbare imperial clothes”, 
subtly referencing Britain’s inability to safeguard Australian and New 
Zealand interests while it fought against the Axis powers.1 The only 
practical solution was pursuing a closer relationship with the United 
States, the world’s most powerful nation that had defeated the Japanese 
almost single-handedly.
1 C.W. Braddick, “Britain, the Commonwealth, and the Post-war Japanese Revival, 
1945–70”, The Round Table 99, no. 409 (2010), 372, https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2
010.498975 
Indeed, this reality was well known to Australians and New Zealanders 
even before they entered the war against Japan. Soon after the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, Australian Prime Minister 
John Curtin had already signalled the future of Australian diplomacy 
and strategy. “Without any inhibitions of any kind”, he declared, “I make 
it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our 
© 2018 Andrew Kelly, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0141.01
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Figure 1. US General Douglas MacArthur signs as Supreme Allied Commander for the formal 
surrender of Japan during WWII, September 1945. Photo by US Navy (1945), US National 
Archives Catalog, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/520694, unrestricted use.
traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.”2 While not going 
as far as suggesting a closer US relationship would come at the expense 
of relations with Britain, New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser 
made similar comments about the importance of the United States to 
the future conduct of his country’s diplomacy. “New Zealand realises”, 
he said, “that the security and future development of the Pacific can 
only be satisfactorily achieved in cooperation with the United States.”3 
In short, Britain’s self-ruling Dominions in the South Pacific had come 
to the understanding that the United States had replaced Britain as the 
predominant power in the Pacific, and US officials certainly agreed. 
The Pearl Harbor attack had utterly discredited the pre-war isolationist 
movement, and had set the United States on a path toward becoming a 
global superpower. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Pacific, 
2 David Day, “27th December 1941: Prime Minister Curtin’s New Year Message, 
Australia Looks to America”, in Turning Points in Australian History, Martin Crotty 
and David Andrew Roberts eds. (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 
2009), 129-142.
3 Fraser Statement, 17 April 1944, in New Zealand Foreign Policy: Statements and 
Documents, 1943-1957 (hereafter NZFP: SD) (Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1972), 65-67.
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where the United States maintained an almost complete monopoly of 
power. As US Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal put it in April 1945, 
“all discussions of world peace” rested on the assumption that “the 
United States [would] have the major responsibility for the Pacific.”4
To that end, the United States moved ahead swiftly with its post-
war plans for the Pacific without any serious thought of cooperating 
closely with Britain or any of the Commonwealth countries. Based on 
US Joint War Committee plans drafted a year earlier, US Chief of Naval 
Operations Chester Nimitz and Chief of the Army Dwight Eisenhower 
agreed that the United States must set up a Pacific Command (stretching 
from the main Japanese islands through to the Philippines) and a 
Western Command (covering the “rest of the Pacific”) solely under the 
leadership of American naval officers.5 
At that time, the United States had no major strategic interest in 
Australia or New Zealand. As the world’s most powerful nation, 
initial US post-war foreign and defence policies were global in nature. 
Moreover, all policies (including those in the Pacific) were considered 
in relation to their impact on the Soviet Union and the global balance 
of power. As part of these global post-war strategies, relations with 
Australia and New Zealand were low on the list of US priorities. As 
US Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy told Secretary of the Navy 
James Forrestal in November 1945, the “post-war problems are global; 
that is, the conditions of anarchy, unrest, malnutrition, unemployment 
[…] the economic dislocations are profound and far-reaching.” For the 
Departments of War and the Navy, the US had to devise and develop 
broad defence policies to meet these challenges and prepare for war 
against the most likely post-war enemy, the Soviet Union. The United 
States had to respond to the “universal fear of the Russian colossus, 
both in terms of the size of that country and the locust-like effect of their 
occupation wherever they may be”, McCloy reasoned.6 
4 Forrestal Diary Entry, 17 April 1945, in The Forrestal Diaries, Walter Mills ed. 
(New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 45. See also the discussion of forward 
defence in Melvvn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman 
Administration, and the Cold War (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
5 Meeting between Nimitz and Forrestal, 31 August 1946, in Walter Mills ed. The 
Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 195.
6 McCloy and Forrestal Meeting, 5 November 1945, in Mills ed. The Forrestal Diaries, 
105-106.
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Reflecting McCloy’s global outlook, the US Joint Post-War Committee 
concluded that in the Pacific, the United States must take a global 
perspective. This meant the United States must consider Pacific strategy 
and defence policy in relation to its effect on the Soviet Union and other 
regions of primary US interest, such as Europe and the Middle East. 
A report produced by the Committee in July 1945 outlined that in the 
Pacific theatre, the United States should maintain an island barrier of 
bases stretching from Japan’s northern islands down to the Philippines 
and the Southwest Pacific. These defence plans aimed to safeguard US 
territory from again being attacked from Asia, but also to prepare for 
a global fight against the Soviet Union. Further reports for US global 
defence policy were drawn up by the Committee in May 1946. These 
plans were code-named “Pincher.” Based on the assumption of war 
with the Soviet Union, the Pincher Series assessed defence capabilities 
for the United States and its allies. The plans concluded that the United 
States must prepare for potential war with Moscow.
In assessing Allied post-war defence capabilities, Australia and New 
Zealand did not feature in US plans for a future war with the Soviet 
Union. This was largely due to Australia and New Zealand’s respective 
geographic isolation and limited military potential, but also because 
Washington thought that their defence plans were largely shaped by 
British defence priorities. In late 1945, US Envoy in Wellington Kenneth 
Patton told US Secretary of State James Byrnes that New Zealand was 
still “strongly inflicted with the Mother Country complex.”7 Similarly, 
US Ambassador to Canberra Nelson Johnson asserted that “Washington 
[dealt] with Australia as part of the Empire.” Before the war ended, 
he even went as far as suggesting that post-war discussions between 
Australia and the United States “would not be settled in Canberra but in 
consultation at 10 Downing Street.”8
Unsurprisingly, Australia and New Zealand did look back towards 
their traditional ally in Europe. The problem these diplomats faced 
when visiting London, however, was the complete lack of any 
meaningful Commonwealth regional defence system in the post-war 
7 Patton to Byrnes, 15 October 1945, United States National Archives and 
Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, 
711.47H/10-1545.
8 Johnson Memorandum, 3 February 1945, NARA, RG 59, 711.47/2-345.
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world. During the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in May 
1946, Frank Corner, the political affairs officer in the NZ Department 
of External Affairs, described this dire situation to his colleagues back 
in Wellington. “What do we do now?” Corner asked rhetorically in 
a lengthy letter to New Zealand External Affairs Secretary Alister 
McIntosh during the Conference; “the British stated quite frankly that 
they are no longer able to defend the whole Commonwealth. Britain 
is resigning her leadership in the Pacific out of weakness”, Corner 
conceded, and the only “logical development of this trend was to push 
Australia and New Zealand steadily towards the US.”9 Reporting 
back from the Prime Ministers’ Conference, the Australians made 
similar observations. In an address to the Australian Parliament on 
19 June, Prime Minister Ben Chifley stressed that Australia’s post-war 
relationship with the United States would now form “a cornerstone of 
our foreign policy.”10
Figure 2. Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley (middle), Australian External Affairs 
Minister Herbert Evatt (left) and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee (right) meet at the 
1946 Commonwealth Conference. Photo by unknown (1946), Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/
photos/chifleyresearch/14483884882, CC BY 2.0.
9 Corner to McIntosh, 27 May 1946, in Unofficial Channels, 44-54.
10 Chifley Address to Parliament, 19 June 1946, National Archives of Australia 
(hereafter NAA), A816, 11/301/586.
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The Britons were indeed in dire straits. The Second World War had 
financially crippled the British economy, so much so that London was 
the world’s greatest debtor by the end of the war and had to borrow 
over three billion dollars from the US to give it breathing space in which 
to balance its overseas payments.11 Even before the war ended officially, 
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden predicted that such severe 
economic difficulties would limit the influence of its foreign policy 
and force Whitehall to reassess which foreign strategic interests should 
be prioritised. At the top of Britain’s list of strategic priorities was the 
post-war reconstruction of Europe and the German occupation, while 
it simultaneously looked to withdraw from any onerous commitments 
in the Asia and the Middle East. For instance, British Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee argued for a withdrawal of British forces in the Middle 
East, granting independence to India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Pakistan, 
and later approved plans for Australia to lead the Commonwealth on 
the advisory Allied Council for Japan during the post-war occupation. 
These actions all signalled a retreat of British influence in the Asia-Pacific 
region. It was no longer a major world power, and had to abandon 
any non-critical commitments lest it further damage its economy or 
international prestige.
Unlike the United States or even Britain, neither Australia nor 
New Zealand was a global power and did not possess a sizeable 
military force or industrialised economy. Much to Australian External 
Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt’s frustration, the United States did not 
give “countries like Australia and New Zealand” the opportunity to 
contribute meaningfully to the post-war defence of the Pacific.12 As far 
as Australia’s defence capabilities were concerned, Australian military 
personnel were still returning from overseas deployments throughout 
late 1945. This delayed finalising more concrete objectives for Australian 
post-war defence policy. As Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley 
outlined in November 1945, early defence policy considerations were 
also affected by:
The delay in establishing an effective world security organisation, 
the international difficulties that have arisen in establishing 
11 George Peden, “Recognising and Responding to Relative Decline: The Case of Post-
War Britain”, Diplomacy and Statecraft 24, no. 1 (2013), 61, https://doi.org/10.1080/09
592296.2013.762883 
12 Ibid.
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cooperation in the immediate post-war world, [and because] 
any present estimated strength of post-war forces would be very 
provisional while demobilisation at present leaves a doubt as to 
the ultimate strengths to which forces can be reduced.13
Once Australian personnel returned from overseas and better estimations 
could be made about Australian military strength, defence policy was 
first outlined publicly in November 1946. Its rationale revolved around 
the concept of imperial cooperation. In an address to the Australian 
Parliament on 2 November, Duke of Gloucester Prince Henry suggested 
that Australian forces be used in three roles: for UN peace-keeping 
forces, under old British Empire arrangements and in national defence. 
It was also announced that Australia would make a larger contribution to 
Commonwealth defence in the Pacific. This outline was then built upon 
by Australian military planners in a 1946 proposal titled the “Nature and 
Function of Post-War Defence Forces”, which suggested that the “basic 
ingredient” of the defence of Australia was “Empire Cooperation.”14 In 
short, despite the clear decline in British power in the Pacific over the 
preceding decade, Australia was committed to retaining defence ties 
with Britain due to personal networks and loyalty to empire.
Australian defence policy did not begin to take a clearer shape 
until 1947. On 6 March, the Australian Council of Defence (consisting 
of the Defence Minister, Defence Secretary the Chief of the Australian 
Defence Forces and other service chiefs) summarised that the post-war 
security of Australia rested on “cooperation with Empire Defence and 
the development of regional security with the United States.” Australian 
cooperation with larger powers was crucial, as the Australian Chiefs 
of Staff concluded that Australia was “an isolated smaller power with 
limited manpower and resources […] it is not able to defend itself.”15 
Later that month, the Joint Intelligence Committee (a sub-organisation of 
the Department of Defence) approved the Defence Council conclusions 
13 Chifley Memorandum on Australian Defence Policy, 27 November 1945, NAA, 
A5954, 2226/6.
14 McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact, 173.
15 Notes on the Defence Council Meeting, 6 March 1947, in W. J. Hudson and Wendy 
Way ed. Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1947-1949 Volume XII 1947 
(hereafter DAFP) (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995), 299-
302; Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting Minutes, 28 October 1947, DAFP 1947 Vol. 
XII, 290.
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and planned for potential war scenarios that might involve Australian 
troops. As the Committee could see no immediate threat to Australia “in 
its own theatre”, the most likely threats to Australian security would be 
in either the Middle East or the Far East. These areas were determined to 
be the most likely to threaten vital British interests and result in Australia 
becoming involved because of its ties with the United Kingdom.16 From 
these initial reports, it appeared that Australian post-war defence policy 
was to set to take a similar shape to previous wartime policies insofar 
as it centred on British cooperation and fighting for Commonwealth 
interests rather than depending completely on US policy.
Six months later, the Australian Defence Committee (a sub-
organisation that advised the Defence Minister on matters relating to 
defence policy) agreed with these recommendations and produced the 
“Strategic Position of Australia” report. In it, the Australian Chiefs of 
Staff insisted on preparing Australian troops to be deployed in either 
the Middle East or the Far East, depending on how desperately British 
forces needed Australian support and whether such support would 
serve Australian interests. In each scenario, it was suggested that 
Australian defence preparations should be orchestrated in cooperation 
with the British Commonwealth.17 Again, the Australians appeared to 
prioritise British cooperation over and above potential cooperation with 
the United States.
Across the Tasman, New Zealand post-war defence policy rested 
on two pillars. Firstly, like Australia, New Zealand defence planners 
recognised that the country was too small to defend itself and wherever 
possible it would have to coordinate its defence policy with Britain and 
the United States. The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff explained on 30 
October 1945 that local defence would be linked to a system of forward 
island bases in the Pacific. In short, the Chiefs concluded that the 
United States would probably take responsibility for the island bases in 
Northeast Asia, so New Zealand should contribute to the defence of the 
Southwest Pacific through coordination with British-occupied bases in 
the Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, and Fiji.18
16 Joint Intelligence Committee Appreciation, 27 March 1947, DAFP 1947 Vol. XII, 277.
17 The Strategic Position of Australia, September 1947, NAA, 5954, 1628/3.
18 Isitt to Chiefs of Staff, 30 October 1945, Archives New Zealand (hereafter Archives 
NZ), Registered Secret Subject Files (hereafter RSSF), 022/4/32.
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The major problem with adopting this strategy was that Wellington 
had very little information regarding American post-war policies in the 
Pacific. Without these plans, New Zealand could not properly coordinate 
its own defence plans with the United States. As New Zealand Minister 
in the United States Carl Berendsen told US Representative for the Allied 
Commission on Japanese Reparations Isador Lubin on 15 October 1945, 
New Zealand could not support US foreign policy in the Pacific unless 
the New Zealand Government “knew what American policy was.”19 In 
response to this lack of information exchange, US Envoy in Wellington 
Kenneth Patton suggested that New Zealand should be informed of US 
defence plans. Even while New Zealand generally followed the lead of 
the United Kingdom, Patton’s interpretation of New Zealand’s defence 
policy suggested that New Zealand objectives in the Pacific were “nearly 
identical” to the United States and that Wellington would support US 
plans “if they were communicated to the New Zealand Government.”20
At this stage, however, Washington was not seeking a closer 
consultative arrangement with Wellington. That being the case, New 
Zealand Chiefs of Staff concluded that while there was no immediate 
threat to New Zealand in the Pacific theatre, the second pillar of New 
Zealand’s initial post-war defence policy should be to assist in an 
Allied victory in the event of war in the Middle East. Under this plan, 
New Zealand was prepared to send its largest military contribution to 
the Middle East so that its limited military potential would make the 
greatest contribution to the outcome of a future war. However, as with 
the Australians, New Zealand defence policy was tied to British defence 
planning. It was on the advice of the British Chiefs of Staff that New 
Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser and his Defence Chiefs agreed 
that New Zealand should make its primary military contribution to the 
defence of the Middle East. Such a contribution was outlined clearly 
and with a specific time frame: an army expeditionary force would be 
deployed within ninety days after the decision to do so was made, and 
air squadrons within seventy days.21
19 Patton to Byrnes, 15 October 1945, NARA, RG 59, 711.47H/10-1545.
20 Ibid.
21 Chiefs of Staff Minutes, 24 September 1948, Archives NZ, EA, 85/1/1 Part 3.
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Control in the Pacific Islands
American dominance in the Pacific first became a problem for Australia 
and New Zealand during the post-war settlement of the Pacific Islands. 
For Australia, New Zealand and the United States, each island held 
a different strategic value for each country and was considered for 
different purposes. John Minter, the US chargé in Canberra, relayed 
to the State Department early in January 1946 that Australian External 
Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt was “directly interested in security and 
welfare arrangements in the whole Pacific area” and that the “Australian 
government [felt] that both countries should participate in any talks 
which are held on this subject.”22 
Evatt’s thoughts were based in part on the Canberra Pact, an 
Australian-New Zealand agreement reached in January 1944 that 
formally declared that the two countries have common interests in the 
South Pacific and that they should have a voice in the settlement of 
island bases. Evatt’s demands reflected his frustration at being left out 
of the 1943 Cairo Conference (where Allied powers had determined the 
post-war fate of territories that had been seized by the Japanese in case 
of Allied victory). Evatt’s comments also reflected his determination 
that Australia’s viewpoint should be considered more seriously in 
Washington. In truth, Australia’s realistic Pacific ambitions lay in only 
a select number of islands. Australia negotiated with Britain the post-
war control of Nauru, the Cocos Islands, Christmas Island, the New 
Hebrides and the British Solomons, all of which have been dealt with 
extensively elsewhere.23 
As far as the Australians were concerned, the key island was Manus, 
the largest island in the Australian-mandated Admiralty Island group 
just north of modern day Papua New Guinea. In early 1946, the State 
Department approached Australia to enter discussions over joint-base 
rights on Manus and the Admiralty Islands. As part of the US proposal, 
Australia would remain the administering authority of the trust territory 
and have full legislative control. The United States made it clear that it 
wanted no obligations or military costs: in a draft agreement sent to the 
22 Minter to Secretary of State, 26 January 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 1.
23 David Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of Britain’s Empire 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002), 51-72.
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Australian Legation, it proposed that the US was “not hereby committed 
to maintain military forces or facilities in the Admiralty Islands when it 
judged that military forces or facilities are unnecessary.” The US only 
wanted rights to be able to “import, station, store in or remove from 
the Islands, personnel, material and supplies.”24 To Australian eyes, it 
looked as though the United States wanted the right to do whatever it 
wanted on Manus but without obligating itself to do anything. 
Evatt took this approach to pursue his own goals: establish a regional 
defence arrangement with the United States and strengthen Australia-US 
defence relations. He was prepared to allow the US Navy to establish 
a base on the island but in return wanted reciprocal base rights for 
the Royal Australian Navy in American ports. He also demanded that 
an agreement over Manus should be concluded as part of a broader 
settlement over the Pacific Islands and that the US should “develop 
a regional defence arrangement which would include New Zealand” 
rather than “discuss individual bases such as the Admiralty Islands.” 
Joint agreement on bases, at least as far as Evatt was concerned, could 
be reached “more easily” if it was “developed within [a] framework [of] 
an overall arrangement for the defence of Australia and New Zealand as 
well as the United States” and give strength in numbers to the defence 
of the Pacific.25 US President Harry Truman, in fact, got word that 
Evatt “refused” to consider a joint-base solution unless it was part of 
an overall defence arrangement. Evatt was also “very keen”, according 
to US Secretary of State James Byrnes, for an international conference 
on the settlement of the Pacific Islands rather than pursuing these 
negotiations privately.26
The United States strongly opposed Evatt’s counter-terms. 
According to Byrnes, the only reason the United States was interested 
in Manus was because they had spent 156 million US dollars on the 
Manus Island base during the war and did not want to do “anything 
more than is absolutely essential for defence purposes.” As Manus was 
not a high US priority, Byrnes thought that it was better not to have a 
24 State Department to Australian Legation, 14 March 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 16-17.
25 Minter to Byrnes, 13 April 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 27-28; Gallman to Byrnes, 25 
April 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 33.
26 Acheson to Truman, 7 May 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 41-42; Byrnes Memorandum, 28 
February 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 6-8.
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formal meeting because “it would only serve to create a lot of talk.” For 
its part, New Zealand was likewise uninterested in partaking in Manus 
Island discussions or a formal conference over the settlement of islands 
in the South Pacific. “This question of bases has to be dealt with very 
discreetly”, New Zealand Minister in the United States Carl Berendsen 
told New Zealand External Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh on 4 June 
1946, “the worst possible thing we could do […] would be to embark on 
a course of public polemics.”27
A formal conference also proved unnecessary because the 
State Department rejected categorically Evatt’s suggestion that the 
settlement of the Pacific Islands should be undertaken as part of 
broader discussions toward a regional defence arrangement. On 25 
April 1946, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson advised that any 
regional defence arrangement was “premature” and “inadvisable.” The 
US military agreed wholeheartedly with Acheson. Assistant Chief of 
Naval Operations Robert Dennison thought that since the United States 
was “not discussing the larger question of reciprocal use of bases”, 
the “present negotiations have no relation whatsoever to a mutual 
defence arrangement or a regional security pact. Such a plan would be 
artificial and impossible under present conditions.”28 George Lincoln, 
US Military Adviser to the Secretary of State, added that Evatt’s Pacific 
plan was “strategically unsound and contrary to the accepted military 
concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” to avoid binding military obligations 
in the Pacific.29 Instead of pursuing a joint base on Manus further, the 
US preferred ultimately to abandon the project and leave the island in 
Australian hands. “At the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff”, US 
Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett later advised President Truman, 
the United States “has no further interest in having bases in territory 
under Australian jurisdiction.”30
27 Berendsen to McIntosh, 4 June 1946, in Ian McGibbon ed. Undiplomatic Dialogue: 
Letters Between Carl Berendsen and Alister McIntosh, 1943-1952 (Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 1993), 109.
28 Dennison to Hickerson, 22 April 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 32; Acheson to Harriman, 
27 April 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 34.
29 Lincoln to Byrnes, 1 May 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 35-36.
30 Lovett to Truman, 7 October 1947, NARA, RG 59, 711.47/10-747.
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The reality was that the United States had little interest in the entire 
Southwest Pacific. While there was “undoubtedly some strategic 
interest” in the Southwest Pacific for defensive purposes and civil 
aviation, the United States only made serious claims for exclusive rights 
to three islands: Canton, Christmas and Funafuti. The United States 
staked a claim to twenty-five islands, but Washington was prepared 
to abandon these claims if it could acquire exclusive rights over these 
three islands.31 The US Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that “these islands 
were somewhat more important from a purely strategic and military 
standpoint than the others.” Outside of these islands, the United States 
pursued joint rights for territory under the administrative authority of 
other countries. 
At the same time the United States approached Australia for joint-
base rights to Manus, the State Department was in advanced negotiations 
with New Zealand over a joint trusteeship for Western Samoa. These 
negotiations progressed more smoothly than with the Australians over 
Manus, but were not without their share of disagreement. Like Manus, 
Western Samoa was a New Zealand mandate and the only New Zealand 
territory to which the United States wanted rights. The United States had 
built an airfield there during the war and spent several million dollars 
on defence installations. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for joint 
operating rights but wanted New Zealand to cover airfield operation at 
its own expense and demanded that any defence installations fall under 
a “strategic area trusteeship.”32
New Zealand did not respond favourably to this US proposal. 
Prime Minister Peter Fraser was “not too happy” about the proposal 
for Western Samoa to become a US “strategic area”, nor did External 
Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh agree that the settlement of a United 
Nations Trusteeship Agreement should go ahead before negotiations 
for military bases were settled. “While it was perfectly apparent that we 
all wanted to achieve the same ends”, McIntosh told Deputy Director of 
the Office of European Affairs John Hickerson, “[I] do not feel that we 
were in agreement.” McIntosh suggested that a military base agreement 
31 Lovett to Forrestal, 23 September 1948, NARA, RG 59, 811.014/9-2048. See 
also Hickerson Memorandum, 19 March 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 15; Furber 
Memorandum, 22 March 1946, NARA, RG 59, 811.24590/3-2246.
32 Hickerson to Acheson, 11 July 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 47.
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should be settled before a trusteeship was put into effect in Western 
Samoa because he was concerned about what might happen if the joint 
US-NZ trusteeship failed to be approved by the UN.33 McIntosh, in other 
words, was concerned that New Zealand’s views would be ignored. 
After raising these concerns with Hickerson, McIntosh and Fraser 
were eventually able to work out an acceptable solution and the UN 
approved the New Zealand-Western Samoa Trusteeship Agreement 
on 13 December 1946. The Australians, for their part, were “extremely 
angry” with New Zealand for not reaching the Western Samoa 
trusteeship solution jointly with their Manus Island problem.34 Before 
the General Assembly, the Australian government cabled New Zealand 
Prime Minister Peter Fraser on 26 August, stating that Australia was 
“anxious to ensure mutual full support at the next General Assembly.” 
The cablegram continued to stress that it was “desirable to [Australia] 
to attempt to attempt to remove without delay any point of substantial 
difference between us” over the settlement of trusteeships in the Pacific 
Islands, and hoped for an “early expression of [New Zealand] views.”35 
No reply from New Zealand was sent to Australia. Although this lack 
of a response was unusual and difficult to explain, it is plausible that at 
least part of New Zealand’s unwillingness to cooperate with Australia 
in the UN was its recent frustration that Australia appeared only to 
cooperate with New Zealand when it suited Australian interests. “I am 
getting very fed up with Australia”, Minister in the United States Carl 
Berendsen told McIntosh in April 1946 after supporting Australia’s bid 
for a UN Security Council seat. “I don’t remember any single instance 
where Australia has supported any action that I have taken […] I am 
bound to say that [Australia-New Zealand consultation] appears to be 
a validity [sic] only when it involves the support of Australian policy, 
and I am getting a little tired of it.”36 Berendsen—who, incidentally, was 
Australian by birth—recorded similar comments about this abrasive 
and non-consultative style of Australian diplomacy in his memoirs.37 
33 Hickerson Memorandum, 27 February 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 8-10.
34 Warren to Acheson, 24 July 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 48-49.
35 Australian Government to Fraser, 26 August 1946, NAA 1838/238, 306/1/1 part II.
36 Berendsen to McIntosh, 2 April 1946, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 106-107.
37 Hugh Templeton ed. Mr. Ambassador: Memoirs of Carl Berendsen (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 2009), 152-153, 171-183.
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McIntosh shared Berendsen’s frustrations with Australian 
diplomacy toward settling the post-war control of South Pacific islands. 
In this instance, New Zealand’s unwillingness to cooperate undercut 
Evatt’s diplomatic efforts to work towards a broader regional defence 
arrangement. It also highlighted that Australia and New Zealand were 
not working together in the Southwest Pacific but at cross-purposes. 
“I get more and more fed up with Australia”, McIntosh replied to 
Berendsen later in May 1947 over Australian diplomacy in the UN and 
the Pacific Islands, “you simply don’t know where they are except that 
they will be following their own interests in every case.”38 
Irrespective of differences between Australia and New Zealand, the 
latter was eventually able to come to an agreement with the United 
States over Western Samoa, even though many politicians in the Fraser 
Cabinet were uneasy about US activity in the South Pacific. The New 
Zealand government “strongly opposed” the transfer of sovereignty of 
Canton, Christmas and Funafuti to the United States for exclusive rights, 
believing that this was “unnecessary” for the strategic and civil aviation 
reasons the State Department offered.39 In the end, there was clearly 
no mutually acceptable solution to all Australian, New Zealand and 
American ambitions in the Southwest Pacific. Each country’s primary 
interests lay in different islands, and when these interests overlapped, 
agreement was not easy to come by. Although Evatt tried desperately 
to secure a broader American commitment through the settlement of 
Manus, the island remained in Australian hands. New Zealand was 
eventually able to conclude UN trusteeship agreement concerning 
Western Samoa. The US ultimately secured access to the three islands 
(Canton, Christmas and Funafuti) it considered to be most valuable for 
strategic purposes through negotiations with Britain.
Even though control over these island bases had been largely 
settled by 1946-1947, tensions simmered during negotiations between 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. This friction only 
increased throughout the remainder of the 1940s. Occupation policies 
in Japan and greater trans-Tasman involvement in British defence plans 
were set to divide these powers further.
38 Berendsen to McIntosh, 21 May 1947, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 125.
39 Acheson Memorandum, 11 July 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 48.

2. Japan, ANZAM, and the Bomb
Outside of the South Pacific, Australia, New Zealand and the United States 
also shared a keen interest in the post-war treatment and occupation of Japan. 
The United States led the occupation and dominated the organisations put 
in place to oversee the terms of Japanese surrender (which were the Allied 
Council and the Far Eastern Commission). This American preeminence 
caused considerable indignation in Australia and New Zealand. Once 
the US abandoned its initial occupation policies and began planning for a 
Japanese peace settlement in mid to late 1947, Australian and New Zealand 
protestations grew louder. The treatment of Japan quickly became one of 
the major divisive issues in the early Australian-New Zealand-American 
post-war relationship.
The United States took charge of the post-war occupation of Japan in 
part because they bore the overwhelming brunt of the war effort against 
them during World War II. Australia and New Zealand did form part of 
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force and were assigned their 
own districts; however, the United States assumed what diplomat George 
Kennan later termed a “totality of responsibility” in Japan.1 US Secretary 
of State James Byrnes made it clear that unlike Germany, Japan would 
be an American-led occupation and they retained the right to make final 
decisions on post-war policy. As Assistant Secretary of State Charles Dunn 
told Byrnes, under no circumstances would Washington allow a “control 
Council in Japan” to diminish American influence.2 
Initially, the United States pursued two basic objectives in the occupation 
of Japan: demilitarisation and democratisation. These policies ensured 
that “Japan [would] not again become a menace to the peace and security 
1 George Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), 388.
2 Dunn to Byrnes, 30 August 1945, FRUS 1945 Vol. VI, 697.
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of the world.”3 As far as war reparations were concerned, President 
Truman’s Personal Representative Edwin Pauley asserted in late 1945 
that the United States would seek a complete industrial disarmament 
of Japan and pass on much of Japanese industrial equipment and plants 
to countries entitled to reparations. Japan, in turn, would be left only 
with access to industries that were essential, such as food production.4 
Australia and New Zealand had no objections to these plans. They 
ensured that Japan was completely unable to threaten Australia and 
New Zealand in the short-term future.
The major objections Australia and New Zealand raised during 
the occupation’s early stages related to the Allied Council and the Far 
Eastern Commission. The Council acted as an advisory body intended 
to ensure that Japan’s surrender, occupation and control plans were met, 
whereas the Commission was an organisation based in Washington that 
oversaw the Council. Both Canberra and Wellington argued that their 
voices were silenced by the Americans, who were unwilling to consult 
seriously with their allies about occupation policy. Indeed, whilst it 
appeared that these committees might offer the Allied powers a shared 
voice in the Japanese occupation, the United States refused to consider 
seriously any views that differed from or criticised US policy. 
In Wellington, New Zealand policymakers were initially pleased 
with their position on the Far Eastern Commission. A place on the 
Commission offered New Zealand diplomats an opportunity to ensure 
that Japan’s capacity for aggressive expansion would be completely 
removed, and so to protect New Zealand from the possibility that Japan 
would again come close to threatening its borders as it did in 1942. After 
the first Commission meetings were held in early 1946, Counsellor in 
the New Zealand Legation Guy Powles reported to Prime Minister 
Peter Fraser that “there seemed to be a general feeling of pleasure” 
that New Zealand was “able to do something” in regards to overseeing 
the Japanese occupation.5 New Zealand’s position on the Commission 
also offered its senior diplomat, Minister to the United States Carl 
Berendsen, a unique opportunity to discuss New Zealand’s post-war 
3 US Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan, 12 August 1945, FRUS 1945 Vol. VI, 
609.
4 Statement by Edwin Pauley, 31 October 1945, FRUS 1945 Vol. VI, 997-998.
5 Powles to Fraser, 20 March 1946, Documents on New Zealand’s External Relations 
(hereafter DNZER) Vol. II, 347-349.
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security interests as they related to Japan with all the great powers. 
Berendsen was even appointed Chairman of the Steering Committee, 
an organisation that aimed to organise the Commission into various 
sub-committees and make recommendations about each aspect of the 
Occupation (including reparations, economic problems, legal reforms 
and war criminals). At this early stage, policymakers in New Zealand 
were likely unaware about the powerlessness of the Commission and 
these sub-organisations.
The Australians, in contrast, were not satisfied with a position on 
the Far Eastern Commission. Japanese attacks on Australian soil had 
spurred a strong sense of hatred towards Japan and its people. As both 
a punishment for wartime misdeeds and to prevent future Japanese 
aggression, the Australian people urged their leaders to demand a 
tough peace with Japan. Australian External Affairs Minister Herbert 
Evatt stated that Australia could not address these issues if it was not 
awarded a significant voice on Allied post-war policy towards Japan. 
More specifically, Evatt believed that the British government was at fault 
for not pressing upon the Americans that Canberra should be involved 
more closely in occupation plans because of its primary strategic interest 
in preventing a resurgence of Japanese militarism. Evatt simply did not 
think Britain fully understood Australian concerns about Japan. “Japan 
is an enemy who tried to destroy us”, Evatt told British Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee and Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin bluntly in May 1946.6
Canberra did secure one concession from the great powers. It 
was agreed in Moscow that a fourth member of the Allied Council 
would jointly represent Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India. 
Responding to Evatt’s claims to Attlee and Bevin, London conceded 
that Australia should be this Commonwealth representative. The 
Chifley Government appointed William Macmahon Ball as the British 
Commonwealth member of the Allied Council of Japan in January 
1946. With Ball’s appointment, Australia hoped it might influence 
Japanese policy, establish its status as a Pacific power and strengthen 
its claim to be “Britain’s representative” in the region. The Americans, 
however, were unwilling to offer Australia (or any other power) a 
chance to meaningfully influence the policymaking process for the 
6 Corner to McIntosh, 27 May 1946, in Unofficial Channels, 50.
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Japanese occupation. In short, the United States was not pleased with 
Ball’s appointment. Chairman of the Allied Council George Atcheson 
even complained that Ball’s early criticisms of occupation policy were 
“palpably designed to cause embarrassment” to the United States.7 
Indeed, Ball had immense difficulty in getting Australian views—
and, by extension, Commonwealth views—considered seriously by 
the Americans. When he proposed slight alterations to the policies in 
mid-July, Ball noted with frustration that “during most of the time I 
was talking Atcheson paid no attention but was turning over papers 
and talking with his State Department assistant.” When Ball finished, he 
complained to Evatt that Atcheson “looked up and said that he could not 
understand my line of argument and expressed disappointment that ‘no 
specific and concrete’ proposals had been made.” Ball concluded that the 
US intended to “bog” the Council with a series of routine administrative 
matters to limit its influence in shaping occupation policy.8
As the weeks progressed, Ball grew further frustrated at American 
attempts to sideline the Allied Council. “I am sure there is a quiet and 
effective campaign to minimise in Japanese eyes the influence and 
prestige of all Allied Powers but the American”, Ball complained again 
to Evatt on 23 July 1946. Because of this reality, Ball even recommended 
that the Allied Council be abolished. “If [the Council] is to be exclusively 
American”, Ball continued to Evatt, “I regard it advisable to remove the 
pretence of an Allied Council.”9 
Ball’s inability to get Commonwealth views considered in Japan 
began to cause serious repercussions for Anglo-Australian relations. As 
the Australian Government urged Britain to support Australian efforts 
to find appropriate resolutions on the Allied Council, London stressed 
that it simply had more pressing matters and needed US support 
elsewhere. As British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs Viscount 
Addison told Canberra,
7 Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy (New York: 
Continuum, 2002), 102.
8 Ball to Evatt, 12 July 1946, NAA, A1838, 482/1/7.
9 Ball to Evatt, 23 July 1946, NAA, A1838, 482/1/7. For a recent detailed examination 
of Ball’s time in Japan, see Ai Kobayashi, W. MacMahon Ball: Politics for the People 
(Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2013).
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Our collaboration with the Americans in other parts of the world (e.g. at 
this juncture in the Middle East and the forthcoming meeting of Foreign 
Ministers) is of such outstanding importance that we are not prepared to 
be committed in advance to a general policy of mediation in Japan. This 
might well fail to achieve its purpose in Japan and at the same time cause 
friction with the United States Government.10
In other words, even though Australia was tasked with representing 
British interests as well as Indian and New Zealand interests, Canberra 
was unable to find any support from London for its views on the Council 
in Japan. Annoyed that the Americans were ignoring every proposal 
he made, in July 1947 Ball resigned as the British Commonwealth 
Representative on the Allied Council. Even with Ball’s resignation, 
however, there was no fundamental change in the main elements of 
Australian foreign policy towards Japan.11
New Zealand came to share Australian concerns with the US 
disinclination to consult its allies in Japan. “There is resistance to any 
proposed course of action which will involve the slightest deviation 
from the line that has been adopted” by the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Forces in Japan Douglas MacArthur, Berendsen told McIntosh 
on 31 May. He added that “I cannot over-emphasise the degree of 
exasperation and frustration which this attitude presents to New 
Zealand and other members of the Far Eastern Commission.” Adding 
to Berendsen’s frustration was the evidence that his efforts to change 
this US dominance were unsuccessful. In late May, Berendsen candidly 
told Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission Frank McCoy about his 
“extreme dissatisfaction with the lack of progress” on the Commission 
but doubted whether even sharing this view “served any useful 
purpose.”12 As a result, Berendsen concluded that the Commission was 
“nothing but a joke.” The Commission was not “allowed to decide on 
any questions of policy at all”, Berendsen later told McIntosh, but rather 
10 Addison to Department of External Affairs, 16 April 1946, NAA, A3317, 1/46 Part 
2; Christopher Waters, The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s 
(Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1995).
11 De Matos, “Diplomacy Interrupted?”, 196.
12 Berendsen to McIntosh, 31 May 1946, DNZER Vol. II, 409-412; Berendsen to 
McIntosh, 2 April 1946, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 107; Berendsen to McIntosh, 4 June 
1946, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 110-111.
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it “follow[ed] behind [MacArthur] in every step, and merely applauded 
him.”
Berendsen was equally annoyed that Australia did not support New 
Zealand and instead opposed all its proposals. Even after speaking with 
Evatt and agreeing that Australia and New Zealand had similar concerns 
about the futility of the Commission, there was no subsequent trans-
Tasman cooperation on these issues. “On the Far Eastern Commission, 
[the Australians] seem to go out of their way to oppose our views”, he 
complained to McIntosh on 2 April 1946, citing protestations about the 
timing of Japanese elections and the proposed wording of the Japanese 
Constitution.13 Taking these concerns one step further, McIntosh 
thought that Australia aimed to be the Commonwealth representative 
for all matters relating to the American occupation and the Japanese 
peace settlement.
Revising Policies in Japan
By 1947, growing Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union and fears over 
the global threat of Communism forced Washington to reconsider its 
policies in Japan. The United States abandoned its twin demilitarisation 
and democratisation objectives and instead planned to rebuild Japan’s 
economy so that it might become a powerful American ally in Northeast 
Asia. In August 1947, the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) expert on Asian 
affairs John Davies told Kennan that they should propose to the National 
Security Council that the US encourage a “stable Japan, integrated into 
the Pacific economy, friendly to the US, and in case of need, a ready 
and dependable ally of the US.”14 As a result, the US began an intensive 
economic recovery program in Japan to revive the war-ravaged nation 
as a powerful American ally and ultimately push the balance of power 
further in America’s favour.
Among other US allies and partners, Australia was concerned by 
the US revision of Japanese occupation policies. As the future of Japan 
was vital to Australian security interests, any movement towards an 
economic recovery could put Australia at risk. At least as far as the 
13 Berendsen to McIntosh, 31 May 1946, DNZER Vol. II, 411-412.
14 Davies to Kennan, 11 August 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. VI, 485-486.
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Australian military were concerned, its own interests were best served 
by a continued American presence in Japan. Therefore, they believed 
the occupation should continue under the existing conditions. As the 
Australian Defence Committee concluded in June 1947, the “most 
important single strategic question affecting Australia’s security in the 
Pacific is the continuance of the present favourable balance of power 
in the Pacific brought about by the United States participation in the 
occupation of Japan.” The Australian military believed that US should 
continue the Allied occupation of Japan “until such time as Japan 
is considered unlikely to endanger the peaceful aims of the United 
Nations.” As part of this hope for a continued Allied occupation, it was 
also concluded that there should also be a continued “destruction of 
Japanese war potential.”15
In the External Affairs Department, Australian policymakers 
argued similarly that a change of policy afforded Tokyo the possibility 
of returning to its imperialistic ways and threatened the security of 
Australia. Even after his position somewhat softened after visiting Japan 
in late 1947, Evatt reported that
The first principle of our policy has always been the safety and security 
of the Pacific, including our own country […] Australia has called for the 
disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan, destruction of its capacity to 
wage war, and a sufficient degree of supervision under the peace treaty 
to prevent the regrowth of war-making capacity. The second principle 
has been the encouragement of democracy in Japan, which involves the 
gradual growth of the social, political and economic system.16
In other words, Evatt’s public position appeared to match closely 
America’s original post-war Japanese policy insofar as it urged complete 
disarmament and demilitarisation, but was reluctant to accept any 
immediate change to policies for Japan.
On top of Evatt’s outline of Australian policy for Japan, the Chifley 
Government also demanded that Japan award reparations to Canberra 
for its war waged against Australia during World War II. These demands 
became especially urgent considering potential revisions to US policy in 
15 Australian Defence Committee Minutes, 24 June 1947, NAA, A1838, 539/1/2.
16 Evatt Statement, 17 August 1947, Current Notes on International Affairs (hereafter 
CNIA) 1947 Vol. 28, 470.
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Japan that focused on economic development, as Australian diplomats 
feared that any delay might mean that Australia would not get fairly 
compensated. “The Australian Government feels that [the] total amount 
and distribution of reparations from Japan should be settled urgently”, a 
Department memorandum to New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser 
specified. The message warned that “it is possible that the United States 
may go ahead now and issue an interim directive on reparations” which 
might entail that there would be “no reparations at all from Japan.”17 
Australian pronouncements against an immediate revision to 
Japanese economic and reparation policies were causing considerable 
headaches for the United States. While the US began redrafting its 
Japanese occupation plans, US Political Adviser in Japan George 
Atcheson Jr. complained on 5 July 1947 to US Secretary of State George 
Marshall that Australia’s “distorted pronouncements and unwarranted 
criticisms have been so violent and so widely publicised” that they 
threatened US prestige in Japan and throughout the Far East. He also 
warned Marshall that “any appeasement of [the] Australians will 
without question seriously undermine American prestige in this part 
of the world.”18
Complicating problems further was Evatt himself, whose abrasive 
and demanding personality grated on the Americans. Under Secretary 
of State Robert Lovett was particularly scathing of Evatt, telling Truman 
in October about
[Evatt’s] aggressive, egocentric manner […] He has been accused 
of self-seeking, and it is not always clear whether he is motivated by 
true patriotism or simply by egotism. He has great self-confidence and 
determination, is anxious to have a finger in every pie, is slow in giving 
his confidence, and insists on receiving full credit for his achievements.19
While Lovett was indeed concerned by the way in which Evatt acted, 
there remained hope in the State Department that his egocentrism could 
benefit the United States if properly cultivated. This was especially true 
in relation to Evatt’s efforts to purposely champion the voices of smaller 
17 Australian Government to Fraser, 20 April 1948, NAA, A1838/2, 479/10 Part V.
18 Atcheson to Marshall, 5 July 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. VI, 531.
19 Lovett to Truman, 7 October 1947, President’s Secretary’s Files, Truman Papers, 
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (hereafter TL).
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powers in the United Nations rather than always support US policies. 
In the instances when Evatt’s views and American views aligned, the 
State Department later concluded that “Evatt’s egotism [should] be 
turned into constructive channels […] When we are satisfied that the 
Australians will follow our line of thinking he, as Australia’s spokesman, 
should be encouraged to take the initiative.”20
New Zealand had similar problems with Evatt, who all too often 
spoke on New Zealand’s behalf or ignored their point of view entirely. 
“If [Evatt] ever stops to think”, McIntosh once told one of his External 
Affairs Officers Frank Corner, he would sometimes “go out of his way to 
consider New Zealand’s viewpoints.” The problem was that Evatt’s list 
of concerns were “so large that he sometimes forgets our irons amongst 
the others he has in the fire”, McIntosh added, mixing his metaphors.21 
So far as the revision of Japanese policies was concerned, the Americans 
found New Zealand diplomats much easier to deal with than Evatt and 
the Australians. Although Wellington also feared that a soft peace treaty 
and an economic revival might reignite Japanese aggression, New 
Zealand policymakers realised that Evatt’s antics were doing little to 
advance their cause with the Americans. It would be better, so far as 
Wellington were concerned, to keep quiet on the issue.
At the time, there were few Australians with enough expertise 
in international affairs to mitigate the detrimental effect Evatt’s 
diplomatic style appeared to have on Australia’s allies. John Beasley 
and Norman Makin, Australian High Commissioner in London and 
Australian Ambassador in Washington respectively, were two notable 
exceptions and they helped to decrease the tensions that arose when 
Australia’s allies grew increasingly frustrated with Evatt, at least in part. 
The former, Beasley, was a rather softly-spoken and shy person who 
arrived in London in August 1946. He did, however, argue assertively 
for Australia’s right to be consulted on international issues and took 
a strongly anti-Communist stance on most matters pertaining to 
the Soviet Union, a position that neatly aligned with British Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin’s views on the global communist threat. At times 
when the British Foreign Office saw Evatt’s behaviour as “sinister” and 
20 Policy Statement of the Department of State, 18 August 1948, NARA, RG 59, 
711.47/8-1848.
21 McIntosh to Corner, 14 June 1946, in Unofficial Channels, 58.
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“nonsensical”, Beasley was often able to smooth over these differences 
and provided a channel for continued discussions about critical matters 
affecting Anglo-American relations such as Commonwealth policy in 
Japan and later discussions about joint defence arrangements.22 He could 
not offset every clash Evatt had with Bevin and other policymakers in 
London, nor could he always consistently articulate Australian views 
relating to the United Nations or post-war international order due to 
Evatt’s predisposition for ad hoc and non-consultative policymaking. 
That said, Beasley navigated his position quite well during a difficult 
period in world affairs, in which individuals such as Evatt complicated 
the efficacy of Anglo-Australian relations in dealing with matters of 
mutual strategic interest.
Across the Atlantic, Makin was another simple but more direct 
type of diplomat. Historian Frank Bongiorno described the British-
Australian as a “small, bespectacled and tidy man that was a Labor-type 
more common in Britain than in Australia […] an earnest, abstaining, 
self-improving Methodist layman.”23 Before moving to Washington, 
Makin earned his diplomatic stripes through representing Australia 
in London at the UN General Assembly and the first meeting of the 
UN Security Council in 1946. While some historians and politicians 
have suggested Makin did not make the most of his opportunity to 
improve Australian-American relations in the late 1940s and early 
1950s (Makin, for instance, abstained from drinking alcohol and found 
social gatherings with diplomats in Washington a rather frivolous and 
tiresome affair), he earned praise from his colleagues by providing a 
much friendlier and more courteous face to US policymakers than Evatt 
did. Paul Hasluck, the Australian counsellor in charge of the Australian 
mission to the UN and acting representative on the Atomic Energy 
Commission, described Makin as someone with “unfailing courtesy 
22 Frank Bongiorno, “John Beasley and the Postwar World”, in Carl Bridge, Frank 
Biongiorno and David Lee eds., The High Commissioners: Australia’s Representatives 
in the United Kingdom, 1910-2010 (Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 2010), 124, https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-
documents/Documents/high-commissioners.pdf 
23 Frank Bongiorno, “Norman Makin and Post-War Diplomacy, 1946-1951”, in David 
Lower, David Lee and Carl Bridge eds., Australia Goes to Washington: 75 Years of 
Australian Representation in the United States, 1940-2015 (Canberra: ANU Press, 
2016), 39, https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/australia-goes-washington 
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and dignity.”24 These character traits were precious commodities in the 
Department of External Affairs while Evatt was still serving as Minister. 
By most accounts, Makin was well-liked in Washington despite having 
to try to defuse tense situations between the United States and Australia 
on policy issues such as the Japanese occupation.
Despite their knack for mitigating some of the difficulties that 
Evatt created in Australia’s external relations, neither Beasley nor 
Makin could exercise enough influence in their respective posts to 
convince policymakers in Washington and London of the necessity for 
a continued hard-line policy on Japan. Reaching a common position 
about this became urgent after the United States issued invitations to the 
eleven countries on the Far Eastern Commission to attend preliminary 
talks for the Japanese settlement in July 1947. In an effort to find some 
degree of policy agreement between Australia, New Zealand and other 
Commonwealth countries in the face of revised US Japanese occupation 
policies, a Commonwealth Conference was held in Canberra from 26 
August to 2 September 1947. Although Australian policymakers had 
been very vocal in their support for long-term demilitarisation and 
democratisation policies in Japan, it was agreed that a peace treaty 
could be finalised so long as Japan remained demilitarised. It was also 
agreed that there should be strict controls over Japanese imports and 
exports and that there should be some form of supervisory commission 
established to implement the terms of the treaty.25 In other words, the 
Commonwealth delegates hoped for a virtual continuation of strict 
early occupation-era controls.
24 Ibid., 45.
25 Department of External Affairs to Mission in Tokyo, 8 September 1947, NAA, 
A1068, P47/10/61 Part IV. For an agenda list of the Commonwealth Conference, see 
Preliminary Notes on Provisional Agenda by Evatt, August 1947, DAFP 1947 Vol. 
XII, 578-591. 
Overall, the communiqué that was issued after the Conference 
urged support for an early yet hard-line demilitarised peace treaty for 
Japan. In Wellington, the agreements reached at the Conference were 
“commended” by the New Zealand External Affairs Department. 
A report by the External Affairs Committee on the Japanese Peace 
Settlement concluded that as far as a potential peace treaty was 
concerned, Japan “must be completely disarmed and demilitarised 
for an indefinite period.” The report also concluded that “post-treaty 
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Figure 3. Delegates to the British Commonwealth Conference on the Japanese Peace 
Treaty in Canberra, August 1947. Back row, left to right: R.T. Pollard (Australia), Sir 
Raghanath Paranjpye (India), U. Shwe Baw, Thakin Lun Baw (Burma); Middle row, left 
to right: J.J. Dedman (Australia), J.G. Barclay (NZ), Hector McNeill (UK), E.J. Williams 
(UK), Sir B. Rama Rau (India), M.M. Rafi (Pakistan), K.A. Greene (Canada); Front row, left 
to right: Peter Fraser (NZ), Lord Addison (UK), J.B. Chifley, H.V. Evatt (Australia), Brooke 
Claxton (Canada), H.G. Lawrence (South Africa). Photo by unknown (1947), Flickr,  
https://www.flickr.com/photos/archivesnz/28950147372, CC BY 2.0.
economic controls will be required” so that a peace conference could 
be held at an early date.26 In other words, if an early peace settlement 
was reached, New Zealand made it clear that it favoured a hard-line 
settlement with Japan. 
This sentiment was shared in Australia. As Evatt said to US Secretary 
of State George Marshall after the Conference, if the Commonwealth 
was to support a peace treaty, special provisions must be made to 
ensure that Japan could not access “certain industries with obvious 
war potential” such as steel and iron ore.27 External Affairs Advisor to 
the Australian Delegation at the Commonwealth Conference Frederic 
26 Report by the External Affairs Committee on the Japanese Peace Settlement, 20 
November 1947, DNZER Vol. III, 195-107.
27 Evatt to Marshall, 2 September 1947, NAA, A1838, 538/1 Part II.
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Eggleston went one step further, arguing that the Conference did 
not properly demonstrate how important it was for Australia that 
Japan remained demilitarised if it was to agree to any Japanese peace 
settlement. “Conferences of this kind do not approach the crucial 
issues”, he told Assistant Secretary of External Affairs Alan Watt in 
September, “to agree on negatives is a waste of time.”28 
Eggleston warned Evatt directly against reaching a speedy settlement 
in Japan and doubted the possibility of the country becoming truly 
democratic. “I feel somewhat disturbed at the views which appeared to 
predominate at the British Commonwealth Conference”, he told Evatt, 
adding that “there seems to be a feeling that nothing could be done 
except to demilitarise [Japan] and that the democratisation of Japan was 
desirable, but the Allies could not impose it and it was futile to try.” 
According to Eggleston, 
If these views prevail, a position of instability will develop in the Pacific 
which will be very disappointing to the Australian people. Japan will 
be free to resume her superiority in East Asia and will then be available 
to move with all her economic and strategic power into the orbit of the 
highest bidder […] under these circumstances, I strongly urge that we 
ask for a prolonged occupation or control of Japan.29
Evatt had no serious problems with Eggleston’s claims about the 
risks associated with a militarised Japan. The crucial issue, especially 
in Australia, was Japanese remilitarisation. At the time, Australia and 
the Commonwealth was only open to a peace settlement if Japan’s 
war potential was completely denied or strictly controlled. Evatt, 
assuming that no movement had yet been made towards remilitarising 
Japan, told US Secretary of State George Marshall and MacArthur that 
the Commonwealth agreed with US policy in Japan and supported 
movement towards a peace settlement. However, the State Department 
was in the middle of reconsidering the idea of a demilitarised Japan. 
In September 1947, the Policy Planning Staff drafted a top-secret paper 
titled “US Policy Toward a Peace Settlement with Japan” which outlined 
that “a major shift in US policy toward Japan [was] being talked about 
under cover.” The paper suggested that the “idea of eliminating Japan 
28 Eggleston to Watt, 3 September 1947, DAFP 1947 Vol. XII, 613-615.
29 Eggleston to Evatt, 1 October 1947, DAFP 1947 Vol. XII, 617-621.
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as a military power for all time [was] changing” and that a peace treaty 
“would have to allow for this changed attitude.”30 This drastic alteration 
in US policy would have serious ramifications for the movement 
towards a peace settlement, as Australia and New Zealand vehemently 
opposed the idea of post-occupied Japan having its own military power 
without assurances from the United States that their countries would 
be protected. This critical issue between Australia, New Zealand and 
the United States subsequently formed one basis for future treaty 
negotiations.
Under these policy changes, Australia would still not be afforded 
the opportunity to influence the decision-making process. The United 
States, in short, remained intent on dominating the Japanese occupation 
without seriously consulting with its allies in the Pacific. Even while it 
was highly desirable to procure Australian support for its policies in 
Japan, the State Department advised that the United States should do 
little more than explain the reasons for these new policies to its allies 
rather than involve them in the decision-making process. “Whenever 
possible”, the State Department suggested on 18 August 1948, 
“announcements of new policy decisions should be preceded by [a] 
frank explanation of our motives to the Australians both here and in 
Canberra” in order to avoid any measures being “misunderstood by 
the Australian Government.” Since the Australian public took a “lively 
interest” in Japan, the Department advised that “every effort should be 
made to brief Australian correspondents both [in Washington] and in 
Japan on reasons for SCAP policies.”31 
Similarly, the State Department recognised that efforts should also 
be made to explain American policies to New Zealand diplomats and 
journalists. As a State Department policy statement claimed on 24 
September 1948, “New Zealand shares Australia’s certain dissatisfaction 
with present relations between the Far Eastern Commission and SCAP 
and has been critical of many of General MacArthur’s policies.” The 
United States, in turn, should “be careful to prepare the ground through 
diplomatic channels before new measures are adopted in Japan” and 
“unheralded interim directives by SCAP should be avoided wherever 
30 Kennan Memorandum, 14 October 1947, FRUS 1947 Vol. VI, 536-537.
31 Policy Statement of the Department of State, 18 August 1948, NARA, RG 59, 
711.47/8-1848.
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possible.”32 Again, these conclusions concisely demonstrated US 
disinclination to consult with Australia and New Zealand in Japan. US 
policymakers aimed to explain American policies as clearly as possible 
to Australian and New Zealand policymakers after decisions were 
made in Washington and Tokyo, yet these diplomats would not be 
accommodated a place in the decision-making process.
ANZAM and the Bomb
As discussions over the Japanese occupation and a potential peace 
treaty progressed, Australia hoped to secure a regional defence pact 
with the United States to safeguard against the possibility that it 
might be attacked by Japan or elsewhere. “What [Australia] needs is 
an appropriate regional instrumentality in Southeast Asia and the 
Western Pacific”, Evatt announced in Parliament on 26 February 1947 
as part of his endeavours to conclude a regional pact with the United 
States over the settlement of Manus Island. He also suggested Australia 
needed access to US military planning so that it might better prepare 
for its own defence in the event of another world war. “The proposed 
regional instrumentality”, Evatt announced, “will at least facilitate 
the free and rapid exchange of basic information […] and plans for 
regional cooperation.”33 The United States, however, was unwilling 
to consider a formal pact during negotiations over Manus Island and 
refused to share military information. As a result, Australia’s attention 
turned to coordinating defence planning more closely with Britain. This 
manifested itself in two ways: the formation of ANZAM and the Anglo-
Australian Joint Rocket Project.34
Britain’s dire post-war economic situation forced London to look 
for allied assistance in regions that were not in its primary interests. 
Against this backdrop, it became wholly practical for Britain to work 
more closely with Australia and New Zealand in the defence of bases in 
32 Policy Statement of the Department of State, 24 September 1948, NARA, RG 59, 
711.47H/9-2448.
33 Evatt Statement, 26 February 1947, Commonwealth of Australia House of 
Representatives Debates, no. 9 1947, 166.
34 ANZAM refers to the Australian, New Zealand and British arrangement for the 
joint defence of Malaya and Commonwealth interests in Southeast Asia.
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Southeast Asia. In the Pacific, Britain’s major post-war concerns centred 
on Hong Kong, Singapore and security issues resulting from Communist 
insurgencies in Malaya. The Foreign Office and British Chiefs of Staff 
realised that in the event of a global war the defence of the Far East and 
Southeast Asia would be a low priority. That being the case, London 
was open to the possibility of coordinating strategic planning more 
closely with Australia and New Zealand. As Communistt activity in 
Southeast Asia became one of the most immediate post-war threats to 
Australia and New Zealand, both Canberra and Wellington welcomed 
closer strategic coordination with Britain. Australian, New Zealand and 
British security interests in Southeast Asia coincided and the informal 
agreement known as ANZAM was established.
On 1 April 1947, the Australian Defence Committee considered 
reports from the Joint Planning Committee about plans for cooperation 
with Britain for Commonwealth Defence in Southeast Asia. These reports 
were based on discussions about a Joint Australian-New Zealand-British 
Liaison Staff to deal with mutual defence problems, which took place 
during the Prime Ministers’ Conference in May 1946. The Australian 
Defence Committee report suggested that the Australian government 
should undertake greater responsibility in strategic planning relating to 
regional security matters in the Pacific. Such planning would have to be 
derived, the Committee concluded, from a broader worldwide strategic 
plan in which the British Commonwealth would participate.35 One 
month later, a memorandum on “Commonwealth Defence Cooperation” 
was produced on 23 May that outlined the larger contribution Australia 
was prepared to make to Commonwealth defence in the Pacific in 
coordination with Britain. The report advised that a Joint Defence 
Committee with British and New Zealand representatives would be 
established to achieve this goal.36 This Committee also formed the basis 
for trilateral discussions relating to the activities of Commonwealth 
forces stationed in Occupied Japan.
Five days later, Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley sent a letter to 
British Prime Minister Clement Attlee that explained his government’s 
plans for this Committee. At a meeting chaired by Attlee in June, the 
35 Defence Committee Memorandum, 1 April 1947, NAA, A2031, 119/1947.
36 Memorandum by the Australian Defence Committee, 23 May 1947, NAA, A5954, 
1850/1.
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British agreed to appoint three lower-rank representatives of their 
Chiefs of Staff to attend Australian Defence Committee meetings. 
Attlee then replied formally to Chifley’s offer on 17 August, welcoming 
Australia’s willingness to chair defence council meetings and take 
primary responsibility for strategic planning in Malaya.37
After Britain indicated it was agreeable to the Australian proposal, 
Chifley contacted Wellington in October to enquire whether New 
Zealand would also accept its joint strategic plan. New Zealand 
Prime Minister Peter Fraser responded on 13 November, saying 
that his government was also agreeable to Australia’s proposals for 
cooperation in British Commonwealth Defence. “I have no doubt that 
the arrangements will prove satisfactory”, Fraser noted after he told 
Chifley that New Zealand was appointing Chief of Staff Colonel Duff 
as the NZ Joint Service Representative.38 With Britain and New Zealand 
accepting Australian plans, the revised system of defence cooperation 
for Malaya and Southeast Asia (which was later termed the ANZAM 
area) began on 1 January 1948.
Once joint planning began in 1948, the Australians raised the 
perennial question of the relationship between Commonwealth planning 
and American planning. Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley argued 
that Australia needed concrete information from the British Chiefs of 
Staff about US plans in the Pacific. Australia would need to know, as a 
minimum, about American plans for the Pacific in relation to Australian 
security, the southern boundaries of the US zone of responsibility and 
the extent to which any assistance might be required from Australia 
in the Pacific. The British joint planners appreciated Australian 
concerns, but also realised that sharing American information involved 
confidentiality issues. 
British reluctance to share American military information stemmed 
from issues arising during the Anglo-Australian Rocket Project, in 
which Australia hosted and assisted British efforts to acquire its own 
nuclear arsenal. Australia was eager to take part in a British-led nuclear 
weapons project. As an Australian Defence Appreciation Report 
37 Chifley to Attlee, 28 May 1947, DAFP 1947 Vol. XII, 322-324; McIntyre, Background 
to the ANZUS Pact, 213.
38 Fraser to Chifley, 13 November 1947, Archives NZ, EA, 156/10/2 Part 2.
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concluded, “the advent of the atomic bomb […] may revolutionise 
the organisation, equipment and employment of armed forces.”39 
With these benefits in mind, Chifley accepted the British plan for a 
joint rocket project and began working on the project in mid-1947. 
The Australian Defence Committee even began contemplating a 
proposal for an Australian atomic stockpile. Defence officials argued 
that Australia should develop “atomic energy from the viewpoint 
of Defence.” Australian atomic energy development would also 
have advantages for “industrialisation, scientific and technological 
development.”40
While New Zealand tended to be an ardent supporter of British 
foreign and defence policy, New Zealand External Affairs Department 
officials were particularly apprehensive about the joint rocket project 
and the proliferation of atomic weapons. At the same time Chifley and 
Evatt were negotiating with Britain over this possible joint project, 
New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Carl Berendsen expressed 
to New Zealand External Affairs Secretary McIntosh that he “heartily 
dislike[d] the look of the world” which was especially grim because 
of America’s recent discovery of the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb’s 
“completely destructive power”, Berendsen said, “just completes my 
cup of doom.” “[The bomb] will certainly be discovered very quickly 
by others” including Britain, Berendsen added, and he “did not see 
anything to be gained, and perhaps a good deal to be lost, by such a 
course.” McIntosh shared Berendsen’s concerns and was fearful of 
Attlee’s determined pursuit of the bomb. “This damned atomic bomb is 
certainly the worst thing that has ever happened”, he wrote in reply to 
Berendsen, suggesting almost jokingly that Attlee’s talks with Truman 
and the Australians were about “nice and friendly […] ways and means 
of devising bigger and better slaughters by atomic methods in the 
future.”41 
39 Appreciation for the Strategical Position of Australia, February 1946, NAA, A5954/1, 
1664/4.
40 Report by New Weapons and Equipment Development Committee, 7 May 1948, 
in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, 1945-1974, Wayne Reynolds and David Lee ed. (Canberra: Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013), 10-11, https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/
publications/historical-documents/Documents/australia-and-the-nuclear-non-
proliferation-treaty.pdf 
41 Berendsen to McIntosh, 1 October 1945, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 100; McIntosh to 
Berendsen, 1 November 1945, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 103.
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The State Department and Pentagon were also anxious about closer 
Anglo-Australian defence relations, especially when they involved the 
production of atomic weapons outside of American control. Recent US 
relations with Australia were chilly, not least because of Evatt’s abrasive 
diplomatic style and his demands for closer US-Australian cooperation 
and exchange of military information. Relations with respect to the joint 
rocket project took a further hit once the Australian media found out 
about present and planned military projects through a series of leaks to 
the press. Australian Defence Minister John Dedman was particularly 
fearful as to what these leaks would mean for Australia’s relations with 
the United States and Britain. The leaks will “increase the distrust in the 
safeguarding of secret information in Australia, and may have a serious 
effect on the readiness of the United Kingdom and the United States 
to furnish information to Australia”, Dedman told a fellow minister.42 
His fear soon materialised after the US, which became convinced these 
leaks confirmed Australia could not be trusted with its own military 
secrets, banned Australia from receiving classified information from the 
United States. Although its motives were not entirely clear, the Central 
Intelligence Agency concluded that there was an “unsatisfactory 
security situation” in Australia and demoted the country to a “Category 
E” recipient of US military information. This was the lowest category 
among all nations with diplomatic representation in Washington.
The US ban on classified information to Australia was an 
embarrassment for the Chifley government, which had argued both 
publicly and privately in Washington that Australia and the United 
States shared a lot of common ground and that both countries should 
work together in tackling mutual threats in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Australian Ambassador to the United States Norman Makin speculated 
that it “placed [Australia] on a basis little better than the USSR.” 
Although Makin was briefed on 3 July 1948 that the ban was temporary, 
he was concerned that there was no certainty when the United States 
might reverse this decision. “In [the] United States”, Makin told Chifley 
apprehensively, “‘temporary’ arrangements frequently extend over an 
indefinite period.” In any case, Makin was certain that the ban would 
42 Peter Morton, Fire across the Desert: Woomera and the Anglo-Australian Joint Project, 
1946-1980 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989), 104.
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“seriously hinder” the joint rocket project and Australia’s relationship 
with the United States.43
Determined to upgrade Australia’s reliability in the eyes of the 
Americans, Chifley realised that although Australia wanted to play a 
greater role in world affairs, it could not do so effectively unless this 
ban was reversed. “Australia should assume a large share of defence 
responsibilities”, according to Chifley, especially because Australia’s 
defence expenditures were large in comparison to its small population. 
His Defence Secretary, Frederick Shedden, reiterated this point later to 
the State Department, pointing to the difficulties that occurred during 
the launch of the joint UK-Australian rocket projects because of a ban 
on classified information. “In addition to the difficulties in connection 
with the rocket range project, defence planning in the Pacific was being 
hampered by the lack of exchange of information”, Shedden remarked. 
So far as he was concerned, all Australia needed to fix these difficulties 
was “information which would enable her to shape her plans for 
Australia’s role in Pacific defence” that the State Department and US 
Department of Defense was refusing to pass over.44 
The US position on the exchange of military information with 
Australia highlighted its overall reluctance to treat Australia as an equal 
and trustworthy partner. Australia did not even receive information on 
US atomic projects first hand. Evatt, after telling the State Department 
in February 1949 that it was his “understanding that information on 
rocket projects at the present time passed through a third country” 
(presumably Britain), argued that this arrangement was unsatisfactory 
and hoped that the “mutually beneficial cooperation between the 
two countries which had obtained during the recent war might be 
continued.”45 Even after these protestations, State Department officials 
43 Makin to Chifley, 3 July 1948, NAA, A3300, 750.
44 Memorandum of Conversation, 20 April 1949, Secretary of State File, Acheson 
Papers, TL, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/
achesonmemos/view.php?documentVersion=both&documentid=65-3_34&docume
ntYear=1949&pagenumber=1 
45 Memorandum of Conversation, 17 February 1949, Secretary of State File, Acheson 
Papers, TL, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/
achesonmemos/view.php?documentVersion=both&documentid=65-01_54&docum
entYear=1949&pagenumber=1 
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did little to re-evaluate US security ties with Australia, preferring 
instead to pass information through other countries which was then 
relayed to Canberra. The United States simply did not trust Australia 
with classified military information. 
By early 1949, there was little agreement between Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States on mutual post-war security issues. 
Australia and New Zealand bitterly opposed efforts to soften Japanese 
occupation policies. These countries also pursued closer strategic 
cooperation with Britain in Southeast Asia, an effort that undercut US 
primacy in the region. Further distrust between the three countries 
manifested during the Anglo-Australian rocket project. New Zealand 
was seriously concerned by potential Anglo-Australian access to 
nuclear weapons and the United States simply refused to share military 
information with Australia once secrets about the project was leaked in 
the Australian media. How, then, did these countries manage to agree 
on forming an alliance less than two years after Washington demoted 
Canberra to the lowest category recipient of US military information? 
The following chapter explores the unique international and domestic 
circumstances that facilitated speedy movement toward the ANZUS 
Treaty.

3. Movement Toward an Alliance
The early years of the post-war Australian-New Zealand-American 
relationship were often frostier than cordial. Yet, after several rapid 
international changes during 1949 and 1950—such as the Soviet Blockade 
of Berlin and its first successful test of an atomic bomb; Mao’s Zedong 
Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War; and the outbreak of the Korean 
War—Australian, New Zealand and American interests began to coincide 
more closely. Against this backdrop the United States began seriously 
to consider the idea of a defence pact with Australia and New Zealand, 
an idea first proposed by Australian diplomats. Under a new Australian 
External Affairs Minister, Percy Spender, Canberra pushed for a binding 
commitment with the United States. Spender’s New Zealand counterpart 
Frederick Doidge initially thought along similar lines, although this was 
a minority view in Wellington. Most other New Zealand diplomats and 
military officers did not want a formal commitment with the United 
States. Across the Pacific, policymakers in Washington refused to consider 
the idea of a Pacific Pact until the outbreak of the Korean War, which 
made obtaining Australian and New Zealand support for a speedy peace 
settlement in Japan highly valuable, and the State Department reasoned 
that concluding a defence pact with the Australia and New Zealand was a 
practical trade-off.
Under the Ben Chifley Government (1945-1949), one of Australia’s 
primary foreign policy objectives was to secure a formal defence pact 
with the United States. This plan was spearheaded by Australian External 
Affairs Minister Herbert Evatt. A regional defence scheme had always been 
Evatt’s “pet plan”, as John Minter, the US Chargé in Canberra, commented 
as far back as 1946. He wanted to “keep the United States and Australia 
in the closest association”, Minter noted, adding that Evatt proposed a 
© 2018 Andrew Kelly, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0141.03
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regional pact not once but “many times.”1 Across the Tasman, New 
Zealand policymakers did not share Evatt’s views on a formal defence 
arrangement with the United States. On 6 July 1948, New Zealand 
Prime Minister Peter Fraser thought that a regional pact would only 
“effectively contribute to our security” if Britain was a member. A 
pact would only develop “if the need arose” for New Zealand, Fraser 
announced in January 1949. In his view, that need “had not yet arisen.”2
In any case, the State Department was unconvinced by Australian 
arguments for any kind of regional defence scheme. In a bid both to 
reassure Western Europe that the US remained committed to NATO 
and to deter unwanted pressure for a pact in the Asia-Pacific region, 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson dismissed a NATO-type pact in the 
Pacific. “While [NATO] does not mean any lessening of our interest in the 
security of other areas”, Acheson announced at a press conference on 18 
May 1949, “the United States is not currently considering participation 
in any further special collective defence arrangements.” In his view, 
NATO was the product of a “solid foundation” of defence collaboration 
with Western Europe, whereas no such foundation existed in Asia and 
the Pacific. Yet beyond any foundation for a defence partnership in the 
region, Acheson feared that if the United States committed to a defence 
treaty in Asia and the Pacific it might overextend US forces into areas 
that were not primary interests (such as the long-simmering conflicts in 
Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia). “A Pacific Pact could not take shape 
until present internal conflicts in Asia were resolved”, Acheson said. He 
simply thought that “the time was not ripe for a pact.”3
The time for a regional defence arrangement with Australia and New 
Zealand might not have seemed “ripe” for Acheson in May, but by late 
1949 to mid-1950, several events drastically changed the situation for the 
three countries in Asia and the Pacific. The declarations of Indonesian 
and Vietnamese independence from Dutch and French colonial control 
presented two uncertain security challenges to Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States in Southeast Asia. However, the most concerning 
development in Asia was the establishment of a Communist government 
1 Minter to Byrnes, 9 April 1946, FRUS 1946 Vol. V, 28.
2 Fraser to Duff, 6 July 1948, DNZER Vol. III, 477-478; Fraser Memorandum, 11 
January 1949, Archives NZ, EA, 10/4/7.
3 Cablegram to Canberra, 18 May 1949, NAA, A1838, 383/1/2/8, Part I.
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in Beijing. After a protracted civil war between the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), PRC Chairman Mao 
Zedong announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
on 1 October 1949. The defeated Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek, 
fled to the island of Taiwan (also known as Formosa). As Cold War 
tensions continued to rise between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the emergence of a major Communist government in Northeast 
Asia was an uncertain and disruptive situation that challenged the West. 
Mao’s victory especially provoked extensive debate in Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States over whether to continue supporting 
Chiang’s government, or instead recognise the PRC by opening 
diplomatic relations in Beijing and supporting its claim to hold China’s 
seat in the United Nations. On the one hand, the ROC appeared fragile 
and corrupt, and struggled to justify its claim to represent all of China 
while its government only controlled the island of Taiwan. On the other 
hand, Western governments feared that awarding recognition to the 
PRC would strengthen the Soviet bloc and encourage further aggression 
from mainland China.
Figure 4. Chairman Mao Zedong proclaiming the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), 1 October 1949. Photo by Hou Bo (1949), Wikimedia,  
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PRCFounding.jpg, public domain.
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For the United States, peaceful co-existence with the PRC and eventual 
formal recognition of its status as China’s governing party remained a 
possibility due to a lingering hope that Mao might avoid aligning China 
with the Soviet Union. However, in the immediate aftermath of Mao’s 
announcement, the State Department shaped its policies toward the 
PRC on the premise that mainland China was entrenched firmly in the 
Soviet bloc and should not yet be awarded recognition. In an address 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 12 October, Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson stated that the “Chinese Government is really a 
tool of Russian Imperialism in China. That gives us our fundamental 
starting point in regards to our relations with China.”4
Australia and New Zealand held their own bilateral talks over whether 
to recognise the PRC in November 1949. During these discussions, New 
Zealand Secretary of External Affairs McIntosh noted with frustration 
that the trans-Tasman talks appeared aimed only to increase Australia’s 
international prestige and to encourage New Zealand to support 
Australian views on China. “It was a typical Australian show”, McIntosh 
wrote to Berendsen on 18 November, “the object was publicity for Evatt, 
External Affairs and Australia in that order.” According to McIntosh, 
Australian Secretary of External Affairs John Burton organised the talks 
as a “publicity stunt.” Burton, convinced recognition was “necessary 
and inevitable”, continually pressed McIntosh and the New Zealanders 
about supporting the Australian position.5
Indeed, the Australians appeared entirely ready and willing to 
abandon the Nationalists and instead recognise Mao’s government on 
mainland China. Even before the Australian-New Zealand talks began 
in November, Canberra recalled its diplomatic mission in Nanking. 
Some of the Australian staff returned to Canberra, while other staff 
members established a temporary post in Hong Kong that could be 
quickly moved to Beijing once recognition was granted. “Personally”, 
Australian External Affairs Minister Evatt wrote to British Foreign 
Minister Ernest Bevin only three days after Mao’s announcement, “I 
do not see why [mainland China] should not be recognised.” In Evatt’s 
view, Australia and the rest of the Commonwealth could take the lead 
4 Supplemental Notes on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 October 1949, 
Harry Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 140, TL.
5 McIntosh to Berendsen, 18 November 1949, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 186-187.
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in recognising Beijing. He told Bevin that Mao’s government could be 
recognised as the legitimate government of mainland China, whereas 
the Nationalists could similarly retain recognition of their government 
in Taiwan.6 For New Zealand, McIntosh did not think that the Tasman 
countries should take the lead in recognising the PRC. He did, however, 
think that there might be substantial benefits of recognition. He thought 
that doing so would prevent the PRC from acting aggressively and 
counter Russian influence in China. Moreover, if for no other reason, 
McIntosh concluded that on legal grounds the PRC should be awarded 
recognition because it already controlled mainland China.
Irrespective of these early views, Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States all opposed recognising the PRC even after Britain did 
so in early 1950. In both Australia and New Zealand, responding to the 
threat of Communism in China and elsewhere was a hotly debated topic 
and became a pertinent election issue. In New Zealand, after fourteen 
years in power, the Labour government was defeated at the polls in 
November 1949. Sidney Holland led the newly-formed conservative 
National government, with Frederick Doidge as his External Affairs 
Minister. Holland turned out to “dominate the NZ Cabinet”, as “one 
man or two men” often do, Berendsen complained. Yet, in contrast to 
his predecessor Peter Fraser, Holland had “almost no interest in foreign 
affairs.”7 Revealingly he took the Finance rather than the External 
Affairs portfolio in addition to the prime ministership, and when he did 
intervene in foreign affairs, he “frequently made gaffes.”
6 Evatt to Bevin, 4 October 1949, NAA, A1838/278, 494/2/10 Part I.
7 Berendsen to McIntosh, 28 March 1950, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 222; McKinnon, 
Independence and Foreign Policy, 114.
The new External Affairs Minister, Frederick Doidge, was better 
equipped to handle New Zealand’s foreign relations than was Holland. 
In contrast to the long-standing convictions of many in New Zealand that 
a US guarantee for New Zealand’s security was undesirable, Doidge, at 
least in the early stages of his time as External Affairs Minister, was 
one of the strongest advocates for a Pacific Pact with the United States. 
Doidge was “very pact-minded” and was convinced that the United 
States had to be a signatory to any regional arrangement. In January 
1950 Doidge raised the idea of a pact at the Colombo Conference, 
an international meeting held in Sri Lanka to discuss how the living 
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Figure 5. New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland (1949-1957), 1951. Photo taken by 
Crown Studies of Wellington (1951), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Sidney_George_Holland_(1951).jpg, public domain.
standards of people in the Asia-Pacific region could be improved. At 
the conference, he suggested that a pact would be useless without the 
inclusion of the United States, Canada and India. According to Doidge, 
the security of Australia and New Zealand could not be ensured without 
the United States to “wall in the tide of Communism.”8 
In Australia, the Liberal Country Coalition led by Robert Menzies 
won the 1949 election. Menzies’s victory ended Evatt’s term as External 
Affairs Minister. He was replaced by Percy Spender, a move that 
signalled a new era of Australia’s external relations with the United 
States. The new Menzies Government recognised that Australian 
security interests in the region rested squarely with the US, and as part 
8 Doidge to Berendsen, 9 May 1950, DNZER Vol. III, 546; Doidge Statement, 9 May 
1950, DNZER, Vol. III, 547.
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of this assessment, External Affairs Minister Percy Spender continued 
Australia’s push for a formal defence pact. US policymakers certainly 
recognised early on that Spender was determined to secure a closer 
relationship. After “differences of opinion rising from dissimilar views 
of the Japanese occupation policy […] and by the difficult personality 
of Evatt”, the State Department concluded, “Spender is desirous of 
establishing the closest and most cooperative relations with the United 
States and has in effect made this a cardinal point in his foreign policy.”9
Figure 6. Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1939-1941, 1949-1966), 1950. Photo by 
unknown (1950), National Library of Australia, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3307904, 
copyright expired.
The Holland Government clearly recognised that a close relationship 
with the United States was important to New Zealand, yet policymakers 
in Wellington still described the relationship as less fundamental to its 
security interests in the Pacific compared to their Australian counterparts. 
While the American-Australian relationship was described as a “cardinal 
point” of Australian foreign policy by the State Department, Counselor 
of the New Zealand Embassy in Washington George Laking told US 
9 Department of State Policy Statement, 21 April 1950, NARA, RG 59, 611.43/4-2150.
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Assistant Secretary of State William Butterworth that it was simply 
“very sensible” for New Zealand to have a “close association between 
the United States [and] New Zealand.”10
As for Spender, New Zealand responses to his appointment and 
its impact on trans-Tasman relations were mixed. Berendsen was 
concerned that Spender might be a mere successor to Australia’s 
“irresponsible” and “hoodlum” behaviour in international affairs that 
he witnessed with Evatt. When it came to Spender, he was afraid that, 
like most Australians, either by nature or by upbringing, they seemed to 
him to be “impossible people.”11 McIntosh and Doidge were even less 
complimentary about Australia’s new External Affairs Minister, fearing 
that he would be just as difficult as Evatt. Spender was an “absolute little 
tick”, McIntosh told Berendsen, complaining that he was just as “great 
an exhibitionist as Evatt” and that “Doidge took an instant dislike to 
him.” Spender and Doidge’s relationship—and, consequently, Australia 
and New Zealand’s relationship—did not improve in the immediate 
future. Less than four months later, McIntosh noted that not only do 
Spender and Doidge “not get on”, but that there is “no common link” 
between the Australian and New Zealand Cabinet.
This lack of a common link between the Australian and New 
Zealand Cabinets stemmed in part from Spender’s relentless pursuit 
of a regional defence arrangement with the United States as well as 
his ambitious Colombo Plan (a multinational initiative to assist in the 
economic recovery of South and Southeast Asia), which he introduced 
at the Colombo Conference in January 1950. He might not have been 
the ideal man to improve Australian-New Zealand relations, yet as far 
as the pursuit of Australia’s foreign policy objectives were concerned, 
Spender was more than a capable replacement for Evatt. He was, as 
Berendsen pointed out, a man of “intellectual gifts” and was blessed 
with an “incomparably more attractive personality” than Evatt. On first 
glance, he also seemed more likely to succeed where Evatt could not in 
securing a US guarantee. He was headstrong, experienced, and more 
than willing to stand up to Menzies—or anyone in Washington for that 
10 Meeting between Laking and Butterworth, 18 November 1949, DNZER Vol. III, 
291-297.
11 Berendsen to McIntosh, 14 February 1950, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 212; Berendsen 
to McIntosh, 15 December 1949, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 194-195.
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matter, should he think it was in Australia’s interest—to ensure that 
Australia’s post-war protection was secured; namely, through a pact 
with the United States. The “future peace of the whole Pacific rested, 
almost entirely, upon the United States”, Spender had argued shortly 
before his appointment.12
Spender also recognised that Communist insurgencies in Southeast 
Asia presented just as clear a threat to Australia as did a potential 
resurgence of Japanese imperialism and aggression. Upon being handed 
the External Affairs portfolio, Spender’s primary task remained clear: 
enlist the United States as a guarantor of Australian security to repel 
these threats. His first job was to ensure that all his officers, diplomats 
and staff members understood his vision for Australia’s relations with 
the world as revolving around a closer relationship with the United 
States. Because of their “common British heritage” and “greater technical 
and industrial development”, Australia and the United States were the 
“two countries which can, in cooperation one with the other, make the 
greatest contribution to stability.” In Spender’s view, it was only by 
“concerted action” that this was possible. Later, during a comprehensive 
speech in the Australian House of Representatives, Spender made his 
vision for Australia’s external relations clear to both the Parliament and 
public. As part of Spender’s outlook, maintaining Australia’s peace and 
security rested on four pillars: the Pacific, in Western Europe through 
cooperation with the British Commonwealth, the United Nations, and 
the United States. In outlining this last pillar, Spender said
I have emphasised how essential it is for Australia to maintain the closest 
links with the United States for vital security reasons […] we propose 
actively to maintain the official and personal contacts and interchanges 
which resulted from the urgent needs of a common military effort.
To maintain these links at the highest level possible, Spender had a clear 
idea in mind:
What I envisage is a defensive military arrangement having as its 
basis a firm agreement between countries that have a vital interest in 
the stability of Asia and the Pacific, and which are at the same time 
capable of undertaking military commitments […] I fervently hope other 
12 Spender Statement, 16 February 1949, Commonwealth Debates, House of 
Representatives, Vol. 201, 358.
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Commonwealth countries might form a nucleus […] [but] I also have 
in mind particularly the United States of America, whose participation 
would give such a pact a substance that it would otherwise lack. Indeed, 
it would be rather meaningless without her.13
On top of convincing the Americans, Spender had to persuade his own 
Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, that Australia needed a formal pact 
with the United States. Such a task was perhaps surprising, as during 
Menzies’s first term as Prime Minister (1939-1941) he had hoped for 
some form of US security guarantee and appealed to US President 
Franklin Roosevelt for American aid during World War II. However, 
Menzies believed that such a pact might compromise Australia’s close 
relationship with the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth 
and Australia simply “did not need a pact with America”, as Menzies 
told his Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Fadden in August 1950, because 
“they are already overwhelmingly friendly to us.”14 Menzies was 
sceptical about the pact until it was nearly completed. At one stage, 
while Spender was straining every effort to conclude the alliance, 
Menzies remarked provocatively that “Percy is trying to build a castle 
on a foundation of jelly”, much to the annoyance of Spender and his 
wife Jean.15
New Zealand Minister to the United States Carl Berendsen shared 
Menzies’s misgivings about the proposed pact. For Berendsen, a Pacific 
Pact as it had been spoken about so far was “superficially attractive” 
and “ambiguous, imprecise and completely impracticable.” He feared 
the result might be Australia and New Zealand having to “defend the 
indefensible” in areas outside of their primary strategic interests. The 
New Zealand military was equally unconvinced. The Chiefs of Staff in 
Wellington produced a defence report in April 1950 which outlined their 
13 Spender Statement, 9 March 1950, Current Notes on International Affairs (hereafter 
CNIA), Vol. 21, 1950, 153-172; See also Roger Holdich, Vivianne Johnson and 
Pamela Andre ed. Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: The ANZUS Treaty, 1951 
(hereafter DAFP: ANZUS) (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2001), 9-10.
14 Menzies to Fadden, 3 August 1950, NAA, A11782, 1950/1.
15 Bell, Coral. Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 45. See also Jean Spender, Ambassador’s Wife: A Woman’s 
View of Life in Politics, Diplomacy and International Law (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 
1968), 23.
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strategic thinking from a purely military perspective. It concluded that 
there were “no reasons on military grounds” to approach the United 
States for a Pacific Pact because Washington would see no direct threat 
to New Zealand. From a US perspective, any New Zealand deployment 
would in fact be more useful in the Middle East than in the Pacific or Far 
East. The United States, the Chiefs of Staff maintained, would certainly 
“prefer to see a New Zealand Division and RNZAF (Royal New Zealand 
Air Force) tactical forces employed in the Middle East rather than tied 
down in the Far East in operations which would have no decisive effect 
on the ultimate outcome of the war.”16
Berendsen, however, thought there was some merit to the narrow 
arrangement that the New Zealand Defence Chiefs proposed. He 
recognised, for instance, that Australia and New Zealand’s limited 
defence capabilities and the grim realities of the world in the early 1950s 
left these countries little choice other than to secure a formal guarantee 
with the major sea power in the Pacific, the United States. Convinced 
that society was moving toward a third world war that would be brought 
about by the “thugs and gangsters” of the Soviet Union, Berendsen 
thought that Asia was a “boiling cauldron” that was “vibrant with 
resurgent nationalism.” In this cauldron, the situation seemed ideal for 
Soviet “fishing in muddy waters.” Since the dangers were so great and a 
world system of collective security so distant, he was “entirely ready” to 
accept a regional system as the best compromise available. To this end, 
Berendsen recognised that Spender and Doidge’s efforts to reach some 
sort of pact with the United States were perhaps in Australia and New 
Zealand’s best interests. “We are forced to look for something more 
real, more actual, more practical”, Berendsen told Doidge. “From our 
point of view”, he went on to suggest, “the logical conclusion which is 
so simple and obvious that it is present in everybody’s mind, and has 
been frequently advanced by Spender, is that what we essentially need 
in our defence is the assistance of the United States.”17 
To strike a compromise between his reservations about a complete 
defence arrangement and his desire to meet New Zealand’s security 
requirements, Berendsen proposed a limited pact. Under this pact, the 
16 The Assistant Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Secretary of External 
Affairs, 28 April 1950, DNZER Vol. III, 537.
17 Ibid., 531.
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United States would commit to the defence of Australia and New Zealand 
in return for their support in defending Japan and the US position in 
Northeast Asia. The response in Wellington was disappointing. Doidge 
had not discussed the idea for over a month after Berendsen’s proposal 
was sent. When Doidge finally replied, he said he would be “very happy 
to consider it” because he regarded an American guarantee of New 
Zealand’s security as “the richest prize of New Zealand diplomacy.”18 
Doidge did not give much more consideration to this proposal. 
Instead, he remained convinced that New Zealand needed a full 
commitment from the United States. McIntosh informed Berendsen on 
12 April that Doidge had not given his idea any deliberation, writing 
that “[Doidge] had not thought the thing out, indeed none of them (the 
Cabinet) will.”19 McIntosh himself was reluctant to pursue Berendsen’s 
limited pact proposal. He was particularly dismayed by the prospect 
that New Zealand would have to take part in a guarantee of Japanese 
integrity so soon after fighting a major war against them.
In any event, up until mid-1950, there was no sign that the talk of 
concluding a defence agreement with Australia and New Zealand, 
either limited or full-scale, had been considered seriously in the United 
States. As Second Secretary of the East Asia Section in the Australian 
Department of External Affairs David Dexter noted, “between the end of 
1947 and mid-1950 the Americans showed little inclination to be involved 
in […] a Pacific pact.”20 In Far Eastern matters, the Japanese Peace Treaty 
and its impact on the US-Soviet balance of power in East Asia had been 
the major subject of deliberation between the State Department and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The former favoured moving toward a peace 
treaty, whereas the latter wanted no diminution of its control in Japan. 
Given the deadlock between restoring normal political and economic 
relations with Japan and a continued occupation—neither of which 
were “wholly desirable” for the United States—US Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson appointed John Foster Dulles as a special advisor for 
reaching a suitable peace settlement.
Dulles’s appointment was crucial for three reasons. Since he was 
a Republican, Truman and Acheson could fend off criticism that the 
18 Doidge to Berendsen, 9 May 1950, DNZER Vol. III, 546.
19 McIntosh to Berendsen, 12 April 1950, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 225.
20 Dexter to Shaw, 27 October 1950, NAA, A1838, 535/6 part i.
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Democrats were failing in Asia and were unwilling to take a bipartisan 
approach to meet their objectives. As a specialist in international 
affairs—he was a legal counsel with the US delegation at the Versailles 
Peace Conference in 1918, an adviser at the San Francisco Conference in 
1945, and helped draft the preamble for the United Nations Charter—
Dulles brought considerable experience to the role and was able to 
reach a settlement with Japan in little over a year. From a historian’s 
vantage point, it is also possible to see that as a future US Secretary 
of State from 1953 to 1959, his relationship with Australian and New 
Zealand policymakers would be pivotal in shaping the contours of the 
relationship for most of the decade. Dulles’s first task was to visit Tokyo 
to discuss a Japanese peace settlement with SCAP Commander Douglas 
MacArthur, as well as members of the Far Eastern Commission. His 
second task was to get Australia and New Zealand, the two most 
outspoken opponents of a soft peace treaty, to agree to a settlement 
that was also acceptable to the United States. Although their support 
was not essential, the State Department believed that Australian and 
New Zealand support for American policy in Japan was still “highly 
desirable.”21
Obtaining Australian and New Zealand support for the Japanese 
Peace Treaty as quickly as possible became even more urgent after 
mid-1950. In the early morning of 25 June, North Korean (DPRK) 
forces crossed the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula and began a 
full-scale invasion of South Korea with the support of the Soviet Union. 
The United States, believing that the North Korean advance was Soviet-
inspired aggression, was quick to commit US ground forces which were 
readily available in Japan. With an American need for an increased war 
effort, Australia and New Zealand were uniquely placed to provide 
much needed military support to the United States. It was the perfect 
opportunity to demonstrate that Canberra and Wellington were 
prepared to support the US bid for UN intervention in Korea, which was 
approved shortly after the North Korean invasion (The Soviet Union 
could not veto the resolution because at the time it was boycotting the 
UN over the non-recognition of Communist China). Both Acheson 
and MacArthur urged Canberra to supply material aid and battalions 
21 Department of State Policy Statement, 21 April 1950, NARA, RG 59, 611.43/4-2150.
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to Korea.22 Menzies was in London where he argued that Australian 
troops should not be sent to Korea due to their small number and that 
deploying these forces would prevent an Australian contribution to the 
Commonwealth defence in the Middle East.
Figure 7. A Soviet-made North Korean T-34 tank knocked out during the UN led intervention 
on the Korean Peninsula. Photo by Curtis A. Ulz (1950), Wikimedia, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:T-34_knocked_out_September_1950.jpg, public domain.
Spender, however, saw Korea as a blessing in disguise with respect to 
his Pacific Pact ambitions and pushed for a speedy Australian response. 
Spender cabled Menzies in early July, warning that the “heat may 
be put on us for further aid” after UN Secretary General Trygve Lie 
urged over fifty UN members to supply more ground forces in Korea. 
Receiving no response and growing agitated, Spender wrote to Menzies 
again on 17 July arguing that from “Australia’s long-term point of view, 
any additional aid we can give to the US now, small though it may be, 
will [be repaid] in the future one hundred fold.” Spender added that “if 
we refrain from giving any further aid, we may lose an opportunity of 
cementing friendship with the US which may not easily present itself 
again.”23
Menzies, who was abroad at the time and unable to take direct part 
in policy decisions, was unconvinced by Spender’s push for Australian 
22 Acheson to UK Embassy, 28 June 1950, FRUS Vol. VII 1950, 223; Watt to Spender, 
15 November 1952, Spender Papers, Box 1, National Library of Australia (hereafter 
NLA).
23 Spender to Menzies, 17 July 1950, NAA, A462/2, 443/1/8 part i.
 653. Movement Toward an Alliance
support in Korea. After attending a British Cabinet meeting, he pointed 
out that for Australia there was a “great danger in allowing the Korean 
affair to disturb our strategic planning based on the importance of the 
Middle East and on our national service scheme.”24 Menzies’s stance 
on Korea became increasingly isolated, especially after the Australian 
Embassy in Washington suggested “the Korea attack has given fresh 
impetus to the consideration of Spender’s initiative and ideas.” 
Embassy staff also suggested that “prior consultation between Australia 
and the United States would have been helpful in meeting the sudden 
crisis” and that “some machinery for automatic consultation would be 
helpful in meeting future crises.” Determined not to let this opportunity 
slide, Spender phoned Acting Prime Minister Arthur Fadden to issue 
a statement that Australia had decided to send troops to Korea, who 
agreed reluctantly. Even without their Prime Minister at home to object, 
Spender was able to push for an Australian contribution to Korea in 
the hope that it might encourage the State Department to better see the 
benefits of a Pacific Pact with Australia. It was certainly an audacious 
move by Spender, so much so that external affairs officer Arthur Tange 
commented later that it left his colleagues “somewhat bewildered” that 
he would push so quickly and without the support of the Australian 
Prime Minister.25
Spender’s swiftness, however, made a strong mark on policymakers 
in Washington. There was “genuine gratification at Australia’s prompt 
response” in the United States, the Australian Embassy in Washington 
cabled to Canberra. After observing US sentiments starting to shift on 
Australia’s strategic value in the Asian region, Spender certainly felt 
encouraged and motivated to keep pushing at home for a closer defence 
relationship with the United States. More specifically, he stressed 
again to Menzies that Australia should capitalise on this response 
and seek a formal defence pact. “This immediate action by Australia 
made a strong impression on official and unofficial American opinion 
which has resulted in the closest of friendly relationships”, Spender 
argued. He added that in order for Washington to realise the benefits 
24 Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War: Volume 1, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1950-
1953 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), 66.
25 Arthur Tange, Defence Policy-Making: A Close-Up View, 1950-1980, Peter Edwards ed. 
(Canberra: ANU Press, 2008), 4, http://press.anu.edu.au?p=101541
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of a pact, Australia should demonstrate to the United States that it was 
wholeheartedly prepared to support US policy in the Pacific. Otherwise, 
the “Australian attitude might be misunderstood and the genuine 
warmth of [the] present relationship since the opening of the Korean 
conflict may be diminished.”26 In this regard Spender’s persistence on 
such an important matter is commendable, particularly given Menzies’ 
reluctance to accept that the United States had to replace Britain as the 
new bulwark of Australian security.
Across the Tasman, New Zealand preempted the Australian 
response by announcing first that it would support the US and UN 
to repel the North Korean advance. On 1 July, Holland declared that 
two warships, Pukaki and Tutira, would be sent to the Korea area. 
He later committed a special combat unit to the fighting. In so doing, 
Wellington demonstrated that New Zealand was likewise willing to 
support the global fight against Communism and that it was a reliable 
ally in the Pacific theatre. Carl Berendsen, New Zealand Ambassador in 
Washington, was particularly happy with this quick response: “we have 
got kudos and widespread appreciation [in the United States] for this 
immediate indication that we are one of those who do not confine our 
support of the principles of freedom to words alone.”27 
Yet over and above any benefit this move had in Washington, New 
Zealand’s hasty response was primarily due to British consultation and 
consideration of London’s attitudes. Wellington’s decision to make a 
naval deployment into Korean waters and its subsequent land-force 
contributions were made because New Zealand was “unprepared to 
undertake a military, and through it a political commitment which 
required it to act independently of a familiar and secure British-
led Commonwealth.”28 After incessant pressing by the Australian 
Government, the New Zealand military response was likewise not part 
of a combined ANZAC Brigade. “That is the very thing we do not want 
to do”, McIntosh told Berendsen on 7 August, “we can supply artillery, 
26 Spender to Menzies, 21 July 1950, NAA, A11537 [1].
27 Berendsen to McIntosh, 14 July 1950, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 234; NZ Ambassador 
in Washington to Doidge, 20 July 1950, DNZER Vol. III, 390.
28 McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, 118. See also Ian McGibbon, “New 
Zealand’s Intervention in the Korean War: June-July 1950”, International History 
Review 11, no. 1 (1989), 272-290.
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[and] we would feel safer in having this particular type of unit and my 
own view is that we should stick to it.” Berendsen agreed and thought 
such a plan would be “disastrous.” If New Zealand cooperated with 
Australia militarily in Korea, “there [was] no doubt at all about it that 
the Australians would shove us right into the background and we will 
get no credit whatsoever for this force which will be represented as, 
and certainly accepted as, Australian.”29 Despite these concerns both 
Australia and New Zealand later contributed soldiers to the creation 
of the 1st Commonwealth Division, a unit that formed part of the 
British military presence in Korea. This division was made up primarily 
of British and Canadian forces, but also included troops from India 
and South Korea. At least with this type of multinational military 
arrangement, McIntosh and Berendsen could be assured that it would 
be quite difficult for Australia to claim credit for any contributions made 
by New Zealand. 
As for China, American-Australian-New Zealand views against 
recognition hardened considerably after the PRC intervened in Korea in 
November 1950. US President Harry Truman responded by completely 
rejecting any possibility of recognition and instead approved a National 
Security Council (NSC) recommendation to impose strict political and 
economic sanctions on the PRC. In addition, the Truman Administration 
threw its support behind Chiang Kai-shek as the legitimate head of the 
government of China. Fighting alongside American forces in Korea, 
respective Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers Robert Menzies 
and Sidney Holland enforced similar sanctions and publicly declared 
their support for Chiang’s embattled regime.
The possibility of recognising Beijing in the short-term future was 
dismissed. In Australia, Spender feared that recognising the PRC after 
its intervention in Korea would encourage Beijing to act aggressively 
elsewhere. “If Communist Chinese demands for Taiwan and recognition 
are accepted”, Spender asked fellow Australian diplomat Keith Officer 
rhetorically on 11 December, “what guarantee is there that she [China] 
will not press in Indochina or elsewhere?” Despite these concerns, 
Spender thought that recognition should not be completely ruled out. He 
told Officer that “on the question of ultimate recognition of Communist 
29 McIntosh to Berendsen, 7 August 1950, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 238; Berendsen to 
McIntosh, 15 August 1950, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 242.
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China, the door should not be barred.” In other words, Spender thought 
that “if a reasonable settlement can be arranged regarding Korea, the 
question of recognition will be reconsidered.”30
Meanwhile, as the Korean situation worsened, several UN countries 
introduced a draft resolution in the First Committee of the General 
Assembly on 12 December to form a separate committee that would 
work towards reaching a ceasefire. This committee also decided to vote 
upon whether the PRC should be admitted as a temporary UN member 
to assist in reaching an immediate ceasefire. During these negotiations, 
another tussle broke out between Australian and New Zealand 
representatives after Australia tried to pressure New Zealand into 
abstaining from voting. Berendsen, who was representing New Zealand, 
was “infuriated” when Australian delegate Keith Officer told him that 
“he (Officer) intended to vote for [Beijing’s] admission” temporarily to 
work towards reaching a ceasefire, and “hoped that I (Berendsen) would 
abstain.” “I could scarcely believe my ears”, Berendsen told McIntosh 
after hearing that Australia wanted New Zealand to simply step aside 
and not get in the way of its own decisions. “The long and short of it 
is I don’t understand the Australians any more than I understand the 
British” on Chinese matters, Berendsen complained.31
Although his reasons for wanting to New Zealand to abstain while 
he voted for Beijing’s temporary seating are unclear, it is evident that 
Officer questioned whether hardline US policies were a prudent means 
of calming hostilities in Korea and subduing Chinese aggression. “My 
own view is that the attitude of the United States at the moment is quite 
unreal”, he wrote to Spender, “I can see few practical arguments against 
a ceasefire.”32 It is possible that Officer’s demands on the committee 
issue were part of a broader Australian concern that New Zealand, 
with strong British ties and a demonstrated propensity to consider 
PRC recognition, saw the committee as a partial step toward potential 
recognition without consultation with Australia. Any such move would 
30 Spender to Officer, 11 December 1950, NAA, A11537 Part I.
31 Berendsen to McIntosh, 25 November 1950, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 250.
32 Officer to Spender, 12 December 1950, in Stuart Doran and David Lee ed. 
Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and Recognition of the People’s 
Republic of China, 1949-1972 (hereafter DAFP: China) (Canberra: Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2002), 33.
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be disastrous for Australia, especially because, at the time, Spender was 
working hard towards reaching a formal defence arrangement with the 
United States. 
The Korean War, the PRC and new conservative governments in 
Canberra and Wellington meant that concluding some form of a defence 
arrangement became more practical for Australia, New Zealand and 
the United States. American policymakers began to view a treaty with 
Australia and New Zealand as a means to reach a speedy settlement 
regarding the Japanese Peace Treaty. In Australia, Spender accepted this 
trade off and hoped to conclude as binding an arrangement as possible 
with the United States. New Zealand, however, continued to favour a 
limited understanding through a Presidential Declaration. There was 
in fact significant apprehension amongst New Zealand diplomats 
and military officers about concluding a binding arrangement with 
the United States. Negotiations for some form of alliance nonetheless 
played out in late 1950 and early 1951, and had a decisive impact on the 
future of the relationship.

4. ANZUS Negotiations
The outbreak of the Korean War signalled to American policymakers that 
Communism was a growing danger in the Asia-Pacific region and stronger 
efforts must be made to prevent its spread. It could not, however, continue 
to do so alone. The US was bearing the overwhelming brunt of the war 
effort through both the financial cost of funding military equipment and the 
loss of lives. In consideration of this heavy burden, the State Department 
lauded Australia’s quick response to the Korean War. “The prompt 
reaction of Australia to the invasion of Korea and the unanimous vote 
of approval given by the Australian parliament to the military measures 
taken by the Government”, a State Department memorandum noted on 
24 July, “afforded a good indication of the close identity of views between 
the United States and Australia on matters of fundamental importance.”1 
It is interesting to note that little mention was made of New Zealand, 
suggesting that perhaps Berendsen was correct in his previous concerns 
that Wellington’s contributions in Korea would be overshadowed by the 
Australian contribution.
In any event, the State Department quickly began manoeuvring for 
discussions to conclude a formal defence treaty. Allen Brown, Australian 
Secretary for the Prime Minister’s Department, reported this change in US 
policy in early August 1950. While visiting Washington, he cabled Spender 
on 3 August to say that in a meeting with Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern 
Affairs Dean Rusk and other members of the US Far Eastern Bureau, Rusk 
told him that the State Department’s views toward a pact were now “very 
1 State Department Policy Background Memorandum, 24 July 1950, NARA, RG 59, 
743.13/7-2450.
© 2018 Andrew Kelly, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0141.04
72 ANZUS and the Early Cold War
fluid” and they were “willing to exchange ideas.”2 This willingness 
stemmed from an increasing need to finalise a suitable peace settlement 
in Japan as the situation in Korea worsened. 
Australia and New Zealand were outspoken opponents of a soft 
peace treaty without suitable assurances that Japan would not again 
be a menace in Asia. In September 1950, the United States entered 
discussions with other governments in the Far Eastern Committee 
about the Japanese Peace Treaty. Dulles, charged with the primary 
responsibility of reaching an agreement over Japan, made it clear that 
the basic American aim was a treaty that restored Japanese sovereignty 
and kept Japan as an American ally. American desire for a multilateral 
peace treaty with Japan offered Australia an opportunity to achieve 
its own objectives; namely, an American guarantee of its security in 
exchange for Australian acquiescence to the Japanese Peace Treaty.
Spender was excited by the prospect that the United States was now 
more open to discussions about a Pacific Pact. As a result, he worked 
harder than ever to “sow the seeds” for a formal defence commitment 
from the United States.3 Spender undoubtedly saw such a commitment 
as vital to Australian security interests, but in his discussions with 
American policymakers after the Korean War had begun, Spender also 
stressed that Australia desperately needed a pact in order to be more 
closely involved in the global planning and international decision-
making processes among Western powers. Meeting with President 
Truman on 15 September, Spender stressed that in the Japanese war 
Australia had “thrown all she had into that conflict.” He added that 
its recent commitment to Korea demonstrated further that Australia 
“could be counted upon in an emergency to give the utmost of her 
manpower and equipment to meet all new crises.” This, according to 
Spender, “should merit a greater degree of consideration in matters of 
consultation among the great powers.” “Australia did not have any say 
in most of the important international decisions now being made by the 
friendly powers”, Spender told Truman, suggesting that it was a “great 
handicap to his country.”4
2 Cablegram from Embassy in Washington to Spender, 3 August 1950, NAA, A1838, 
250/7/10 part I.
3 Jean Spender, Ambassador’s Wife, 21.
4 Notes of Meeting between Spender and Truman, 15 September 1950, NARA, RG 59, 
611.43/9-1550.
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Truman sympathised with Spender and the Australian position, but 
suggested that this was a matter that he should take up with Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson. Disappointed by this response from the President, 
Spender commented publicly at a UN General Assembly in New York 
that Australia was keen for a regional defence pact and had clear ideas 
about what scope it should take. He told Alan Watt on 15 September that 
a Pacific Pact should be as wide as possible, “including the countries of 
the Indian Ocean capable of entering into firm commitments, but that if 
that were not possible, then an area generally including Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, North America and Great Britain.”5 He also 
had no objection to including South American countries.
Figure 8. President Truman (second left) meeting with US Secretary of Defense George 
Marshall (left), Secretary of State Dean Acheson (second from right) and Secretary of the 
Treasury John Snyder (right), October 1950. Photo by Abbie Rowe (1950), US National 
Archives Catalog, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/200235, unrestricted use.
5 Spender Cablegram, 15 September 1950, DAFP: ANZUS, 21-22. Spender’s ideas for 
a Pacific Pact can be found in Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS 
Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1969).
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Spender soon received a clearer idea of US thinking towards Japan and 
a regional pact. On 22 September, Dulles pulled Spender aside during 
US negotiations with Far Eastern Commission nations for the peace 
settlement in Japan. Dulles presented a seven-point memorandum which 
outlined that the United States had plans to revitalise Japan as a military 
power that was friendly to the United States. According to Dulles, this 
was because Japan was no longer an isolated problem but part of a 
broader struggle against Communism. It was in America’s self-interest 
that “Japan should be denied to [Russia] and attracted to the side of the 
Western democracies.” Spender was not pleased by this memorandum. 
Recalling the meeting, John Allison, Director of Northeast Asian Affairs 
in the State Department, penned that “[Spender’s] face grew more and 
more suffused with colour. At one point, I thought he would burst a 
vessel.”6 Spender told Dulles that Australia could not subscribe to a 
Japanese treaty unless there were adequate assurances for Australia’s 
protection. In other words, to “allay Australia’s fears”, he wanted a 
“formal commitment by the United States.” In response, Dulles told 
Spender that Australia’s security was assured through a continued US 
presence in Japan. Nevertheless, he recognised Australian trepidations 
and suggested “some compromise might have to be found.”7
At the same time, New Zealand Minister for External Affairs Frederick 
Doidge surprisingly cooled towards the idea. Although Doidge had 
initially been a strong supporter of a Pacific Pact, his enthusiasm 
dropped once the war in Korea began. Again, unlike Spender, he also 
had no clear idea of what form a pact should take. In September 1950 
Doidge proclaimed in the New Zealand Parliament
My own view now, and I think the view of the government, is the pact is 
not as necessary as we thought it was six months ago. It is unnecessary 
now because of what is happening in Korea. Today the United States of 
America is in the Pacific. I think she is there now as a permanent partner 
in the policing of the Pacific.8
6 John Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland (Boston: Houghton 
Miffin, 1973), 151.
7 Australian Mission to the United Nations to External Affairs, 22 September 1950, 
NAA, A816, 19/304/451; Cablegram to the Department of External Affairs, 22 
September 1950, NAA, A1838, 532/11 part i.
8 Doidge Statement, 5 September 1950, NZ Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 291, 
2142-2143. 
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There was equally little enthusiasm from the New Zealand Department 
of External Affairs to collaborate with Australia on the matter. It was not 
a surprise that Spender complained that “even New Zealand displayed 
little active interest” in the pact proposals he made in late 1950.9
Doidge, nevertheless, left for Washington in October to discuss 
a regional defence pact with the United States. While in Washington, 
New Zealand-American talks appeared to reignite Doidge’s interest in a 
pact but it did not take the shape he had advocated previously. Doidge 
recalled that after the discussions in Washington, the US was still a 
crucial signatory to any regional agreement but suggested different 
treaty signatories than did Spender. He told Parliament on 2 November 
that there can be “no satisfactory pact without the United States, Canada 
and India”, and that the “Pacific pact should be the natural corollary 
to an Atlantic Pact.”10 This was not the same view he had had several 
months earlier when he thought such a pact was unnecessary. A pact 
similar in scope to the Atlantic Pact would most likely entail a direct 
New Zealand military commitment to defend US interests in the region.
This was also not the pact Spender was suggesting. A month earlier, 
Spender had stressed to US Assistant Secretary of State John Hickerson 
in a meeting on 12 October that Indian inclusion was “unlikely” and 
that the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and possibly 
the Philippines were the only “essential” potential treaty signatories. 
Spender also dismissed Canada because it had “heavy obligations in 
Europe” and was “not deeply interested in the Pacific.”11 Disagreement 
over the scope of membership aside, Spender’s desire to pursue a 
regional pact had an additional layer that Doidge was not considering. 
As well as seeking reassurance of support in the event of future Japanese 
aggression, Spender wanted a Pacific Pact because Australia was not 
associated with any “body of nations dealing with global strategy or 
similar questions.” If there were a Pacific Pact with Australia as a member, 
it could be “brought into consultation” with US military planning that 
the Pentagon was currently unwilling to share with Canberra.12
9 Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, 35.
10 Doidge Statement, 2 November 1950, NZ Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 292, 3942.
11 Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, 33. See also Meeting Between Spender and Truman, 
1 September 1950, NARA, RG 59, 611.43/9-150.
12 Note by Officer, 13 October 1950, NAA, A1838, 532/11 part I; NZ High Commissioner 
in Canberra to McIntosh, 27 October 1950, DNZER Vol. III, 548-550.
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Dulles’s task to find a solution in Japan became even more urgent 
once Chinese forces intervened in the Korean War in late November 1950. 
With Chinese involvement in Korea and the situation fast deteriorating, 
Dulles informed New Zealand that he hoped to devise “some satisfactory 
means of assuring the government and people of New Zealand” as soon 
as possible. At the same time, the State Department told Spender that 
they were giving “active consideration” to his proposals for a Pacific 
Pact.13 Further interest came from Undersecretary Dean Rusk, who 
appeared more sympathetic to Australia’s and New Zealand’s desire 
to secure US protection. As a means of enlisting Australian and New 
Zealand support for the Japanese Peace Treaty, Rusk proposed a plan 
for a Presidential Declaration that announced that both countries were 
defensively tied to the United States. “There is merit in tightening 
our relationship with Australia and New Zealand”, Rusk told Deputy 
Under Secretary of Political Affairs Elbert Matthews on 9 October, and 
the US should consider “a more formal statement of mutual security 
commitments.” 
This statement, Rusk thought, would be welcomed by Spender and the 
Australian government. “It is unlikely that the Australians would press 
for more than this”, Rusk added, “[Australia and New Zealand] appear 
to be interested not so much in written assurances of military protection 
as in an opportunity to participate more closely in military and political 
planning.”14 Doidge and New Zealand would have been content with 
such a statement, but Spender wanted a more binding commitment. He 
later told Rusk that while he appreciated Rusk’s sincerity in his desire 
to establish a closer Australian-American relationship, a Presidential 
Statement was “not sufficient at all.” Australia, in Spender’s view, 
required “something of more substance.”15 
After Spender rejected a Presidential Statement, Allison suggested to 
Dulles in early December that he and the US should consider a formal 
13 New Zealand Embassy in Washington to the Secretary of External Affairs, 5 January 
1951, DNZER Vol. III, 424-425; O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 177.
14 Rusk to Matthews, 9 October 1950, NARA, RG 59, 790.5/10-950; McNicol to Officer; 
31 October 1950, NAA, A1838, 532/11 part i; Spender to Watt, 1 November 1950, 
A6768, EATS 77 part i.
15 Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, 65; McNicol to Officer; 31 October 1950, NAA, 
A1838, 532/11 part i; Spender to Watt, 1 November 1950, A6768, EATS 77 part i; 
Spender to Watt, 3 November 1950, A1838, 535/6 part i. 
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defence arrangement with Australia and New Zealand. For Allison, 
a security treaty was a worthwhile commitment to ensure a speedy 
Japanese settlement after the recent intervention of Chinese forces in 
the Korean War. “In my opinion”, Allison told Dulles, the United States 
should consider concluding “mutual defence arrangements with New 
Zealand, Australia and the Philippines.”16 Five days later, Allison again 
raised the pact idea with Dulles. Allison’s general proposal for a Pacific 
collective security pact would “have the dual purpose of defending 
Japan from Communist aggression and assuring our friends that 
Japan would be on their side and not a menace to them.” After these 
discussions, Dulles wrote to Acheson and stressed that the US must 
consider all measures that might hasten an acceptable settlement. In 
other words, Dulles thought that a Pacific Pact with Australia and New 
Zealand might be necessary.
Figure 9. John Foster Dulles, US Negotiator to the ANZUS Treaty and US Secretary of State 
(1953-1959). Photo by US Department of State (n. d.), Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/
statephotos/2358513061/, unrestricted use.
16 Allison to Dulles, 2 December 1950, FRUS 1950 Vol. VI, 1354-1355.
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Allison also told David McNicol, Australia’s Second Secretary in its 
Washington Embassy, that discussions for a formal defence arrangement 
were now being given greater consideration in the State Department. 
“There was now considerably more support in the State Department for 
a Pacific Island Pact”, he told McNicol confidentially on 9 December, 
adding that Dulles had “come around to the support of a Pacific Pact.”17 
In response, Spender and the Australian government increased their 
demands for a pact with the United States in exchange for agreeing to 
the Japanese Peace Treaty and remilitarisation plans. After Spender was 
informed of Allison’s briefing, he announced publicly that the need for 
a regional pact has become “more urgent.” Australia was “not satisfied 
that Japan [could] be trusted with military power”, Spender said on 
11 January 1951, because it was “too great a gamble for Australia to be 
asked to take [without] effective regional security.”18
At the 1951 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in January, 
Australia continued to take a noticeably hard line toward the Japanese 
Peace Treaty. Australia was alarmed at the “tendency to slip into an easy 
treaty” as Australian High Commissioner in London Eric Harrison said. 
Australia objected to the possibility of Japan’s military resurgence and 
distrusted Japan to remain a loyal ally. Australia, Harrison said, needed 
security against future Japanese aggression.19 In London, New Zealand 
Prime Minister Sidney Holland took a similar line but was more flexible 
than the Australians. While he conceded that New Zealand interests 
were “much the same” as Australia’s, its fear of Japanese aggression 
was “slightly less.” In terms of opposing a soft peace treaty for Japan, 
Holland was “not prepared to push this point too far.”20
Holland’s reluctance to follow the Australian line in London and 
press hard for a comprehensive Pacific Pact reflected a growing belief 
in the External Affairs Department that New Zealand’s political and 
military interests would be best served by concluding an arrangement 
with the United States that was as informal as possible. Shortly after 
17 Makin to Spender, 9 December 1950, NAA, A6768, EATS 77 part iv.
18 Spender Statement, 11 January 1951, NAA, A4534, 46/2/4 Part II.
19 Paper by the United Kingdom Government on the Japanese Peace Treaty, 2 January 
1951, DNZER Vol. III, 425-431.
20 Report of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in London, 9 January 1951, 
DNZER Vol. III, 433-434.
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the Prime Ministers’ Conference, an External Affairs Department 
memorandum that was prepared for the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff 
in late January considered three possible types of arrangement that 
might be struck with the United States in exchange for agreeing to the 
Japanese Peace Treaty. The report concluded that the disadvantages 
of the comprehensive NATO-type pact that the Australians were 
pursuing would outweigh any advantages for Wellington, citing that 
it would “provide little reassurance against the long-term threat from 
Asia […] and impair the ability of Australia and New Zealand to meet 
that threat.”21 Alternatively, the usefulness of a “limited” pact similar 
to the idea Berendsen proposed could not yet be determined because 
New Zealand’s military capacity needed to be studied further, while 
its commitments continued in the Middle East. Dismissing these two 
possibilities, the report concluded that the best outcome was a declaration 
from President Truman that the United States would defend New 
Zealand, even though the Australian attitude to such an arrangement 
would be unfavourable. “Such an undertaking”, the report conceded, 
“would be insufficiently precise to afford Australia real assurance of 
American assistance in the event of hostilities in the Pacific.”22
Meanwhile, the State Department proposed to the Australian and 
New Zealand External Affairs Departments that Dulles visit in mid-
February to discuss the Japanese Peace Treaty and the question of a Pacific 
security arrangement. Holland and his External Affairs Department 
were unsure of whether Dulles would also stop in Wellington or 
whether there would be joint talks in Canberra. When his visit was first 
proposed, New Zealand got word that Dulles thought combined talks 
in Canberra would be better in case “time did not allow him to visit both 
countries.”23 As the weaker party, New Zealand thought joint talks were 
best and proposed that Doidge and the New Zealand delegation would 
meet Spender and Dulles in Canberra. From a New Zealand perspective, 
joint talks potentially disposed of the possibility that major policy 
differences between Australia and New Zealand would be noticeable to 
Dulles. There was also a danger that if Dulles met with Doidge after he 
21 External Affairs Notes on a Pacific Pact, 30 January 1951, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3.
22 Ibid.
23 External Affairs Minister to the NZ High Commissioner in Canberra, 27 January 
1951, DNZER Vol. III, 555.
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had seen Spender, Australia would make “impossible demands” and it 
would be difficult for Doidge or anyone else in New Zealand to argue 
against them.24 If the discussions proceeded independently in Canberra 
and Wellington, New Zealand could be faced with an agreement it did 
not like and one it would find difficult to change.25
For their part, the Australians feared that having Doidge at the 
talks with Dulles would be inhibiting. While his presence might 
project solidarity between Australia and New Zealand, it could also 
prevent Spender from putting forward his point of view as forcefully. 
New Zealand had not, after all, shown the same level of opposition 
to Japanese rearmament at the recent Prime Ministers’ Conference in 
London. In other words, New Zealand and Australia did not approach 
the Dulles talks with the sense of solidarity and confidence in one 
another that might have been expected from two neighbouring countries 
importuning the United States.26 
Allison drew up US plans for Dulles’s visit. These drafts were then 
forwarded from Dulles to US Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup. So far as 
membership of a pact was concerned, the draft proposed six signatories: 
the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and New 
Zealand. Dulles explained in early January that one major consideration 
was to “give significant reassurance to Australia, New Zealand and 
the Philippines so that they will consent to a peace treaty with Japan 
which will not contain limitations upon rearmament.” To alleviate these 
fears, Dulles raised the possibility of a defence council, where Australia 
and New Zealand could be afforded a “voice in how Japan’s defence 
forces progressed.” Above all else, however, Dulles stressed that it was 
essential that the US “should not become committed to the Pact unless it 
is assured that the other Parties will agree to the kind of Japanese Peace 
Treaty the United States feels is necessary.”27
Allison forwarded Dulles’s plans to Australian Second Secretary 
in Washington David McNicol on 21 January. The confidential brief 
24 Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, 152.
25 Shanahan to McIntosh, 26 January 1951, Archives NZ, EA 102/9/4.
26 Trotter, New Zealand and Japan, 152.
27 Allison to Jessup, 4 January 1951, FRUS 1951 Vol. VI, 132-134; Dulles to Jessup, 4 
January 1951, FRUS 1951 Vol. VI, 134-137; Allison Memorandum, 11 January 1951, 
FRUS 1951 Vol. VI, 790-792.
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emphasised strong US support for a Pacific Pact. The Department of 
Defense “favoured” a pact and some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
were “very keen.” The Far Eastern sub-committees of the House and 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee also both approved of the idea. 
Allison stressed that Dulles had in mind “an arrangement not quite as 
formal as [NATO].” In other words, US thinking did not necessarily 
contemplate an “attack upon one, attack upon all provision” and an 
“organic link” with NATO.28
Meanwhile, the New Zealand military reconsidered its preferred 
structure and scope of a defence arrangement with Australia and 
the United States. The New Zealand Defence Chiefs concluded that 
an informal guarantee of New Zealand’s security in the form of a 
Presidential announcement seemed to best suit its interests. In reaching 
this conclusion, it was decided that a formal pact could never be confined 
to the Southwest Pacific. Rather, a pact would only serve US interests 
in Northeast Asia and commit Australian and New Zealand forces 
there. “The United States cannot give a direct and precise guarantee 
to New Zealand and Australia which are in any case remote from the 
centre of the danger”, the Chiefs concluded, adding that it was “only in 
connection with [American] arrangements in the Philippines and Japan 
that sufficient Congressional and public support could be given for an 
extension of American commitments to Australia and New Zealand.”29
As New Zealand policymakers decided that a formal defence 
arrangement with the United States did not meet their strategic interests, 
the External Affairs Department agreed that a Presidential declaration 
announcing a US commitment to the defence of Australia and New 
Zealand was the best course of action. The Department suggested that 
Doidge should keep this possibility in mind during talks with Dulles 
later in February. Since Wellington did not see “any immediate threat 
to New Zealand or the Pacific”, no formal pact was required. Instead, 
a “Presidential Statement would be useful.”30 Doidge left for Canberra 
with the proposal for a Presidential guarantee as his first preference.
28 Makin to Spender, 21 January 1951, NAA, A1838, TS250/7/10.
29 Notes on the Defence Aspects of the Japanese Peace Settlement, 30 January 1951, 
DNZER Vol. III, 558-563.
30 Memorandum for Doidge, 8 February 1951, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3 part 3.
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Australia wanted no part in the Presidential Statement, nor could 
it accept any arrangement other than a formal commitment from the 
United States. In Spender’s view, any agreement short of a formal 
guarantee of US protection in Asia and the Pacific would be worthless 
to meet Australia’s security needs. Spender argued that the preferred 
arrangement was a “treaty in solemn form.” Dulles’s visit might be 
the “last opportunity” Australia and New Zealand had to secure an 
American guarantee, he told Doidge, so it was imperative that they 
cooperated and did not squander the opportunity.31 In the end, it was 
agreed that it would be counterproductive to propose different things 
to Dulles. Spender and Doidge finally agreed to push for the same 
tripartite pact, after which Spender commented that New Zealand had 
finally “seen the light.”32
After meeting with Japanese representatives in Tokyo to finalise 
the arrangements for a peace treaty, Dulles flew to Canberra where 
official talks began on 15 February. Dulles stressed immediately to 
both Spender and Doidge the US plans for post-occupied Japan and 
unlimited rearmament. He stated that a continued US military presence 
in Japan should quell Australian and New Zealand concerns over 
revived Japanese aggression. Moreover, any restrictions on Japanese 
rearmament were counterproductive for American efforts to prevent 
the spread of Communism. As he was concerned by the perception of a 
“White Man’s Club” in Asia, Dulles also pushed for a broader security 
treaty that included the Philippines. This echoed Acheson’s original 
instructions to Dulles, which specified that the US was willing to enter 
some sort of “mutual assistance arrangement” with countries including 
Australia and New Zealand but also Japan, the Philippines and possibly 
even Indonesia. The condition attached to these types of arrangement 
was that these countries must support US objectives regarding the peace 
settlement in Japan.33
For his part, Spender seemed unconvinced. Whether he truly 
disagreed with Dulles or was cunningly using “the negotiating value 
of Australia’s agreement to sign a peace treaty as a lever to obtain an 
31 Note on Discussion between the New Zealand and Australian Ministers of External 
Affairs, 13 February 1951, DNZER Vol. III, 590-591.
32 Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, 124.
33 Acheson to Dulles, 9 January 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. VI, 789.
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effective security guarantee”, he told Dulles that Australia could not 
so easily accept a soft policy toward Japan. He argued that Australia 
needed adequate assurances that it was safe from any future Japanese 
aggression. “[Australia] is not satisfied that in the long-run, it was 
wholly unlikely that [Japan] would not […] present any menace to 
peace” Spender replied.34 As for including the Philippines, Spender and 
Doidge successfully resisted Dulles’s efforts even though Spender later 
admitted he would have been prepared to accept the Philippines if the 
alternative was no form of defence arrangement. 
As Thomas K. Robb and David James Gill concluded, the reasons 
for this resistance reflected a range of geopolitical, security, and racial 
motivations.35 That said, there is certainly enough evidence from these 
meetings to praise Spender’s and Doidge’s diplomacy, particularly 
because it was likely they would have begrudgingly accepted the 
Philippines into ANZUS if there was no other option. It is also worth 
noting that these efforts were well received in London. The British were 
keen to ensure that the Philippines were not included in ANZUS, because 
such an inclusion would completely undermine British influence in the 
region.
With respect to the Japanese Peace Treaty, New Zealand had always 
been more pessimistic about Australia’s and New Zealand’s chances of 
influencing its conclusion. For example, regarding Japan, McIntosh had 
long thought “all [New Zealand] could do is to plug the old line and see 
what, if anything can be salvaged.” For McIntosh, it seemed unrealistic 
to hope for the demilitarisation of Japan based purely on Australian 
and New Zealand objections. The only acceptable compromise was a 
“guarantee against Japanese aggression.”36 In a similar spirit, Doidge 
expressed New Zealand’s reservations about the long-term possibility 
of revived Japanese aggression. Doidge told Dulles that his explanation 
for the US plan for Japan in the short term was “highly convincing”, but 
it “did not seem to cover the long term possibilities.”37 Australia and 
34 Spender to Harrison, 21 February 1951, NAA, A6768, EATS 77 Annex A.
35 Robb and Gill, “The ANZUS Treaty during the Cold War”, 139.
36 McIntosh to Berendsen, 12 April 1950, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 225.
37 Notes on the Australian-New Zealand-United States Talks in Canberra, 15-17 
February 1951, DNZER Vol. III, 599-606.
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New Zealand needed some other guarantee to cover themselves against 
the long-term prospects in Japan.
Doidge also raised concerns about New Zealand military 
commitments elsewhere. Holland had told him that he was concerned 
about what a Pacific Pact might mean for its obligations in the Middle 
East if its provisions did not adequately protect New Zealand’s security 
concerns closer to home. “We cannot do both”, Doidge said to Dulles, 
passing on Holland’s reservations, “a Pacific Pact [cannot] lead us into 
obligations which would conflict with those we undertook to fulfil in 
the Middle East.” Doidge also pointed out the “folly of securing the 
front door and leaving the back door open.” New Zealand’s military 
commitment to global strategy could only be met, as Doidge stressed, 
with a “guarantee from the United States” in New Zealand’s “back 
door.”38
As a possible compromise, talks moved towards a trilateral regional 
security pact. When Spender and Doidge argued for a pact on 16 
February, Dulles spoke about the difficulties it would cause for the 
Philippines, which only had an informal US guarantee. He also raised 
Britain’s clear objections to a pact, as the British Foreign Office did not 
want to see a US treaty with two Commonwealth nations that excluded 
Britain as a signatory. Spender, who was unaware Britain had pressed 
the United States to reconsider discussions for a pact with Australia and 
New Zealand, protested vehemently. He pointed out that Britain was 
no longer a major Pacific power and its objections were not relevant.
After lengthy discussions, Dulles agreed to examine possible draft 
tripartite pacts. Ralph Harry, part of the Australian delegation during 
the talks, prepared a possible treaty. Harry had studied the NATO 
treaty and hoped to model his draft on its provisions, suggesting that 
Dulles was more likely to accept its clauses if “every point […] [had a] 
precedent in some other treaty to which the US was a party.”39 Harry’s 
draft, although amended to meet Dulles’s more specific demands about 
the scope of any commitment, provided a solid base for discussions 
between Spender, Doidge and Dulles on 17 February. After the meeting, 
38 Ibid., 599.
39 The Dulles Visit to Canberra, DAFP: ANZUS, 78.
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the three representatives agreed that the draft should be presented to 
their respective governments for further consideration.
Even after a draft treaty was agreed upon, there were still three 
potential issues that threatened to derail the entire project. The first 
was getting the treaty through the US Senate. In the lead up to its 
presentation to the Senate, Spender and Berendsen were still discussing 
changes to the wording with Dulles. Berendsen was particularly 
apprehensive about what these discussions might entail. “Here we have 
been offered on a platter the greatest gift that the most powerful country 
in the world could offer to a small and comparatively helpless group of 
people and we persist in niggling and naggling about what seems to me 
to be the most ridiculous trifles”, Berendsen told McIntosh on 25 June. 
He added that this sort of “stupid pin-pricking” could “cost us very 
dearly.” Berendsen feared that late objections to the treaty’s provisions 
would prevent getting it through the Senate. “It is not Acheson, Rusk, 
Dulles, the President and the State Department that we need to worry 
about”, Berendsen suggested, “it is the Senate, and my mind is on the 
Senate all the time.” Senate approval, according to Berendsen, was the 
“most difficult hurdle”, and trying to get further assurances from Dulles 
could “ruin the whole thing.”40 It certainly appeared that Berendsen had 
come around to the idea of a more binding commitment with the United 
States.
The second issue was British objections to the conclusion of the 
ANZUS Treaty. From London’s perspective, ANZUS demonstrated 
to the world that Britain was incapable of protecting Commonwealth 
countries in the Pacific and potentially threatened its positions in Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Malaya. While Whitehall was pleased that the 
Philippines was not ultimately included in the draft treaty and British 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Kenneth Younger acknowledged 
publicly that ANZUS was “a most useful contribution to Commonwealth 
strategy”, the British Government deeply resented the conclusion of 
ANZUS without being included as a signatory. “We are most certainly 
a Pacific power”, British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison argued, 
40 Berendsen to McIntosh, 25 June 1951, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 265-266; Berendsen 
to McIntosh, 13 July 1951, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 267.
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and “it would not have been unwelcome to us if we were included in 
the proposed pact.”41
British efforts to stifle and undermine ANZUS came well before the 
treaty’s presentation to the Senate. While Dulles was in Tokyo finalising 
the peace treaty and post-occupation plans, Political Representative 
of the British Liaison Mission Sir Alvary Gascoigne told him that the 
UK Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to accept the US as Australia’s and 
New Zealand’s chief protector. “From the standpoint of the United 
Kingdom’s position as a world power”, he told Dulles on 2 February, the 
proposed Pacific Pact “would be interpreted in the Pacific and elsewhere 
as a renunciation of [Britain’s] responsibilities and possibly as evidence 
of [a] rift in policy between Britain and the United States.”42 He also 
argued that excluding Asian countries would encourage aggression in 
areas where Communist activity was highest.
Then, during ANZUS negotiations, Britain went to great lengths to 
prevent the US signing a formal agreement with Australia and New 
Zealand by voicing its strong discontent in Washington. London “hated” 
the idea of the ANZUS Treaty and had been doing its best to “head the 
Americans off and get them to substitute a Presidential Declaration”, 
McIntosh suggested in March 1951. The British also played on Dulles’s 
concerns over the inclusion of the Philippines. As McIntosh described 
shortly after Dulles’s visit to Canberra,
The British are obviously doing their best to torpedo the whole thing and 
they want to represent to the Americans the undesirability of including 
the Philippines because of the adverse effect it would have on United 
Kingdom prestige, more particularly in United Kingdom territories like 
Borneo, Malaya, Hong Kong and so forth. The Australians are ropeable 
about the British. They say they have been doing everything they can 
before Dulles arrived and since he arrived to stop the treaty.43
Although New Zealand still considered itself tied firmly to the 
Commonwealth and the British Empire, even the New Zealand External 
Affairs Department was upset by British efforts to stifle conclusion of 
the pact. Along with Britain’s sudden recognition of Communist China 
41 Spender Memorandum, 19 April 1951, Spender Papers, Box 1, NLA.
42 Dulles to Rusk, 2 February 1951, FRUS 1951 Vol VI Part I, 143-144.
43 McIntosh to Berendsen, 16 March 1951, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 255.
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in January 1950, which caused a noticeable rift in Anglo-American 
relations, Berendsen argued to McIntosh in early April that Britain were 
“behaving like stupid children” and had done a “great deal of harm.”44
Another distraction was the development of a Middle East Command, 
which was already being discussed in depth by US and British officials 
to protect Western interests in the region. Britain contacted Australia and 
New Zealand about the possibility of forming a Middle East Command 
in mid-1951. Australia and New Zealand shared similar post-war 
interests in the security of the Middle East. For both countries, the Suez 
Canal was the major shipping route to Britain and the rest of Europe. 
Access to the region’s oil reserves was also especially important for the 
post-war industrial development schemes of both countries. However, 
it was only after New Zealand protestations over how little opportunity 
it had to influence policy and defence decisions that it accepted a formal 
British invitation to participate in the Middle East Defence Command.
Australia, on the other hand, was far less forthcoming in its support 
for a defence commitment to the Middle East. While Canberra “agreed 
in principle” to the Command and was willing to participate in 
discussions, the Australian External Affairs Department stressed that 
its agreement “[did] not involve any commitment to provide forces 
to the Middle East.” Its final position on the Command would be 
“substantially affected by arrangements for higher political direction 
and by views which are worked out as to the place of Southeast Asia 
in those elements of strategy which are relevant to Australia.”45 For 
Australian policymakers, ANZUS had to remain the priority.
Lastly, the final version and scope of the ANZUS Treaty had to be 
approved by the US military. Spender was particularly anxious about 
the military reaction to the ANZUS Treaty, as he hoped that it might 
provide a means for Australia to access US strategic plans and influence 
global strategy. After Dulles left Canberra in February, Spender wrote 
to him on 8 March and said, “I know you won’t mind me saying directly 
that we in this country are a metropolitan power in the Pacific and we 
hope that our view will be predominate.” He also hoped that closer ties 
with the United States might become a pretext for further US assistance 
44 Berendsen to McIntosh, 2 April 1951, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 257-259.
45 Middle East Command Report, 11 October 1951, NAA, A4462, 439/1/10 Part 1.
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in meeting Australia’s own defence production needs. In the same 
letter to Dulles, Spender wrote that “our objective is to get into full 
production, to increase our military forces and to take steps necessary 
to ensure that defence needs have priority. The lead which the United 
States has given on these matters is an inspiration”, Spender added, 
but urged that Australia needed more assistance to deal with “serious 
industrial troubles.”46 
While the Department of Defense had already indicated in January 
that the conclusion of the treaty was a favourable outcome for the 
United States, many top-ranking US military officials now argued that 
the scope of American military and strategic consultation obligations 
should be as narrow as possible. In a combined State Department-
Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on 11 April, Chief of Naval Operations 
Forrest Sherman stressed the “value of informality in establishing joint 
planning” and indicated his preference for “leaving such arrangements 
out of the treaty.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley 
agreed with Sherman’s conclusions. In Bradley’s estimation, combined 
planning was “theoretically all right but practically objectionable” 
because too many countries would have access to US strategic plans 
and could thereby complicate the policymaking process.47
Two days after this meeting, Secretary of Defense George Marshall 
suggested even at this late stage that, from a military perspective, any 
formal commitment to Australia and New Zealand’s defence was not 
an ideal outcome for the United States. “Any trilateral agreement with 
Australia and New Zealand should be made a simple understanding 
or public declaration rather than a formal pact.” Marshall wrote to 
Acheson on 13 April. At the very least, Marshall argued that “if political 
considerations are so overriding that a formal pact must be made, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose the inclusion in the pact of any reference to 
military plans, planning or organisations.” Recognising that a formal 
treaty was necessary for Australian and New Zealand acquiescence to 
the Japanese Peace Treaty, Dulles and Acheson refused to make a public 
declaration rather than a formal commitment. However, they accepted 
these military views and made sure to omit any reference to secret 
46 Spender to Dulles, 8 March 1951, Spender Papers, Box 1, NLA.
47 Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 11 April 1951, NARA, RG 59, Lot 
64, D 563.
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military planning under the ANZUS Treaty. “In the case of the trilateral 
arrangement with Australia and New Zealand”, Dulles told Acheson, 
“we can, I think, make it clear that any organisation thereunder will not 
have the right to demand knowledge of and to participate in planning.”48
Figure 10. ANZUS logo. Archives New Zealand (n. d.), Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/
archivesnz/20921987801/, CC BY 2.0.
Despite these uncertainties, the US Senate approved the ANZUS 
Treaty. Several days before the Japanese Peace Treaty was signed formally, 
Acheson, along with Australian and New Zealand representatives Percy 
Spender and Carl Berendsen, signed the ANZUS Treaty at a ceremony 
at The Presidio in San Francisco on 1 September 1951. The treaty was 
planned to enter into force on 29 April 1952. Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States were now allied formally and agreed to respond to 
mutual dangers in the Asia-Pacific region. After securing the agreement 
with the Americans, Spender declared that ANZUS was a momentous 
landmark in Australian history. In his view, ANZUS did more than 
express formally the close ties of comradeship between the parties; it 
48 Marshall to Acheson, 13 April 1951, FRUS 1951 Vol. VI Part I, 202; Dulles to Acheson, 
13 April 1951, FRUS 1951 Vol. VI Part I, 203.
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also marked “the first step in building of the ramparts of freedom in the 
vast and increasingly important area of the Pacific Ocean.” He added 
that the treaty was “directed to regional security in the Pacific” and took 
the “first step towards what we hope will prove to be an ever widening 
system of peaceful security in the vital area.”49 
Spender’s New Zealand counterpart, Frederick Doidge, also 
welcomed the conclusion of the treaty but appeared less convinced 
about its significance. The treaty represented “nothing new in the 
relationship of the three countries”, Doidge announced to the New 
Zealand House of Representatives on 13 July, as there was already “a 
deep and firm understanding on security between the United States and 
ourselves.” Unlike the other ANZUS powers, Doidge also alluded to the 
possibility of future British membership or consultation. In the same 
address, Doidge announced that “the New Zealand Government looks 
forward, in giving effect to the provisions of this treaty, to the closest 
consultation with the United Kingdom and other powers concerned 
with the security of the Pacific […] both New Zealand and Australia have 
special obligations in defence as members of the British Commonwealth 
of Nations.”50 The issue of British membership of ANZUS surfaced later 
once the treaty came into effect.
Doidge’s comments aside, the ANZUS Treaty undoubtedly signalled 
a crucial new era of Australian-New Zealand-American relations. In 
finalising its conclusion, Spender achieved what most people thought 
might be impossible. Given the circumstances, he could not have 
secured a more binding commitment from the United States at the time. 
Dulles certainly meant what he said when he told Spender’s wife Jean 
that “there would have been no ANZUS without Percy.” Achieved in 
the face of active opposition within the United States, Britain and most 
of the Commonwealth, it was one of the most impressive achievements 
by any Australian foreign affairs minister. If the ANZUS Treaty would 
be effective in practice, however, remained to be seen.
49 US Department of State Bulletin, 24 September 1951, reproduced in ANZUS Council 
Preparations, 24 July 1952, Acheson Papers, TL.
50 Doidge Statement, 13 July 1951, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol. 294, 
1951, 318-319.
PART TWO: ANZUS IN FORCE

5. Post-Treaty Issues
Conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty was a watershed moment in 
Australian and New Zealand history. After the 1944 Australia-New 
Zealand Agreement, ANZUS was the first major international treaty 
that Australia and New Zealand signed that did not include Britain as 
a member. While policymakers in Canberra and Wellington stressed 
that its conclusion would not weaken their country’s ties to the British 
Commonwealth, ANZUS testified to Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
newfound security reliance on the United States during the early Cold 
War. Although it was a far less historic event in Washington, ANZUS 
enabled the United States to finalise the Japanese Peace Treaty and 
provide further support to its defence structure along the Pacific Rim. 
Even allowing for this difference in significance, ANZUS was important 
for all three countries. 
Once ANZUS came into effect, however, there were still four key 
post-treaty issues that the signatories needed to address. Firstly, 
opinions were divided over the proposed machinery of the treaty. 
While New Zealand had no issues with the ANZUS consultation 
and discussion process, Australia wanted greater access to strategic 
and military planning undertaken by NATO and the Pentagon. The 
Americans, however, were unwilling to provide such access. Secondly, 
opinions were also divided over the question of British membership. 
New Zealand wanted Britain to be included as a member of ANZUS, 
the United States opposed British inclusion, and Australia remained 
ambivalent. Thirdly, once it was clear that Britain would not become a 
treaty member, planning began for a separate defence arrangement for 
Southeast Asia through the Five Power Staff Agency. Again, hoping to 
include Britain, New Zealand thought that this new mechanism might 
© 2018 Andrew Kelly, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0141.05
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be a means to merge ANZUS with Commonwealth defence planning 
in Southeast Asia. Australia, on the other hand, remained aloof until its 
diplomats received confirmation from Washington that ANZUS would 
not be superseded by these new defence arrangements. Washington 
did not intend to replace ANZUS with a broader defence mechanism in 
Southeast Asia, but major US commitments were put on hold until after 
the 1952 elections. Finally, uncertainty over the future of ANZUS ensued 
after Dwight Eisenhower replaced Truman as US President in January 
1953. In Australia and New Zealand, policymakers were concerned 
by new US national security strategies and whether the Eisenhower 
Administration viewed ANZUS as a serious commitment.
ANZUS Machinery and Membership
After the ANZUS Treaty was finalised and presented to the public, 
Spender was replaced as Australian External Affairs Minister and 
reassigned as Australian Ambassador to the United States in April 1951. 
As he played an instrumental role in concluding the treaty, Spender 
thought he was best placed to influence decision making in Washington 
and look after Australian interests. “I believe the next two or three years 
will be critical years in the history of civilisation”, Spender wrote to 
former US Ambassador in Canberra Myron Cowen on 5 April, “and it is 
in Washington that the decisions affecting the free world will be made.” 
Spender added that “I believe I can serve my country and the cause of 
peace in the world better in the USA than I can in any capacity at the 
moment in Australia.”1 His replacement as External Affairs Minister, 
Richard Casey, was tasked with ensuring Spender’s efforts to secure 
the ANZUS Treaty were not in vain and worked to serve Australian 
interests; namely, greater Australian-American strategic cooperation 
and military information exchange with the Pentagon. He was a more 
than capable successor to Spender. Serving previously as Australia’s 
first Minister to Washington and a Cabinet Minister during the ANZUS 
negotiations, Casey’s thirty years of experience in international affairs 
1 Spender to Cowen, 5 April 1951, Spender Papers, Box 1, NLA.
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made his appointment as External Affairs Minister a role “for which his 
whole life seemed to have prepared him.”2 
Figure 11. Australian External Affairs Minister Richard Casey (1951-1960), 1951. Photo by 
Australian News and Information Bureau (1951), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Richard_Casey_1951.jpg, Crown Copyright.
Even for Casey, it was not an easy assignment. ANZUS did not require 
American policymakers to share their strategies with Australia and New 
Zealand, nor did it specify that Canberra or Wellington must be informed 
of US intentions before any decisions were made. Annual ANZUS 
Council meetings between External Affairs and State Department 
officers, as well as a small representation from the US military, became 
the basic mechanism for trilateral discussions, yet these meetings were 
designed mostly for the Americans to outline the plans they had already 
made, rather than to consult with Australia and New Zealand over 
2 Christopher Waters, “Cold War Liberals: Richard Casey and the Department of 
External Affairs, 1951-1960”, in Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: Australian 
Foreign Policy Making, 1941-1969, Jean Beaumont, Christopher Waters, David Lowe 
and Gary Woodard eds. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003), 89.
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their perspectives, objections and interests. US Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson later recalled:
Instead of starving the Australians and New Zealanders, we would give 
them indigestion. For two days we went over the situation in the world, 
political and military, with the utmost frankness and fullness. At the end 
they were very happy with political liaison through the Council and 
military planning through the Commander in Chief Pacific.3
United States military officials insisted that discussions should be 
mostly political and should not offer Australia and New Zealand any 
concrete information on military planning other than through the US 
Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC).
Members of the New Zealand External Affairs Department generally 
accepted this structure. As one adviser told Secretary McIntosh less than 
two weeks before the first ANZUS meeting in Honolulu during early 
August 1952, New Zealand “did not share the long-standing Australian 
objective of infiltration into the world’s policy-making hierarchy.”4 
Instead, Frank Corner suggested that all that New Zealand was seeking 
from the United States was basic consultation in Far Eastern matters 
rather than the high-level military and political discussions for which 
Spender had hoped. “What in fact we are all seeking to establish”, 
Corner told McIntosh, was ANZUS as a kind of “Dominion status with 
the United States, [and] a right to be consulted in Pacific and Far Eastern 
Affairs.”5 
George Laking, another New Zealand External Affairs Officer, was 
not even convinced that ANZUS was in any way useful for New Zealand. 
“The plain fact is we are getting nothing at all from the Americans, 
who have a childish faith in their ability to fox one and all”, Laking 
complained to Secretary McIntosh on 25 June 1951. “The chances of our 
knowing the right answers before the press are five to four against”, he 
added, and “the secret of it all [was] that the Americans don’t know the 
answers themselves until it happens.”6 McIntosh certainly sympathised 
3 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1987), 876-878.
4 Memorandum for McIntosh, 25 July 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/1 Part 8.
5 Corner to McIntosh, 20 February 1953, Archives NZ, EA, 316/4/1.
6 Laking to McIntosh, 25 June 1951, in Undiplomatic Dialogue, 76.
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with Laking’s reservations. Along with Foss Shanahan and Joseph 
Wilson, two of New Zealand’s External Affairs Officers, McIntosh 
conceded that New Zealand “never wanted the damn Pacific Pact in the 
first place.”7 
Before the first ANZUS meetings even began in August 1952, Casey 
recognised the difficulties that ANZUS posed for Australia and New 
Zealand. “ANZUS represents [two] difficulties: the fact that there is 
one very strong partner and two others very much less strong, and that 
any threat to which [Australia] may be exposed must come from the 
southward expansionist ambitions of Communist China which must 
come by land”, Casey penned in his diary on 1 August. He added that 
“the fact that the US will not even consider any further land obligations 
on the Asian mainland makes for an obviously anomalous position.” 
Unfortunately for Casey, he knew that there was little Australia could 
offer the United States in return for a greater commitment in Southeast 
Asia. “There are a great many great things that we could ask the 
Americans for”, Casey conceded, but “few things that we could offer 
them in exchange.”8
Spender, the architect of ANZUS, was having similar problems in 
Washington. “We need to put flesh on the bones of the Pacific Pact”, 
Spender argued to Casey, suggesting that the powers needed to agree 
on a “wide flung strategy” and not ignore the needs of home defence.9 
Much to Spender’s frustration, as Australia was not a NATO member, 
ANZUS was not allowing Australia to get its voice heard in any of 
NATO discussions. For Spender, this was important for Australia’s 
general strategic planning. “NATO decisions affect everyone and 
Australia should have the right to be heard, not only with respect to 
general strategic considerations but especially on matters directly 
affecting Australia”, Spender said in a State Department meeting on 20 
May 1952. Spender, in other words, was “not content to be the hair on 
7 McIntosh to Corner, 3 October 1952, in Unofficial Channels, 106.
8 Casey Diary Entry, 1 August 1952, in Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R. 
G. Casey, 1951-1960, T. B. Millar ed. (London: Collins, 1972), 84-85 (hereafter Casey 
Diaries).
9 Spender to Casey, 25 June 1952, Spender Papers, Box 1, NLA.
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the tail of the dog.” He felt that Australia should at least be “part of the 
hide of the dog itself.”10
Acheson was unprepared to meet Spender’s demands. Brushing 
off these concerns, Acheson proposed that “if the Australians wanted 
real contact with the American Government and its thinking on world 
problems, it was highly desirable that they keep in touch with the 
Department of State and not continue to attempt to establish themselves 
in liaison with the Pentagon.” He added that “with particular regard to 
Pacific defence and its problems, the real planning was being done by 
Admiral Arthur Radford (US Chief Commander in the Pacific) and his 
staff in Hawaii. If the Australians and New Zealanders really wanted 
contact with US military planning operations, this was the place for it.”11 
In short, Acheson advised that the Australians and New Zealanders 
should stick with their present contacts in the Department to obtain 
information relating to global strategic plans. The ANZUS Council 
meetings were Australia and New Zealand’s supposed “door of entry” 
to information on US global planning, but not to NATO.12 
It was simply not possible for Australia and New Zealand to expect 
any greater access to the Pentagon through ANZUS. If the ANZUS 
meetings got through the organisational steps in good order, however, 
Acheson offered that he would present a total picture that would give 
them “plenty to think about and work on.” It was certainly not the 
consultation for which Australia had hoped. New Zealand diplomats, on 
the other hand, believed this method of consultation was appropriate. 
New Zealand delegates at the first ANZUS Council meeting in Hawaii 
described the trilateral discussion as “a most successful one.”13
The US military did have one clear idea how Australia and New 
Zealand could meaningfully contribute to the relationship. While ANZUS 
was originally designed to protect against mutual security threats solely 
in the Pacific theatre, US military planners began to suggest that Australia 
10 Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, 20 May 1952, Secretary of State 
File, Acheson Papers, TL.
11 Memorandum of Conversation, 4 August 1952, Secretary of State File, Acheson 
Papers, TL.
12 Watt to McIntosh, 12 July 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/1 part 8.
13 Memorandum for Holland, 15 August 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/1 part 8; 
Webb Statement, 12 August 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/15 part 1.
 995. Post-Treaty Issues
and New Zealand should also be prepared to commit their forces to 
defending the Middle East. During another joint State Department-Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) meeting in late November, JCS Chairman Omar 
Bradley concluded that it would be “good performance” for Australia 
and New Zealand to commit infantry divisions to any future hostilities 
in the Middle East.14 By JCS estimates, this trans-Tasman contribution 
would assist in meeting the “ground force deficiencies” under current 
American contingency plans for war with the Soviet Union in the region. 
For Bradley, Australian and New Zealand military contributions to the 
Middle East (as well as contributions from other countries) should still 
come under the guise of a joint defence Command. There was a “need 
for the early establishment” of the Middle East Defence Command, 
Bradly concluded, as this organisation would undertake the joint 
military planning required to defend the region from Soviet control.
By this stage, however, the Australians had cooled even further 
towards the idea of the formation of a Command. Australian External 
Affairs Secretary Alan Watt expressed serious reservations about 
the Command because it offered Australia absolutely no method 
of influencing the decision-making process. According to Watt, the 
proposed Command structure did not give Australia “an adequate 
political voice in [the] political direction of the Middle East Command.”15 
There was also little Australian support for a commitment to the Middle 
East because policymakers in Canberra believed that the security of the 
Pacific region was far more important. As New Zealand External Affairs 
Secretary Alister McIntosh reported from his trip to Canberra on 6 May 
1952, “the Australians felt that there was a large element of unreality 
about the Middle East Command.” He suggested that the Australians 
“preferred a Pacific approach, and the construction of a relationship 
with the Americans, through a Pacific Defence Council.”16
For different reasons, New Zealand began to reconsider the 
usefulness of a Command. McIntosh and Shanahan conceded on 13 
14 Department of State Minutes of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 28 November 
1952, RG 59, NARA, Lot 61, D 417.
15 Middle East Command – Australian Views, 22 May 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/39/2 
Part 3; Meeting between Watt and McIntosh, 6 May 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/39/2 
Part 3.
16 Note for File, 6 May 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/39/2 Part 3.
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June 1952 that “there will probably be some military secrets from which 
we will be excluded”, but did not think this prevented New Zealand 
from actively supporting the Command. According to McIntosh and 
Shanahan, there were other more pressing issues about the arrangement 
that brought its usefulness into question. For one, they both thought 
that “serious differences in views between the United States and 
Britain” in the Middle East—such as the make-up of the Command 
personnel, US policies toward Egypt and the Suez Canal, and British 
intentions for nearby Sudan—made the proposed Command a potential 
disaster for Western interests in the region.17 They also concluded that 
tense relations with Egypt over British bases near Suez presented a 
complicated situation to address for the Command powers, especially 
in the wake of Cairo’s refusal to participate.
ANZUS itself was complicated further by the question of British 
membership. For the first time in Australian and New Zealand history, 
the two former British colonies signed a major international defence 
treaty that did not include Britain as a member. London argued that 
its exclusion was a blow to its international prestige, signalled a 
clear military weakness in the Commonwealth, and might cause a 
serious rift in Anglo-American relations. On these grounds, British 
policymakers ignored Australian and New Zealand representations 
and strongly objected to ANZUS. After the Foreign Office was initially 
unable to prevent the treaty’s conclusion in early to mid-1951, British 
policy changed to press upon the ANZUS powers the need for British 
membership either directly as a signatory to, or indirectly as an observer 
of, Council meetings. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden argued on 
19 April 1951 that Britain should be included in the alliance because “any 
threat to either Australia or New Zealand must always be calculated 
as a threat to [Britain].” He went on to suggest that British interests in 
Malaya “make it essentially a Pacific Power.”18
Winston Churchill, who had returned to office in late 1951 for his 
final stint as prime minister, also staunchly objected to British exclusion 
from ANZUS. Believing that links between Britain and the Dominions 
were still strong, Churchill saw the need for his government to play a 
17 Meeting between McIntosh and Shanahan, 13 June 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/39/2 
Part 3.
18 Eden Statement, 19 April 1951, UK Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 484, 2007-2008.
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larger role in Pacific defence planning to “guide” US strategy against 
the Communist bloc. In short, without closer Anglo-American strategic 
cooperation, British interests in the Pacific were likely to become 
increasingly marginalised by US strategists when they considered 
issues of concern in this region. Churchill pushed for British inclusion 
on two fronts: lobbying in Washington on many occasions during 
1951-1953, and appealing to Australia and New Zealand to convince 
the Americans to include Britain in ANZUS.19 Finding support in 
Canberra and Wellington would not have appeared too difficult to 
Churchill, especially since pro-British sentiment in these countries was 
particularly strong. However, the extent to which the Pacific Dominions 
would be able to convince the Americans to include Britain in ANZUS 
was certainly overstated.
The Australians were divided over British membership. Given 
his well-established predisposition to support Britain and its policies 
abroad, Menzies was receptive to Churchill’s reasoning and agreed that 
London should be included in ANZUS in some capacity. He told British 
officials on 5 June that he was “very much in favour” of closer association 
with the United Kingdom through ANZUS.20 He then told Casey and 
Spender that “[Australia] should not place any obstacle in United 
Kingdom efforts” to join ANZUS Council meetings as an observer […] 
provided the Americans are willing to play and provided the United 
Kingdom request does not involve our acceptance of a string of other 
countries in the same capacity.”21 These last two points were crucial for 
Menzies. Firstly, Menzies recognised that American agreement to British 
observer status was a key condition. This suggests that Menzies had in 
fact moved away from the idea of British leadership and recognised the 
need to prioritise the US position. Secondly, if the United States agreed, 
Menzies was willing to consider British consultation but feared that this 
might herald the expansion of ANZUS to include other Commonwealth 
countries. He did not want Australia becoming responsible for defending 
areas outside of its strategic interests.
19 Robb and Gill, “The ANZUS Treaty during the Cold War”, 147.
20 Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to UK High Commission in New 
Zealand, 5 June 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/6 part 1.
21 Menzies to Casey and Spender, 5 June 1952, NAA, 5954/1, 1418/3.
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Spender was unconvinced. He feared British inclusion might 
strain Anglo-American relations and Britain’s relations with other 
Commonwealth countries. Most importantly for Australia, British 
inclusion might dilute the usefulness of ANZUS meetings as a forum 
to consult with the United States on matters of regional and global 
strategy. If the United States and Britain were both present at ANZUS 
meetings and squabbled over their own disagreements, Australia’s 
voice might become increasingly marginalised. Before Britain could be 
seriously considered as an observer, he told Eden that it was “absolutely 
essential that the United States and United Kingdom get their lines 
straightened out and agree upon a common approach” towards pressing 
disagreements between Washington and London.22 Spender also told 
Menzies on 6 June 1952 that “while I appreciate the strength of [your 
observations] […] before any questions of ‘observers’ or any extension 
of the Pact to include other nations should arise, the Council should be 
first established.”23
Casey was more sympathetic to British concerns over exclusion from 
ANZUS. He recognised that the British were “very concerned about their 
being excluded from any official contact with the ANZUS Council.” He 
was also determined not to pursue closer US consultation at the expense 
of Australia’s relationship with Britain. Casey wrote at the outset of the 
first ANZUS Council meeting that “Australian relations with the US are 
close and confident, but I always have in mind the effect of any accord 
on the British. It would be counter-productive if our good relations 
with [the] US were at the expense of bad UK-US relations.” Along the 
lines of Menzies’s suggestion, he thought he might be able to include 
“UK people into the ANZUS Council as British Liaison Officers”, even 
though he recognised that Australia must execute “caution in extending 
‘observer’ rights to the United Kingdom or other countries.”24 Even 
if Britain did not become associated with ANZUS, Casey went as far 
as suggesting that Australia and New Zealand were already acting as 
British representatives for Commonwealth interests in the Asia-Pacific 
region through ANZUS. “ANZUS [was] only a local manifestation of 
22 Spender to Eden, 15 March 1952, Spender Papers, NLA.
23 Spender to Menzies, 6 June 1952, NAA, A1838/276, 686/6, part 1A.
24 Richard Casey, 3 August 1952, Casey Diaries, 85; Casey to Spender, 11 June 1952, 
NAA, A1838/289, 250/7/10, part 1.
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closer British-American relations”, Casey told the Australian Parliament 
in September 1952.”25 In other words, Australia and New Zealand would 
retain their roles as British outposts in the Pacific.
While the Australians were divided over the question of British 
membership, the New Zealanders agreed almost unanimously that 
Britain must be included in some capacity. New Zealand External Affairs 
Minister Thomas Clifton Webb thought that while “the Australians 
saw great difficulty for the United Kingdom to be associated with the 
Council”, New Zealand was “anxious to have the closest consultation 
with the United Kingdom on operation of [ANZUS].”26 Wellington had 
always been reluctant to adjust to American leadership in the Pacific 
because of its sentimental ties to Britain. Britain’s inclusion, even as an 
observer, was therefore greatly appealing. 
Including Britain also countered concerns in New Zealand that 
Australia and the US would dominate ANZUS discussions. “From New 
Zealand’s point of view”, a brief for the New Zealand delegation to the 
ANZUS Council meeting stated on 25 July 1952,
British participation would be a most useful counter-weight which would 
help to guard against [ANZUS] being influenced too much by Australia 
or the United States or both. United Kingdom would undoubtedly give a 
stability to the Council which might otherwise be lacking.27
In short, while the Australians were primarily concerned that British 
inclusion might prevent closer consultation with the United States 
through ANZUS, the New Zealanders wanted British inclusion 
precisely because it would prevent Australia and the United States from 
dominating ANZUS discussions.
After the first ANZUS meeting in August, McIntosh and Corner 
both expressed their concerns about British exclusion. On 3 October, 
McIntosh told Corner that he had “always wanted to have the United 
Kingdom in.” He even complained that during ANZUS meetings 
External Affairs Minister Webb “did not put up any fight whatsoever to 
have the United Kingdom in as observers.” In response, Corner replied 
25 Casey Statement, 24 September 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/6 part 1.
26 Webb to Holland, 8 June 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/6 part 1.
27 Brief for the Council Meeting: Relationship with the United Kingdom, 25 July 1952, 
Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/24.
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that US objections to British inclusion were the real problem. “It seems 
to me”, Corner wrote to McIntosh in December 1952, that 
The American unwillingness to include Britain in ANZUS springs from 
a refusal to share real power in the Pacific with any other country. They 
will talk to Australia and New Zealand, and will be most forthcoming 
with us, because we are so unequal and represent no real challenge to 
their right of decision. But the British are a different proposition and if 
they were admitted they would bring much greater weight and prestige 
and would require that America shared its power of decision.28
Corner’s concerns about US opposition to admitting Britain into ANZUS 
proved to be correct. Casey told Acheson in the first ANZUS meeting in 
early August that he was under considerable pressure from the British to 
have them brought into ANZUS planning. He said that British Foreign 
Minister Anthony Eden “feels very deeply” on this question and had 
pressed Casey to push the British case. Acheson, in response, said he felt 
that this was “completely impossible.”29 
The United States, preferring to “go it alone” in the Pacific rather 
than including Britain, had no interest whatsoever in including it in 
ANZUS in any capacity. While Acheson told Menzies that he thought 
the ANZUS powers should “keep no secrets” from the United Kingdom, 
he was not prepared to offer them “any special consideration” through 
ANZUS.30 After informing Eden of his decision in August 1952, 
Acheson’s stern comments ended any further serious discussion about 
British membership. Acheson was determined to assert that the United 
States was indeed the dominant power in the relationship and would 
not accept changes to the treaty that did not suit US interests. Unable to 
sway American opinion, British policymakers eventually conceded that 
“Australia and New Zealand had grown up” and London would not be 
directly associated with ANZUS in any capacity.31 
28 McIntosh to Corner, 3 October 1952, in Unofficial Channels, 106; Corner to McIntosh, 
17 December 1952, in Unofficial Channels, 112.
29 Memorandum of Conversation, 4 August 1952, Secretary of State File, Acheson 
Papers, TL.
30 NZ Embassy in Canberra to Webb, 24 July 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/1 part 8; 
Memorandum for Webb, 14 August 1952, Archives NZ, EA, 111/3/3/1 part 8.
31 Corner to McIntosh, 11 December 1952, in Unofficial Channels, 109.
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Another interesting element that has recently received greater 
attention regarding the US response to British inclusion in ANZUS is the 
issue of race. While Acheson privately stated that there was no capacity 
for Britain to be involved in ANZUS, US public explanations suggested 
that including Britain would increase anxieties in the Asia of an “Anglo-
Saxon” or “White Man’s Club” in the region.32 This reasoning was 
hardly convincing, especially since all three ANZUS signatories were 
already predominantly Anglo-Saxon. It does, however, echo some of the 
concerns Dulles originally had when conducting treaty discussions in 
Canberra and explains why he was particularly interested in including 
the Philippines in the pact. It was certainly not a primary consideration, 
but perceptions over race did inform Dulles’s thinking and influenced 
broader US concerns about its image in Asia. The US was mindful of 
domestic race relations with African Americans and certainly wanted 
to win the propaganda war against the Soviet Union in the developing 
world. In this case, though, it seems that concerns over an exclusionary 
defence treaty based on race were something of a convenient excuse for 
not including Britain in ANZUS.
A Five-Power Staff Agency
After being rejected from ANZUS as an observer, Britain instead pushed 
for the conclusion of a Five-Power Staff Agency between the United 
States, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand for the collective 
defence of Southeast Asia. In December 1952, British, American 
and French representatives met in Paris and agreed in principle to a 
coalition for liaison on intelligence and other defence matters in the 
region. In a follow-up meeting in London, Churchill stressed that “it 
was unreasonable for ANZUS staff planners to deal with the Pacific 
and Southeast Asia without direct assistance from the British.”33 Then, 
in a separate meeting with Dominion representatives, Churchill told 
Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers Robert Menzies and 
32 Robb and Gill, “The ANZUS Treaty During the Cold War”, 145. For a broader 
examination of the element of race in the Australian-American relationship, 
see Travis Hardy, The Consanguinity of Ideas: Race and Anti-Communism in the 
US-Australian Relationship, 1933-1953. PhD Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2010.
33 External Affairs Memorandum, 16 January 1953, Archives NZ, EA, 434/8/1 Part 2.
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Sidney Holland that the Agency would essentially be a revitalised 
and widened version of previous ANZAM defence arrangements 
between their three countries. He handed both Menzies and Holland 
a newly revised British defence policy document called “The Future of 
ANZAM”, which outlined Britain’s plans for the Agency as well as a 
new focus on defending Malaya from Communist aggression.34 This 
plan, in short, aimed to expand previous cooperation between Australia, 
New Zealand and the British into a defence arrangement for Southeast 
Asia that also included the United States and France. This arrangement 
would effectively supersede ANZUS and enable Britain to be as closely 
involved as possible in the defence planning for the region. 
New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland was particularly 
excited at the prospect of creating a Staff Agency. If the United States 
agreed to take part, Holland thought it was a fantastic opportunity to 
incorporate Britain in Pacific defence planning after their attempts to join 
ANZUS were blocked by the State Department. It would be a “marriage 
of ANZUS and ANZAM”, Holland said, adding that the Agency could 
become a prelude to a joint machinery in the whole Pacific.35 In other 
words, Holland hoped to reignite discussions over including Britain as 
an ANZUS partner.
Support for the proposal was less forthcoming in Wellington. Frank 
Corner considered that, given the proposition of French membership 
coupled with the deteriorating situation in Indochina, the Agency 
appeared to be intended primarily for multilateral defence discussions 
about that region. As a result, he questioned whether a focus on 
Indochina was in New Zealand’s best interests. The Agency aimed to 
deal primarily with the “vital problems in Indochina” and “raise French 
morale”, Corner told McIntosh, and he also thought the Pentagon was 
only interested in the Agency for “considering practical problems 
relating to Indochina.”36 
34 Meeting between Churchill, Menzies and Holland, 12 December 1952, NAA, 
A5954/1, 1424/1.
35 Hiroyuki Umetsu, “The Origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve: 
The UK Proposal to Revitalise ANZAM and the Increased Defence Commitment 
to Malaya”, Australian Journal of Politics and History 50, no. 4 (2004), 517, https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2004.00350.x 
36 Corner to McIntosh, 20 February 1953, in Unofficial Channels, 125.
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In the Australian External Affairs Department, however, Casey and 
Spender were greatly concerned that the creation of a joint Staff Agency 
for the defence of Southeast Asia would undermine the importance of 
ANZUS. Similarly, they were also concerned that an Agency would 
prevent Canberra from consulting directly with Washington on security 
issues in the region. As Truman’s second term as US President was soon 
scheduled to end, Casey and Spender thought that Australia should 
push for an ANZUS Council meeting with the Americans shortly 
after new President-elect Dwight Eisenhower took office to gauge his 
Administration’s views on the subject. To “offset any danger” that the 
Agency might undermine ANZUS military planning, Spender urged 
Casey to call an ANZUS meeting shortly after Eisenhower took office.37
Fearing the political effect it would have in London, New Zealand 
responded unfavourably to an ANZUS meeting. Webb told the 
Australians shortly after the meeting was proposed that it was untimely 
“to press for an early ANZUS meeting at least at this juncture” 
because it might aggravate the British.38 Secretary in the Australian 
Commissioner’s Office in Wellington J.S. Cumpston then tried to urge 
New Zealand to reconsider. When meeting with Shanahan and McIntosh 
in late February, Cumpston attempted to persuade both men of the 
need for an early ANZUS meeting with the Americans. Their response, 
however, was again quite negative due to concerns about the effect an 
early ANZUS meeting would have in London. Wellington dismissed 
subsequent Australian efforts to urge New Zealand to support an earlier 
ANZUS meeting in March.
Meanwhile, after initial consultation with London, the United 
States agreed in principle to the establishment of a Five-Power Staff 
Agency for the defence of Southeast Asia. While the arrangement did 
not specifically commit any country to military action, it did provide 
a basic framework for joint-defence planning in the region. Delegates 
agreed that each country would appoint a military representative to 
coordinate defence plans with one another, as well as exchange all 
available intelligence information useful to the defence of Southeast 
Asia. As Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs John Allison advised 
37 Spender to Casey, 2 January 1953, NAA, A5954/1, 1424/1.
38 Webb to Casey, 21 January 1953, NAA, A5461/1, 1/4/2A Part 3.
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Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in late January, “I cannot conceive 
how we can engage in efficient planning for the military defence of 
the Pacific without engaging in some form of joint planning with our 
allies.”39
Allison argued that the Agency must take a different form to ANZUS 
for two reasons. Firstly, he thought that an enlargement of ANZUS 
would entail an unwanted US commitment to Hong Kong, Malaya 
and Indochina. Secondly, he urged Dulles that the Agency would be 
useful primarily because it would help prevent Chinese aggression in 
the region. US policymakers such as Allison, in other words, had no 
intention of expanding ANZUS or merely mollifying British concerns 
about defence planning for the region. Instead, the Agency “offered the 
best prospect of causing Communist China to cease an aggression”, the 
State Department concluded on 17 February.40
In Australia, policymakers continued to be concerned that the 
military function of ANZUS would be substantially absorbed by the 
Staff Agency. Australian Defence Minister Philip McBride told Menzies 
one week after the Conference that “the accent on planning for South 
East Asia has been transferred from an ANZUS to a Five Power basis.” 
He added that he was concerned that the Staff Agency might subsume 
ANZUS and ANZAM in the long-term future.41 Members of the 
Australian External Affairs Department were also anxious as to what 
the Agency would mean for the future of ANZUS military discussions. 
Assistant External Affairs Secretary Ralph Harry argued that the 
development of the Agency would lead to “the suspension by ANZUS 
of its military planning and concentration on political consultation”, 
mainly because the Agency’s proposed plan of studies would “seem 
to render redundant at least some of the current ANZUS military 
planning.”42
Given New Zealand’s great reluctance to hold an ANZUS Council 
meeting on the subject, Australia stepped up its own diplomatic efforts 
to obtain US views. In late May, Minister of the Australian Embassy 
in Washington Arthur Tange conferred with US Director of the Office 
39 Allison to Dulles, 29 January 1953, FRUS 1952-1954 Vol. XII Part I, 265.
40 Memorandum for Allison, 17 February 1953, FRUS 1952-1954 Vol. XII Part I, 232.
41 McBride to Menzies, 17 April 1953, NAA, A816/30, 11/301/855.
42 Harry to Hay, 21 April 1953, NAA, A1838/269, TS654/8/3/2 Part 2.
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of the British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Andrew 
Foster. Foster made it clear that given the Pentagon’s reluctance to 
underwrite the security of mainland Asia, the US did not think the Staff 
Agency should be “a formal and elaborate organisation.” The Agency 
should “rest on an ad hoc, on-call-need-to-know basis.” He assured 
the Australians that there was no prospect that the Agency would 
supplant ANZUS and ANZAM machineries. Regarding the concept of 
an ANZUS-ANZAM linkage, Foster claimed the US could not establish 
a firm position until it “learn[s] of any ideas that may come out of 
conversations” among the Commonwealth states on the reformation of 
ANZAM.”43 At least for now, Australian concerns about the future of 
ANZUS had been allayed.
Eisenhower in the Oval Office
As discussions surrounding ANZUS and the Five-Power Staff Agency 
took place in late 1952 and early 1953, major political changes in the 
United States complicated the future of defence arrangements in the 
Asia-Pacific region. President Truman’s second term as US President 
was scheduled to end in January 1953 and an election was planned 
for November 1952 to decide his replacement. After almost twenty 
years of Democrat control of the White House, the Republican Party’s 
Presidential candidate, Dwight “Ike” Eisenhower, won the election by 
campaigning on major changes to US foreign policy. While Ike strongly 
criticised Truman for plunging the United States into a costly and 
protracted war, Eisenhower promised he would end the war in Korea 
and reduce the financial deficit from overspending on the military.
On taking office, Eisenhower’s first major foreign policy initiative 
was appointing John Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State. Given his 
experience in international affairs, Eisenhower believed that Dulles was 
an “obvious” choice for the position.44 In Australia and New Zealand, 
Dulles’s appointment was especially important because both countries 
had experience in dealing with him during the ANZUS negotiations in 
early 1951.
43 Foster to Matthews, 29 May 1953, NARA, RG 59, 790.5/5-2953. 
44 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday & 
Co., 1963), 86.
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Figure 12. Eisenhower during the US Election Campaign in Baltimore, MD, September 1952. 
Credit: Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:I_like_Ike.jpg, Public domain.
Eisenhower’s most immediate foreign policy problem was ending 
a protracted and costly war in Korea. “Of the manifold problems 
confronting me early in 1953”, Eisenhower penned in his memoirs, 
“none required more urgent attention than the war in Korea.”45 He had 
famously visited Korea in late 1952, but had no precise idea about how 
to end the war. Fortunately for Eisenhower, in March US negotiators 
achieved a breakthrough with their North Korean and Chinese 
counterparts over an exchange of prisoners of war. After restraining 
South Korean President Syngman Rhee from continuing the war and 
accepting a compromise demarcation at the 38th parallel, an armistice 
was signed on 27 July 1953 that brought the Korean War to an end.
While an end to the fighting in Korea was a welcome development, 
Eisenhower continued to follow the previous Administration’s example 
and refused to recognise the PRC. In Australia, however, Casey thought 
that the end of the war made the prospect of recognising Beijing more 
palatable. Within weeks of the signing of the Armistice, Casey discussed 
with the Australian Cabinet how to approach China. He felt that it 
45 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 171.
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Figure 13. US President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961), 1952. Photo by Fabian Bachrach 
(1952), US Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/resource/cph.3c17123/, public domain.
was becoming increasingly important to open a dialogue with the 
Communist regime to prevent Mao from moving “closer into the arms 
of Moscow.”46 
Across the Tasman, Webb also thought that the end of the Korean 
War signalled a chance to reconsider the recognition of the PRC and 
thereby reduce tensions in East Asia. On 6 July, Webb went one step 
further and made his thoughts on recognising China public. Three days 
after Webb’s address, New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Leslie 
Munro reported that the speech had gravely concerned policymakers 
in Washington. The remarks “caused distress” in the United States, 
Munro told Webb on 9 July, and comments such as Webb’s “gravely 
disturbed the Americans.”47 Munro was especially concerned that the 
speech might affect New Zealand’s relationship with the United States 
and suggested that, in the future, New Zealand should publicly support 
the US position on China. 
Webb had anticipated that Australia was “inclined to take the 
American view” on China, and indeed McIntosh told Corner that his 
comments caused a “dislocation of the eyebrows in American and 
46 Cabinet Submission, 14 August 1953. NAA, A1838, 3107/33/1, Part 1. 
47 Munro to Webb, 9 July 1953, Archives NZ, EA, 264/3/14/1 Part 10; Munro to Webb 
31 July 1953, Archives NZ, EA, 264/3/14/1 Part 8.
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Australian circles.” According to McIntosh, Australia’s major concern 
was that Webb might push New Zealand towards recognising China 
without prior consultation.48 This concern suggests that there was little 
trans-Tasman communication or cooperation regarding the issue of 
Chinese diplomatic recognition.
Outside of East Asia, another concern for the ANZUS countries 
was reconsidering policy toward the Middle East. By the time of 
Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953, Egyptian General Gamal 
Abdel Nasser had already overthrown the Egyptian government led by 
King Farouk and he declared Egypt a republic in June. These dramatic 
events convinced the Eisenhower Administration that a Command 
structure was no longer an appropriate means for the defence of the 
Middle East. “We had decided to put the [Command] concept on the 
shelf”, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs 
John Jernegan told Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington 
Harold Beeley on 17 June, citing political instability in the region as 
the major reason for US reluctance to participate.49 Beeley replied that 
the British Foreign Office had a similar view and instead supported the 
idea of working closely with individual countries that appeared willing 
to defend Western interests in the region. At Beeley’s insistence, this 
included Australia and New Zealand.
In an NSC meeting, American policymakers confirmed that in their 
view a formal multilateral defence arrangement was no longer the best 
way to protect US interests in the Middle East. The Command was “no 
longer played up as a likely defense arrangement in the future”, US 
National Security Advisor Robert Cutler told the NSC on 9 July, and 
“Egypt was no longer considered to be the nucleus of an area defence 
organisation.” Secretary of State John Foster Dulles agreed. “The 
[Command] was too complicated, too much like NATO, and it obviously 
would not work”, Dulles said to Cutler, adding that “something 
less formal and grandiose was needed as a substitute.” The meeting 
concluded by agreeing that the United States should support Britain “to 
the greatest extent practical, but reserving the right to act with others or 
48 Webb to Scotten, 7 July 1953, Archives NZ, EA, 264/3/14/1 Part 8; McIntosh to 
Corner, 7 August 1953, in Unofficial Channels, 147-148.
49 Memorandum by Jernegan, 17 June 1953, NARA, RG 59, 780.3/6-1753.
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alone.”50 In other words, the United States remained committed to the 
defence of the Middle East, but it wanted greater flexibility in a future 
response if a crisis developed. 
For their part, Australia and New Zealand certainly agreed with 
abandoning the idea of a Middle East Command. In no uncertain 
terms, New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner in London Frank 
Corner argued that “the Middle East is of no direct importance to New 
Zealand.” He concluded that it was completely unsatisfactory “to be 
committed to fight in an area where we have no representation, no way 
of making an independent appraisal of conditions in the country where 
our troops will be placed [and] no way of influencing the governments.” 
Australian military officials reached similar conclusions. In one report, 
the Australian Defence Committee argued that “the threat to Southeast 
Asia is greater than that to the Middle East […] Southeast Asia should 
be given priority.”51 
Looking more broadly, the Eisenhower Administration also needed 
new national security strategies. After much deliberation, the National 
Security Council produced the NSC 162/2 report in late 1953, a formal 
statement that outlined Eisenhower’s “New Look” approach to foreign 
policy.52 NSC 162/2 aimed to achieve the same goals as Truman’s 
national defence policies, but would do so through more cost effective 
means; namely, through a reliance on nuclear weapons, an apparent 
willingness to use them and the subsequent deterrent effect on the 
belligerent Soviet bloc. It also relied on forming a number of defence 
pacts with Allied powers that aimed to ensure the United States would 
not again have to shoulder the burden of an entire military effort as it 
did in Korea. 
Part of this plan encompassed a continued commitment to the 
ANZUS treaty. In September, the second round of ANZUS Council 
meetings were held in Washington. During these meetings JCS 
Chairman Arthur Radford confirmed this sustained commitment 
50 National Security Council Meeting Minutes, 9 July 1953, Ann Whitman File, 
Eisenhower Papers, NSC Series, Box 3, EL.
51 A Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, 8 January 1953, NAA, A5954, 1353/2.
52 NSC Report, 30 October 1953, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 2, EL. See 
also Valerie Adams, Eisenhower’s Fine Group of Fellows: Crafting a National Security 
Strategy to Uphold the Great Equation (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 63-69.
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to the ANZUS partners, emphasising both his “continued interest 
in ANZUS” and the treaty’s overall “importance and value” to US 
defence planning in the Pacific. Commander of the US Pacific Fleet 
Admiral Felix Stump expressed similar sentiments. He stated that 
ANZUS military discussions would be used as “background material 
to national plans” in the Pacific theatre, particularly in relation to Five-
Power Agency defence discussions in Southeast Asia.53 ANZUS, in other 
words, would provide one basis for US defence planning in the region. 
The Australians and New Zealanders welcomed this arrangement, yet 
similar issues re-emerged to those presented during the first Council 
meetings one year earlier. Casey again raised the possibility of British 
membership of ANZUS, asking whether “any link could be created” to 
satisfy British membership demands. Spender also continued to express 
his discontent at the “insufficient planning and coordination” between 
the ANZUS partners in the event of a worldwide war and suggested the 
smaller ANZUS partners should be privy to US global war plans. Both 
suggestions, however, were dismissed by US representatives. In short, 
the United States remained committed to ANZUS under Eisenhower, 
but it was not prepared to change the membership or consultative 
arrangements of the alliance. 
Outside of these ANZUS discussions, Australian and New 
Zealand policymakers were seriously concerned by the Eisenhower 
Administration’s new national security policies. On the one hand, an 
increased US commitment to its formal allies suggests Eisenhower and 
Dulles were prepared to take ANZUS and the Five-Power Staff Agency 
seriously and consult more closely with Canberra and Wellington. 
On the other hand, a reliance on nuclear weapons opened further the 
serious possibility of another world war in which Australia and New 
Zealand would undoubtedly have been involved. 
New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Leslie Munro suggested 
that the new Administration would follow a “conservative line”, 
meaning that Eisenhower was looking to cut military spending and 
reduce direct US military involvement overseas during the 1950s. Such a 
policy, according to Munro, was not ideal for New Zealand, particularly 
53 Minutes of the ANZUS Council Meeting, 9-10 September 1953, NARA, RG 59, Lot 
60, D 627, CF 163.
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for Western defence positions in the Pacific.54 In terms of broader US 
strategy, there were similar concerns in New Zealand that Eisenhower’s 
proposed foreign-policy brinkmanship could be disastrous for the West. 
Many New Zealand diplomats regarded these policies as “misguided”, 
“misconceived” or “extreme.”55
While still concerned about the potential for global nuclear war, 
policymakers in Canberra were more optimistic about Eisenhower’s 
new national security strategies. Many officers within the Australian 
External Affairs Department hoped that increased US reliance on its 
defence pacts would heighten American involvement in Asia and the 
Pacific. If used cautiously, they were also optimistic that US nuclear 
diplomacy could prevent further Communist advances. Casey, for 
one, was hopeful that the “major re-appraisal of US foreign policy” 
would benefit Australia because it would create greater US interest in 
defending a region close to Australian borders. He thought, in turn, that 
Australia must capitalise on this unprecedented US interest in Southeast 
Asia and demonstrate that Canberra was a reliable US ally. “It would 
be bad value”, Casey later wrote in his diary, “to give Washington the 
impression that it was “contemplating retreat from [its] obligations.”56 
Testing the ANZUS powers’ commitment to defending Southeast Asia 
soon proved crucial, as Communist forces in Indochina sparked a major 
international crisis that tested the ANZUS commitment to Southeast 
Asia.
54 Laking to McIntosh, 25 February 1953, in Unofficial Channels, 127-128.
55 James Waite, “Contesting ‘the Right of Decision’”, 897-898.
56 Casey Diary Entry, 16 September 1954, Casey’s Diaries, 186.

6. Crisis in Southeast Asia
As Australian and New Zealand diplomats contemplated the repercussions 
of new US national security strategies during the early stages of the 
Eisenhower Administration, a Communist offensive in North Indochina 
threatened the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu and raised questions 
about US involvement in Southeast Asia. Before the outbreak of fighting 
in March 1954, Communist revolutionaries and the remnants of French 
colonial forces had been locked in a power struggle over Indochina for 
almost ten years. To a large extent, Eisenhower’s policy options toward 
this struggle were constrained by the choices of his predecessor. Under 
Truman, the United States had explicitly stated that France had a right to 
retake control of Indochina after the Japanese occupation that took place 
during World War II. From 1950 onwards, the Truman Administration 
actively aided the French war effort after France’s position in the 
region looked increasingly unstable. After promising an unwavering 
commitment to stop the spread of Communist aggression during the 1952 
election campaign, Eisenhower had little choice other than to continue 
supporting the French cause in Indochina even if Paris could not continue 
to hold its position alone.
Similarly, the Menzies and Holland governments had long been 
concerned about the deteriorating situation in Indochina and outlined 
a firm commitment to defending Communist aggression. In March 
1950, Australian External Affairs Minister Percy Spender thought that 
Indochina represented the “greatest present danger point” in Southeast 
Asia.1 Policymakers in Wellington reached similar conclusions. By 
1953, New Zealand High Commissioner in London Frank Corner was 
1 Spender Statement, 9 March 1950, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 627.
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convinced Indochina was the “key” to Southeast Asia. He argued 
that if the Communists were successful in Indochina, Malaya, Burma 
and Siam would also fall under Communist control. Corner was also 
hopeful that New Zealand might be able to work closely with Australia 
on Southeast Asian issues, even though he complained that “the 
Australians are often more interested in having a voice than solving 
practical problems.”2 
Siege at Dien Bien Phu
On 13 March 1954, tensions in Indochina reached a climax after 
Vietminh forces led an assault against the French fortress at Dien Bien 
Phu. The siege caused a major strain in Anglo-American relations, 
prompting Australia and New Zealand to seriously reconsider how 
closely, if at all, their respective External Affairs departments were 
prepared to align their policies with Washington. Moreover, even 
though the security of both countries rested on combating the spread of 
Communism Southeast Asia, there was no certainty that Australia and 
New Zealand could reach common ground as to the most appropriate 
response. On the contrary, two days after the first day of the siege, 
Frank Corner warned External Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh that 
New Zealand should not involve itself in the conflict purely to protect 
Australian strategic interests. He also doubted whether the future of 
Southeast Asia was in fact a vital interest for New Zealand. Predicting 
that Australia would push for joint intervention in Southeast Asia, 
Corner wrote on 15 March that New Zealand “should resist being 
dragged by the Australians […] into premature involvement in 
Southeast Asia.” He concluded that he felt “very dubious about 
bustling into commitments in Southeast Asia […] there is no good 
future for us there.”3
2 Corner to McIntosh, 20 February 1953, in Unofficial Channels, 122-127.
3 Corner to McIntosh, 15 March 1954, in Unofficial Channels, 158.
In Washington, JCS Chairman Arthur Radford warned Eisenhower 
that the United States must be prepared to intervene militarily in order 
to prevent the loss of all Indochina. In Radford’s own words, the United 
States “must be prepared […] to act promptly and in force possibly to a 
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Figure 14. Viet Minh soldiers capture French troops and escort them to a prisoner-of-war 
camp, 1954. Photo by unknown (1954), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Dien_Bien_Phu_1954_French_prisoners.jpg, public domain.
frantic and belated request by the French for US intervention.”4 Dulles, 
however, disagreed with Radford’s proposal. He feared that the United 
States might get embroiled in another protracted and costly war. He 
also thought that even if the Administration wanted to act unilaterally, 
Congress would be unlikely to authorise such action. Dulles’s sharp 
prediction proved correct; leaders from Republican and Democratic 
parties told him in early April that they would only sanction the use of 
US force if the Administration could obtain commitments from other 
allies, particularly Britain.
At the time, political discussion about combatting Communism 
and US defence was very heated. The Eisenhower Administration 
was under constant attack from hardline senators such as Joseph 
McCarthy who argued strongly that the United States was not doing 
anywhere near enough to combat Communism at home and abroad. 
Much to Eisenhower’s annoyance, these attacks separated the House 
of Representatives and Senate on almost every issue and often froze 
Congress so that it became an impractical and unmanageable sector 
4 Radford to Eisenhower, 24 March 1954, NARA, RG 59, 751.00/3-2454.
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of government. In short, Congressional backing for any short-term 
policy in Indochina was close to impossible. “It is close to disgusting”, 
Eisenhower wrote angrily, “it saddens me that I must feel ashamed for 
the United States Senate.” Already in his own fight with Congress, the 
President wrote in frustration several days later on 18 March that the 
Indochina Crisis was “just another of the problems dumped on [his] 
lap.”5 
In an effort to alleviate any domestic criticisms of US inaction, 
Eisenhower declared publicly that his government was committed 
to preventing the spread of Communism. He warned that the loss of 
French Indochina would have a domino effect that would leave the rest 
of Southeast Asia vulnerable to Communist control. In order to respond 
to this threat as well as curb domestic concerns of unilateral action, 
Dulles then proposed that the United States should act jointly with its 
allies in preventing the loss of Indochina to Communist forces. Advising 
the NSC that “there was no need” for immediate unilateral action, 
Dulles suggested making US intervention provisional on whether US 
allies would be willing to support such action. After Eisenhower agreed 
to this approach, Dulles followed up the “domino theory” speech with 
his own public call for a multilateral response to Indochina. Privately, 
plans were also made between Eisenhower and Dulles to use ANZUS 
meetings to consult with Australia and New Zealand. Knowing 
Canberra’s earnest desire for closer consultation with the United States, 
Eisenhower commented that this plan would make the Australians 
“terribly excited.”6 
In order to convince Canberra and Wellington that their participation 
in Indochina was important, Dulles made a decided effort to urge the 
respective Australians and New Zealand Ambassadors in Washington, 
Percy Spender and Leslie Munro, that the loss of Indochina would 
directly threaten the security of both of their countries. “If Indochina 
goes”, Dulles told Spender and Munro, “Australia and New Zealand 
will be directly threatened.” Dulles had already built a strong reputation 
as an astute diplomat with the Tasman countries following ANZUS 
5 Eisenhower to Hazlett, 18 March 1954, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 6, 
EL.
6 Eisenhower-Dulles Conversation Memorandum, 3 April 1954 Dulles Papers, 
Telephone Conversation Series, Box 6, EL.
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negotiations several years earlier, which he surely hoped would work in 
his favour when speaking directly about the importance of multilateral 
participation with Australian and New Zealand representatives in 
Washington.
Still concerned that London would not be willing to participate in 
multilateral intervention, Dulles also requested that US Ambassador to 
Australia Amos Peaslee make similar efforts to persuade policymakers 
in Canberra to support the American plan rather than aligning with 
British policy. “I hope you will take appropriate occasion to spell out 
our views in discussions with top officials”, Dulles told the US Embassy 
in Canberra, as he was concerned that the Australians would take a 
“similar line to [the] British.” It is indeed telling that Dulles made a 
point to stress directly that Peaslee should clearly outline US views on 
this topic, since it would already fall well within the scope of expected 
ambassadorial duties to share such views with top Australian officials. 
It suggests how important he thought it was to secure their support. 
Dulles, to be sure, remained hopeful that Australia and New Zealand 
could convince policymakers in London to participate. Whilst predicting 
there would be “great difficulties” in securing British support, Dulles 
thought that Australia and New Zealand would be “willing to urge the 
British in the right direction.”7 
Dulles, who shrewdly assessed that the Britons were highly unlikely 
to agree to his plan, highlighted the increasingly untenable position the 
Americans found themselves in regarding Indochina. Indeed, while the 
British were certainly keen for the French to retain control of Indochina, 
they were not prepared to use force due to fears that this could escalate 
into a larger war in the region. Even US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Arthur Radford, who visited London in April to convince the 
British to support military action, could not sway Churchill or Eden 
to back the American proposal. Instead of a military approach British 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden reasoned that a better course of action 
was to pursue a negotiated settlement, particularly because there was a 
conference in Geneva scheduled in a few weeks that would involve deep 
discussions about the situation in Indochina. If there was any possibility 
to steer British views toward a military solution before Geneva, Dulles 
7 Dulles to Peaslee, 1 April 1954, FRUS 1954 Vol. XIII Part I, 1204.
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saw Australia and New Zealand, two countries that still held strong ties 
to the British Commonwealth, as key negotiators that might be able to 
stress the value of a united military response in London.
On its surface, it was somewhat naïve of Dulles to think the two 
small Tasman countries may succeed where the United States could 
not in assuaging British concerns regarding Indochina. His initial 
discussions with Australian and New Zealand diplomats did, however, 
illustrate the increasingly important role that Canberra and Wellington 
could play in mitigating tensions in the Anglo-American relationship. 
It is also important to note that Dulles fully recognised the potentially 
disastrous consequences of a unilateral military response and that the 
American public had no appetite for another protracted war like the one 
fought on the Korean peninsula. Conceding that British acquiescence 
to the proposals of the United States would be extremely difficult 
to obtain, it is fair to assess that Dulles had few other options at his 
disposal to gather support for multilateral intervention. The stakes 
were extremely high, especially since US military planners had been 
seriously contemplating the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina while 
simultaneously questioning the usefulness of their alliance with Great 
Britain.8
In this light Dulles formally proposed “United Action” to Spender 
and Munro in early April, a term that referred to the US plan for a 
multilateral response in Indochina. Echoing Eisenhower’s earlier words, 
Dulles said that if Australia and New Zealand were not prepared to be 
“excited” by the coalition then the United States would not take action.9 
Again, Dulles stressed that British participation in this plan was crucial. 
He told both Spender and Dulles that a new military force was needed 
in Indochina and it “had to include Britain.” That being the case, Dulles 
asked both men to meet with diplomats in the British Embassy in 
Washington and urge them that the United States, Britain, Australia and 
New Zealand must all unite for the defence of Indochina to repel the 
Communist advance in Southeast Asia. 
8 Matthew Jones, “Great Britain, The United States, and Consultation over Use 
of the Atomic Bomb”, The Historical Journal 54, no. 3 (2011), 797-828, https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0018246X11000240
9 Memorandum of Meeting with Dulles, Spender and Munro, 4 April 1954, NARA, 
RG 59, 751.00/4-454.
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As far as the Australian position was concerned, Spender told Dulles 
that he could not commit his government while it faced a general 
election for the House of Representatives which was set for 29 May. 
On the surface, Australian reservations about a multilateral response 
appeared less about British inaction and more about domestic policy. 
Another domestic concern was the recent development of the Petrov 
Affair in early April, an event that saw Third Secretary of the Soviet 
Embassy in Canberra Vladmir Petrov offer details of Soviet espionage 
in Australia in exchange for political asylum. The Petrov Affair sparked 
considerable public outcry in Australia that the Menzies Government 
must do more to combat Communist threats domestically instead 
of focusing solely on overseas developments in Indochina. As one 
American report concluded, Petrov’s defection was the “biggest story 
of its kind that has ever happened in Australia.” As a result, Indochina 
had been “all but shoved of [the] front pages of newspapers by [the] 
Petrov Affair.”10 
Once Spender described his conversation with Dulles to Casey, 
however, he urged that Australia should accept this proposal as a means 
to increase US interest in defending Southeast Asia. As he told Casey,
One of the primary aims of our policy over recent years has been, as I 
understand it, to achieve the acceptance by the USA of responsibility for 
[South East] Asia. It is for consideration whether, if we fail to respond at 
all to the opportunity now presented, what US reactions are likely to be 
if and when areas closer to Australia are in jeopardy.11
Casey agreed it was crucial for Australia to support the US position in 
Indochina. As he penned in his diary one day after receiving Spender’s 
message, the United States “won’t go in alone” in Indochina and if 
“Australia and others don’t respond they may change their South-
East Asia attitude.”12 As the defence of Southeast Asia was crucial to 
Australian security, any decline in US interest in the region was a very 
10 Report from the United States Naval Attaché in Melbourne to the Department of 
Army, 2 April 1954, NARA, RG 59, 743.00W/4-254. For more on the Petrov Affair, 
see David Horner, The Spy Catchers: The Official History of ASIO, 1949-1963 (Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin, 2014); Robert Manne, The Petrov Affair (Sydney: Text Publishing, 
2004).
11 Spender to Casey, 6 April 1954, NAA, A5462/1, 2/4/1 Part 2.
12 Casey Diary Entry, 7 April 1954, NAA, M1153, 34.
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serious concern. Casey tried to urge the seriousness of the Indochina 
situation to the Australian public in the event that Australia might have 
to follow the United States into a war there. Gathering public support 
was crucial, as a large segment of the Australian public were still 
confused about what United Action entailed and what Australia’s role 
would be in such a plan. “If Indochina were to fall to the Communists 
the whole of Southeast Asia would be threatened”, Casey proclaimed 
in the House of Representatives on 7 April.13 This statement mirrored 
Eisenhower’s sentiments about the loss of Indochina having a potential 
domino-like effect on the rest of Southeast Asia.
Yet despite how seriously Casey feared the deteriorating situation 
in Indochina and any decline in US interest in Southeast Asia, he was 
unsure whether the United Action proposal was the best course. After 
speaking with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on 15 April, 
it was clear to Casey that Britain would not participate in the plan 
regardless of Australian efforts to encourage a military response. In any 
case, Casey thought personally that were substantial risks involved if 
Australia participated in joint military intervention without Britain. 
Describing the American plan for mass intervention as “wrong”, Casey 
stressed that United Action would not stop the fall of Dien Bien Phu and 
risked putting Australia “in the wrong with world opinion particularly 
in Asia.” He also thought such action could potentially risk war with 
China.14 
For these reasons, Casey thought that United Action should not be 
pursued and probably did not push the importance of this plan to the 
Britons as strongly as the Americans had hoped. This action—or lack 
thereof—did little to foster closer Anglo-American relations, but Casey’s 
mindfulness about the direct political and strategic consequences for 
Australia was commendable. His recognition of the implications should 
Asian countries develop a poor opinion of Australia also dovetailed 
with his broader efforts for a strategic refocus toward Southeast Asia. 
Casey aptly recognised that Australia’s future would depend on 
peace and stability in this part of the world and took a keen interest 
in cultivating closer relationships with Southeast Asian countries. 
13 Casey Statement, 7 April 1954, Commonwealth House of Representatives Debates, 
Vol. 3, 122-126.
14 Casey Diary Entry, 15 April 1954, NAA, M1153, 34. 
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He travelled regularly throughout the region and even published a 
somewhat insipid yet purposeful book appropriately titled Friends 
and Neighbours, in which he made a case for wanting Australia to live 
peacefully with Asian countries amidst increasing nationalistic and 
Communist-driven insurgencies.15 These efforts did little to convince 
other Australian cabinet members of the importance of fostering 
friendlier relationships with Asian countries, but at the very least 
helped encourage more positive perceptions of Australia at a time when 
Australian views about Asian people were often noticeably racist. Casey 
even had to condemn Australian newspapers for using the term “White 
Australia”—an immigration policy implemented in the early twentieth 
century that aimed to exclude people from non-Anglo backgrounds—
due to concerns that it would be “most offensive to all Asian peoples” 
even though a more relaxed form of the original immigration policy was 
still in effect during the 1950s.16
Nevertheless, Casey’s arguments regarding Indochina were 
successful and the Australian government agreed that it could not 
commit to the United Action proposal in the current political climate. 
While the Cabinet concluded that Australia should encourage the 
French to continue fighting and support US military involvement in the 
region, it could not commit to Dulles’s plan for multilateral intervention 
because of the political pressures leading up to a general election in 
May. The Cabinet also concluded that because Australia had defence 
arrangements with Britain in the region it would be unfavourable to 
join in a US military response if Britain did not participate. Overall, 
the Cabinet decided Australia could not commit to the plan but still 
15 R.G. Casey, Friends and Neighbours: Australia and the World (Melbourne: F.W. 
Cheshire, 1954). For a more detailed analysis of Casey’s international outlook and 
views on Australian engagement with Asia, see J Cotton, “R.G. Casey and Australian 
International Thought”; James Cotton, “R. G. Casey’s Writings on Australia’s Place 
in the World”, in Melissa Conley Tyler, John Robbins, and Adrian March eds. 
R.G. Casey: Minister for External Affairs, 1951-1960 (Sydney: Australian Institute of 
International Affairs, 2012), http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/wp-content/
uploads/2014/01/casey-book-final-revised.pdf 
16 “Offends Asia”, The Courier Mail, 7 June 1952. The White Australia Policy and 
its implications for Australia’s relationship with the world have been dealt with 
extensively elsewhere. See, for example, James Jupp, From White Australia to 
Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002).
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must somehow show the United States that it was “not lukewarm in 
supporting proposals designed to ensure that Communism in Southeast 
Asia is checked.”17 With regards to Indochina and US interest in 
Southeast Asia, Australia simply wanted to have its cake and eat it too. 
Meanwhile, policymakers in New Zealand wanted to know the 
British response before they made any decision. Writing to the New 
Zealand High Commission in London, McIntosh told Corner that his 
personal preference was that New Zealand should “tell the Americans 
we will join them on the understanding that the British […] come in 
also.”18 In Washington, New Zealand Ambassador Leslie Munro 
suggested that Dulles’s plea for United Action signalled a new course 
of American policy in Indochina, indicating that the United States could 
not accept under any circumstances that Indochina fall completely to the 
Communists. As a result, Munro concluded that New Zealand “had little 
alternative but to join the coalition” because New Zealand valued its close 
relations with the United States especially due to Indochina’s proximity 
to Australia and New Zealand. Munro, however, thought along similar 
lines to McIntosh and attached one very important condition to New 
Zealand participation: the United Kingdom “must also participate.”19 
McIntosh also thought that New Zealand should encourage the French 
to commit to the US plan for multilateral intervention. He reasoned that 
this response would prevent New Zealand from falling out with the 
Americans (who desperately wanted the French to continue fighting in 
Indochina) while simultaneously meaning that New Zealand would not 
commit without British support.
On 7 April, Australia and New Zealand exchanged some of their 
defence policy conclusions with respect to Indochina. The Australian 
position, which was developed by the Joint Intelligence Committee and 
primarily focused on broader strategic and military considerations, 
determined that every effort must be made to strengthen the will of the 
French. It also determined that “Australia should also encourage Indochina 
governments to reach agreements with the French in establishing their 
independence and continue the Communist resistance.” In order to 
17 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 6 April 1954, NAA, A1838/276, TS383/4/1 Part 1.
18 McIntosh to Corner, 12 April 1954, in Unofficial Channels, 164.
19 Munro to Corner, 6 April 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 316/4/1 Part 6; Munro to Webb, 6 
April 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 316/4/1 Part 6.
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achieve this objective, the document even concluded that “Australia 
should participate in United Action because doing otherwise might 
compromise the present helpful trend of American policy towards the 
security of the Pacific.”20 This was in glaring contrast to Casey’s views 
on the untenability of United Action, highlighting that the Departments 
of Defence and External Affairs held noticeably different views on the 
strategic benefits of a military response. In short, military planners 
instead proposed a two-fold objective in the Indochina Crisis: encourage 
the French to continue fighting, and assure the Americans that Australia 
was committed to the defence of Southeast Asia even though upcoming 
elections delayed an immediate public response. British participation 
was desirable for the Australians, but not essential. 
In contrast, the equivalent New Zealand policy document on 
Indochina revolved around British participation, UN involvement and 
avoiding a confrontation with China. It determined that New Zealand 
would only participate in United Action “under the condition that 
Britain [was] also a participant” and such a coalition fell under the “aegis 
of the United Nations.” Moreover, due to concerns that intervention 
might escalate into a wider war, the document claimed that a Western 
multilateral response must make “every effort to avoid confrontation 
with China.”21 Much like British views, New Zealand prioritised a 
diplomatic solution over a military response. 
Australia and New Zealand greatly differed in their assessments 
about the possibility of Chinese intervention. The Australians were 
aware of New Zealand’s policy position that “armed intervention in 
Indochina may lead to involvement with China and possibly even with 
the Soviet Union itself”, as an Australian Joint Intelligence Committee 
report concluded, adding that Wellington was “more doubtful whether 
it could be possible to avoid conflict with China.” Australia predicted 
instead that it “was not likely that the Chinese would abandon their 
profitable policy for one of open intervention which carries the risk of 
retaliation.”22
20 Australian Policy on Indochina, 7 April 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 316/4/1 Part 2. See 
also Joint Intelligence Committee Report, 14 April 1954, NAA, A5954, 2298/2.
21 Collective Action in Indochina Policy Document, 6 April 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 
316/4/1 Part 6.
22 Joint Intelligence Committee Report, 14 April 1954, NAA, A5954, 2298/2.
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Irrespective of whether China would act in Indochina after possible 
Western intervention, the British strongly opposed the United Action 
proposal. As part of his initial pursuit of United Action, Dulles met 
with British Ambassador Roger Makins on 2 April. During the meeting, 
Anglo-American differences over supporting French action in Indochina 
were sharply exposed. While Dulles warned against the “dangers of a 
French collapse” and that the “French accepting a settlement would be 
disastrous for the free world”, Makins responded that his government 
regarded “the deteriorating situation in Indochina in more pessimistic 
terms” and was inclined to accept a settlement in Indochina.23 
Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower wrote to British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill and declared that his Administration had no 
intention of searching for a peaceful solution. Churchill, however, was 
reluctant to commit to any action. Churchill told Eisenhower directly 
that he feared multilateral intervention would lead to a wider war and 
threaten British interests in Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore. In short, 
Churchill said that the US plan for multilateral action simply “raised too 
many problems” for Britain. Privately, Churchill confessed that he had 
no interest in putting British troops “in the jungle” and thought that 
Malaya could still be held even if Indochina fell.24
As the weeks passed and the US mustered little support for United 
Action, the situation in Indochina worsened. Eisenhower again wrote 
to Churchill, hoping that the British might reconsider their position 
on Indochina as the Geneva Conference approached. “I am deeply 
concerned by the seemingly wide differences in the conclusions 
developed in our respective governments”, Eisenhower wrote to 
Churchill on 26 April, “especially as these conclusions relate to such 
events as the war in Indochina.”25 Even though France was quickly 
losing control over Indochina, Eisenhower had problems convincing 
the French to consider multilateral support for their position. “For more 
23 Conversation between Dulles and Makins, 2 April 1954, FRUS 1954 Vol. XIII Part I, 
1216.
24 Churchill to Eisenhower, 7 April 1954, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 6, 
EL; James, Churchill and Empire, 379. See also Daniel Williamson, Separate Agendas: 
Churchill, Eisenhower and Anglo-American Relations, 1953-1955 (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2006).
25 Eisenhower to Churchill, 26 April 1954, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 
6, EL.
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than three years I have been urging upon successive French governments 
the advisability of finding some way of ‘internationalising’ the war”, 
Eisenhower confessed, but:
The reply has always been vague, containing references to national 
prestige, Constitutional limitations, inevitable effects upon the Moroccan 
and Tunisian peoples, and dissertations on plain political difficulties 
and battles within the French Parliament. The result has been that the 
French have failed entirely to produce any enthusiasm on the part of the 
Vietnamese for participation in the war.26
Eisenhower concluded that the situation in Indochina had gotten 
to a point where “the French have used weasel words in promising 
independence and through this one reason as much as anything else, 
have suffered reverses that have really been inexcusable.”
Figure 15. French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault (left), British Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden (centre), US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (right). Photo by unknown (n. d.), 
Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Georges_Bidault,_Anthony_Eden_
and_John_Foster_Dulles.jpg, CC BY 3.0.
As American frustrations with British and French policies toward 
Indochina increased, the possibility of unilateral action resurfaced 
26 Eisenhower to Hazlett, 27 April 1954, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 6, 
EL.
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in Washington. During an NSC meeting on 29 April, Vice President 
Richard Nixon and Director of the Mutual Security Agency Harold 
Stassen argued that the United States “should not let the British have a 
veto over our freedom of action.” Eisenhower disagreed, believing that 
the United States was not able to be the non-Communist world’s sole 
policeman and would be looked upon unfavourably by the rest of the 
world if it took unilateral action. “To go in unilaterally in Indochina”, 
Eisenhower said, “amounted to an attempt to police the entire world.” 
He added that if the United States attempted such a course of action, 
“we should everywhere be accused of imperialistic ambitions.”27
Meanwhile, the Geneva Conference began on 26 April 1954. Two 
weeks into the Conference, after the US refused to act unilaterally and 
did not gather support for United Action, Dien Bien Phu fell to the 
Communists on 7 May 1954. Although American delegates continued 
to press the British for joint military action and urged the French to 
continue fighting, by June the Eisenhower Administration abandoned 
its plans for multilateral intervention and instead looked towards 
finding a diplomatic solution in Indochina. As with the post-war 
division of Korea, delegates at Geneva agreed that Indochina would be 
divided into two regions, with the Vietminh occupying the North and 
the French occupying the South. The decision awarded the Soviet bloc 
a major diplomatic victory in the face of French defeat. Likewise, the 
decision was a significant blow to Western prestige. After having failed 
to defend Dien Bien Phu, the Eisenhower Administration then turned 
its attention to the possibility of a collective defence arrangement in 
Southeast Asia.
Formation of SEATO
Having to resort to reaching a diplomatic solution in Indochina was 
disappointing for US policymakers. After sending the French $2.6 billion 
in military assistance between 1950 and 1954, Washington’s failure 
to prevent a Vietminh victory in Indochina damaged Eisenhower’s 
credibility in fulfilling his promise to limit Communist expansion. 
Nevertheless, the end of the fighting and the formalisation of a North 
27 NSC Meeting, 29 April 1954, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4, EL.
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Vietnamese Communist state enabled the Eisenhower Administration to 
pursue a broader collective security pact for Southeast Asia, especially 
because the Five-Power Staff Agency talks had produced few tangible 
results since its inception a year earlier. Rather than dwell on the loss 
of Indochina, the United States needed to seize the opportunity to 
deter the expansion of Communism in Asia through a regional defence 
arrangement.
Discussions for such an arrangement in Southeast Asia began in the 
National Security Council. From a military point of view, questions 
were raised about the desirability of a pact when few states in the region 
were capable of defending themselves. At an NSC meeting on 23 July, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Arthur Radford said that “we 
[the United States] are now talking about an area where there are no 
developed military forces.” He added that the US could build military 
power in the region, but “only at considerable cost.” Overall, he argued 
that the United States “should take a good look at the idea of a defence 
alliance for this area to be sure we are not making a mistake […] from a 
military point of view a Southeast Asia defence pact seems undesirable 
and unwise.”28 
The State Department, however, saw clear advantages in concluding 
a defence pact. Such a pact would signal an evident US willingness to 
prevent the spread of Communism and ensure that countries at risk of 
Communist subversion would be provided with American assistance. 
At a follow-up meeting about American policy toward Southeast Asia 
on 24 July, Dulles argued that a defence pact would have two significant 
advantages: it would give Eisenhower discretionary authority (which he 
did not already have) to use in the event of overt Chinese aggression in 
the area, and it would ensure that Washington had the support of other 
nations in any action it might be forced to take. Moreover, as a means to 
offset Radford’s concerns about an undesirable military commitment, 
Dulles suggested that the treaty would not be drafted in such a way 
“so as to lead other signatories to expect large amounts of US military 
28 Memorandum of a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 23 July 1954, 
NARA, RG 59, Lot 61, D 417.
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assistance.”29 In order for such a pact to be effective, it would require 
support from other countries willing to enter into the agreement.
Most importantly for the prospects of concluding a regional defence 
treaty, Britain quickly signalled its willingness to enter into a defence 
pact despite sharp differences with the Americans over Indochina in 
Geneva. Fearing that British bases in Malaya and Hong Kong were at 
risk, Churchill wrote to Eisenhower on 21 June stating that Britain and 
the United States should “establish a firm front against Communism 
in the Pacific sphere.” More specifically, Churchill suggested that there 
should be a Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) similar in 
structure and purpose to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for 
Europe.30 Concerned that the Communist diplomatic victory in Geneva 
might spur further aggression in the region, there was a clear sense of 
urgency about Churchill’s efforts to secure the treaty. New Zealand 
Ambassador in Washington Leslie Munro reported to Wellington that 
at a luncheon meeting in Washington a week later, Churchill said that 
plans for the defence of Southeast Asia would be “pressed forward now, 
immediately.”31
Meanwhile, an ANZUS meeting took place in Washington on 30 
June. Dulles told Casey and Munro that as agreements for Indochina 
took place in Geneva, the United States was “very deeply concerned” 
about developments in the area. Moreover, he stressed that the United 
States could not “fight their own way into the area, alone, and under 
conditions by no means clear.” Dulles then suggested that it would be 
especially useful for the United States to be briefed on Australian and 
New Zealand views on Indochina, because France was “fading away” 
and Britain was “badly overextended.” 
In response, Casey suggested that reaching a SEATO-type 
arrangement would be useful for Australia. However, he thought 
that a temporary “ad-hoc SEATO” would be practical until a formal 
multilateral agreement could be agreed upon by Washington and 
London. He proposed a public non-aggression pact with as many 
Asian countries as possible. “Such a document would have no teeth 
29 Minutes of a Meeting on Southeast Asia, 24 July 1954, NARA RG 59, Lot 60, D 627, 
CF 348. 
30 Churchill to Eisenhower, 21 June 1954, FRUS 1954 Vol. XIII Part II, 1728.
31 Munro to Holland, 30 June 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 434/8/1 Part 4.
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and involve no obligations for its parties”, Casey conceded, but once a 
more binding agreement could be reached, he thought that “the teeth of 
an alliance would be in SEATO.”32 Casey, in short, was in favour of an 
immediate defence structure for Southeast Asia that included countries 
in that region and hoped both Britain and the United States would be 
involved. “We could not be belligerent while the United Kingdom was 
not”, Casey wrote in his diary after the meeting. He added, almost 
excitedly, that since Australia was “poised rather delicately” between 
the United States and Britain in international affairs, Canberra was “in a 
position to exercise some influence on each.”33 
Speaking on New Zealand’s behalf, Munro mirrored Casey’s 
sentiments and suggested Wellington was in favour of an immediate 
defence arrangement in Southeast Asia. He noted New Zealand’s 
concerns about Communist aggression in the area and argued that his 
country would “firmly resist” any further advances. However, he made 
two unique points. Firstly, he thought that any immediate aggression 
before SEATO could be established should be referred to the United 
Nations rather than dealt with through Casey’s proposed temporary 
non-aggression pact. Secondly, he reiterated that New Zealand would 
only participate in SEATO if Britain was also a member. “It was a 
principle of our policy and negotiation that [Britain] should be a party 
to the SEATO arrangement.” Munro told Dulles on 30 June 1954.34
Dulles, however, made it clear that the United States would only 
commit to an arrangement that specifically aimed to stop Communist 
aggression. “The United States would be prepared to take positive 
action if there were any substantial extension of Communist power”, 
Dulles said to Casey and Munro, but he stressed “there would be 
nothing in the nature of a blanket commitment.”35 He repeated these 
views later on 28 July to US Ambassador to the United Kingdom 
Roger Aldrich, requesting he make it clear to London that the United 
States “did not envisage the Southeast Asia pact developing into a 
NATO-type organisation with [a] large permanent machinery [and] 
32 Notes of the ANZUS Meeting, 30 June 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 434/8/1 Part 4.
33 Casey Diary Entry, 30 June 1954, NAA, M1153, 34.
34 Notes of the ANZUS Meeting, 30 June 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 434/8/1 Part 4.
35 Ibid.
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substantial US financial support.”36 The US military supported this 
limited commitment. The SEATO machinery “should be similar to 
the ANZUS arrangements”, US Acting Secretary of Defense Robert 
Anderson told the State Department, insofar as it should function more 
as a “consultative arrangement” rather than representing definitive 
American military commitments in Southeast Asia. Anderson went on 
to suggest that these views reflected “the thinking of this Department 
at this time.”37 
While Australia and New Zealand reasoned that their influence on 
US policy was perhaps greater than it had ever been, neither government 
could convince Washington to sign anything other than a very limited 
defence treaty. The United States, in short, would only commit to respond 
to Communist aggression. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation was 
subsequently signed into effect on the 8 September 1954 at the Manila 
Conference between the ANZUS powers as well as Britain, France, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. The three Associated States, South 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, were also awarded observer status and 
included under the area protected. Its scope was very similar to ANZUS, 
stating that all signatories would respond to meet a common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.
Overall, SEATO’s conclusion was ultimately born out of Western 
failure in Indochina and concerns about further Communist aggression 
in the area. It had a number of weaknesses: its scope was limited, and 
there was no clear machinery for intelligence cooperation or military 
consultation between the signatories. Ultimately, even though the 
siege at Dien Bien Phu and the conclusion of SEATO offered Australia 
and New Zealand an opportunity to play more important roles in US 
strategy, there were few positives that could be drawn from the ANZUS 
response to the crisis.
36 Dulles to Aldrich, 28 July 1954, FRUS 1952-1954 Vol. XII Part I, 680.
37 Anderson to Murphy, 19 August 1954, FRUS 1952-1954 Vol. XII Part I, 767-768.
7. A Horrible Dilemma in the 
Taiwan Straits
While Australian, New Zealand and American delegates met in Manila 
to finalise SEATO in September 1954, another crisis broke out in the 
Taiwan Straits after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began shelling 
the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Even though 
by sheer geographical size and position alone it would be unthinkable 
that a global war might erupt over such small islands, there was a very 
real possibility that any miscalculation by the United States could spark 
a war with China, and by extension, the Soviet Union. America had long 
established its determination to prevent Taiwan and the Pescadores falling 
into Communist hands, but to achieve this, Eisenhower’s Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) thought it was important that these lesser offshore islands also 
remain in Nationalist hands. Others, such as Australia, New Zealand, 
Britain and most of the American public, were not convinced. US Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles, for one, described them as “a bunch of rocks.”1
Less than nine months before the PRC shelled Quemoy, Secretary of 
Defence Charles Wilson approved a JCS recommendation to loan US naval 
vessels to the Nationalists to assist in the defence of the offshore islands. 
These loans included two destroyers, ten patrol crafts, two landing repair 
ships, and less than one hundred small landing crafts. Approving these 
loans meant that, at the very least, Eisenhower and his military staff hoped 
that the Nationalists could hold these islands if hostilities broke out in the 
immediate future.2 Yet once the crisis began, Eisenhower was certain that 
1 Department of State Conversation, 19 January 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. II, 47.
2 Wilson to Dulles, 7 December 1953, FRUS 1952-1954 Vol. XIV Part I, 339.
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the offshore islands could not possibly be defended by the United 
States. After Dulles presented the NSC with the “horrible dilemma” that 
confronted the United States on 12 September, Eisenhower stressed that 
“Quemoy is not our ship.” According to the former General, defending 
Quemoy by force would lead to war with China. Public opinion seemed 
to support this position. Eisenhower went on to tell the NSC that he 
had constantly been receiving letters from the American public saying 
“please do not send our boys to war” and “do we really care what 
happens to those yellow people out there?”3
Political opinion aside, most US military planners argued that 
the offshore islands were important to the defence of Taiwan. A JCS 
report, submitted to the President on the afternoon of 3 September, 
recommended that current American policy towards the Taiwan Strait 
area be changed to assist in the defence of Quemoy as well as nine 
other offshore islands. The JCS Chairman Arthur Radford, a strong-
minded former admiral with a wealth of experience in Pacific naval 
planning, argued particularly strongly for the defence of the islands. He 
recommended to the State Department that the United States commit 
to defending Quemoy and Matsu even with the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons. Not all of the Chiefs of Staff agreed with Radford’s radical 
approach, but along with the Chief of the Air Force Nathan Twinning 
and Chief of Naval Operations Robert Carney, the JCS majority 
opinion concluded that defending the offshore islands was important 
and any withdrawal would have a considerable psychological effect 
on Nationalist morale.4 In opposition, Army Chief of Staff Matthew 
Ridgeway and Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson thought that any 
psychological effect did not outweigh the alarming consequences that 
could ensue if the United States committed to defending these islands. 
Ridgeway argued that defending Quemoy was “not substantially related 
to the defence of Taiwan”, whereas Wilson simply saw no worthwhile 
reason for the US to defend those “doggoned little islands.”5 
3 NSC Meeting, 12 September 1954, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers, NSC 
Series, Box 6, EL.
4 Anderson to Eisenhower, 3 September 1954, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers, 
Dulles-Herter Series, Box 3, EL. 
5 NSC Meeting Notes, 10 September 1954, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers, 
NSC Series, Box 6, EL.
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Figure 16. Map of the Taiwan Strait. Created by Andrew Kelly, adapted from map by 
NordNordWest (2008), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Taiwan_
location_map.svg, CC BY 3.0.
In Canberra, opinion was unanimous that defending the offshore islands 
was out of the question. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, Casey 
drew a line between the defence of Taiwan and the offshore islands. On 
25 August he told Spender that there was a “distinction” between the 
two and “hoped that the US could see that.”6 Thomas Critchley, Head 
of Australia’s East Asia Section in the Department of External Affairs, 
echoed Casey’s concerns over American policy. According to Critchley, 
“[the offshore islands] problem was critical […] because of the dangers 
of US involvement.” He was particularly concerned that ANZUS 
obliged Australia to respond if the United States was attacked in the 
Taiwan Strait. In this event, any Australian failure to respond would be 
catastrophic for its relationship with the United States, even if Canberra 
was “left free” of any strict military obligation to defend the offshore 
islands.7
6 Casey to Spender, 25 August 1954, NAA, A1838, 519/3/1 Part 1.
7 Critchley Memorandum, 25 August 1954, NAA, A1838, 519/3/1 Part 1; Critchley 
Memorandum, 19 October 1954, NAA, A1838, 519/3/1 Part 1.
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Casey and Critchley’s position did not change once the attacks 
began. In fact, Australian policy closely matched British policy toward 
the islands. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden told Dulles on 
17 September that Quemoy and the other offshore islands had “no 
conceivable strategic importance”, and he hoped to keep “as much water 
as possible” between the PRC and ROC.8 To achieve this, Eden argued 
that Chiang Kai-shek should evacuate Nationalist troops stationed on 
the offshore islands. Although the Australians did not express their 
disagreement as openly to the United States in mid-September, there 
was a strong feeling in Canberra that Australian interests were best 
served by following the British example. “We agree with the United 
Kingdom”, Attorney General John Spicer told Casey on 16 September, 
“with the proximity of the offshore islands to the Chinese mainland […] 
fighting [for the islands] would be difficult to justify.”9 
Although the United States and Britain did not agree on the 
defensibility or otherwise of the offshore islands, they did agree that 
war must be avoided at all costs. With this thought in mind, Eden and 
Dulles met in London during September to plan for a potential UN 
resolution that would call for a ceasefire in the strait. Eden felt that it 
would be best if the United States did not itself initiate action in the 
United Nations, fearing that the PRC might respond aggressively. 
Instead, Eden suggested that New Zealand might propose the resolution 
because at the time it was a temporary member of the Security Council. 
Moreover, as New Zealand was a much smaller power than the United 
States or Britain, a call for a ceasefire from Wellington was far less likely 
to provoke a strong international backlash from China or the Soviet 
Union. Dulles agreed with Eden’s recommendation, believing that 
a UN resolution had substantial political benefits.10 He had told the 
NSC before he left for London that if a joint US-UK resolution could 
be reached in the Taiwan Straits, it may lead to a “coming together” 
of Anglo-American policy in the Far East. In Dulles’s view, it had an 
additional benefit. If the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution, it would 
8 Australian High Commissioner’s Office to Canberra, 17 September 1954, NAA, 
A5954, 1415/3.
9 Spicer to Casey, 16 September 1954, NAA, A5954, 1415/3.
10 Dulles to Eisenhower, 18 September 1954, John Foster Dulles Papers, JFD 
Chronological Series, Box 9, EL.
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demonstrate the aggressive and dangerous threat that Communism 
posed and spur allied support. If Moscow supported the resolution, it 
would mean the PRC was acting “against the will of the majority in the 
UN.”11 
Dulles and Eden proposed a UN resolution codenamed “Oracle” to 
New Zealand’s Acting High Commissioner in London Richard Campbell 
on 29 September. Interestingly, they both stressed the “extreme secrecy” 
of the proposal. In other words, even with an ANZUS Council meeting 
scheduled in less than a month, the Australians were not to be told.12 
Upon hearing about the proposal, New Zealand policymakers were 
excited by the opportunity to assist in an international crisis. They were 
also hopeful that a resolution might encourage US-UK rapprochement 
vis-à-vis China. New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland believed 
that his government should accept responsibility and move ahead with 
the UN resolution as it presented New Zealand with an “opportunity of 
playing a constructive role” in joint US-UK policy regarding Far Eastern 
matters.13 New Zealand External Affairs Minister Thomas Macdonald 
agreed, but emphasised that New Zealand should not commit beyond 
the introduction of the resolution to the United Nations unless the 
United States and Britain were certain they could cooperate. As 
Macdonald explained, New Zealand might be placed in an immensely 
difficult position if the United States and British differences on China 
were exposed publicly once the resolution was presented to the Security 
Council. “We may find ourselves able to play a useful part”, Macdonald 
told Munro on 1 October, “but my inclination is not to commit ourselves 
to any particular course in the UN beyond initiation of the debate.”14
Nevertheless, these concerns were put aside and the next day New 
Zealand notified the United States and Britain that it was prepared to 
assist in the project and propose Oracle to the United Nations. All states 
agreed to submit it under Article VI of the UN Charter, declaring that 
the crisis threatened international peace and security. As for when the 
resolution should be submitted, Under Secretary of State W. Bedell 
11 NSC Meeting, 12 September 1954, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers, NSC 
Series, Box 6, EL.
12 Campbell to Macdonald, 30 September 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 264/2/2 Part 1.
13 Holland to Munro, 30 September 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 264/2/2 Part 1.
14 Macdonald to Munro, 1 October 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 264/2/2 Part 1.
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Smith told New Zealand Ambassador in Washington Leslie Munro 
that the submission must wait until after the US mid-term elections 
in November. Macdonald also asked Munro to find out whether the 
United States would object to briefing the Australians on the resolution. 
Macdonald suggested that it would be “highly embarrassing” if Casey 
found out at the upcoming ANZUS Council meeting in October that 
discussions had been taking place between America and New Zealand 
without Australia even knowing about them. Macdonald, in short, 
thought that it might be best to include Australia in these plans before 
proceeding to the Security Council.15 When asked about informing the 
Australians, Dulles told Munro that he preferred that Australia not yet 
be told but would not object if New Zealand thought it essential. On 
further reflection, Munro seemed to agree with Dulles that Australia 
should not be told until the last possible moment. “There is always the 
risk of Australian intervention at an inappropriate stage and pursued 
by Spender in his own peculiar style”, Munro told Macdonald, “I do not 
like the risks that involves.”16
Despite reservations from Munro and Dulles, Casey was told 
about the Oracle project in mid-October as part of preparations for the 
ANZUS Council meeting in Washington. Upon being briefed by New 
Zealand, Casey had immediate objections. He did not understand 
why his American and New Zealand counterparts could not see that 
potentially serious issues could occur if a UN resolution was pursued. 
For one, Casey thought the prospects of a successful UN submission 
would be “so remote as to throw in doubt [the] value of [the] exercise.” 
Even in the unlikely event that a resolution was passed, it was clear 
neither how the full cooperation of the Nationalists in neutralising the 
islands could be obtained nor how this would be implemented. So far 
as Casey was concerned, there was also a disconcerting possibility that 
a Soviet veto could “stimulate pressure” in the United States to defend 
the offshore islands.17 In short, although Casey wanted a ceasefire in 
the Taiwan Straits as soon as possible, he did not agree that the New 
15 Macdonald to Munro, 7 October 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 264/2/2 Part 1.
16 Munro to Macdonald, 9 October 1954, Archives NZ, EA, 264/2/2 Part 1.
17 Caseyto Spender, 5 November 1954, NAA, A5954, 1415/3.
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Zealand-American-British UN resolution was the most appropriate 
action to achieve that objective.
A Mutual Defence Treaty
By late 1954, the United States was also moving ahead with the 
conclusion of a binding commitment to defend Taiwan and the nearby 
Pescadores. Due to the close cooperation between the US and New 
Zealand in the service of the Oracle project, the Americans told the 
New Zealanders about this plan before the Australians and left it to 
New Zealand to “keep Australia adequately informed if and when a 
decision seemed likely.” Once the Australians were briefed about this 
plan, Spender immediately called a meeting with Dulles on 31 October 
to express his dissatisfaction with the proposed treaty and the lack of 
consultation with Australia. During the meeting Spender “expressed 
some annoyance that the Australians had not been brought into these 
talks” for the mutual defence pact with Taiwan. He also suggested that 
a pact would be “unwise” because it would “compel a clarification of 
the situation with reference to the offshore islands and that a somewhat 
indeterminate status was preferable.”18 In other words, Spender thought 
that the United States should avoid a clear-cut commitment and instead 
keep the PRC guessing as to American intentions in the Taiwan Straits.
Nonetheless, a mutual security treaty between the United States and 
the Nationalist Government was eventually signed on 2 December 1954. 
This treaty guaranteed that the United States would defend Taiwan, 
potentially even with the use of nuclear weapons. It also required 
Chiang to consult with the United States before launching any attack 
on the Chinese mainland. This provision ensured that the Nationalists 
could not drag the United States into an unwanted war over mainland 
China. As Dulles had hoped, the wording over the commitment to 
defend the offshore islands was left unclear. Eisenhower stressed later 
that the decision to defend Taiwan’s “closely related territories” would 
be made by the President.19 
18 Memorandum of Conversation between Spender and Dulles, 31 October 1954, 
NARA, RG 59, 611.43/10-3154.
19 NSC Memorandum, 2 November 1954, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers, 
NSC Series, Box 6, EL.
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Once the treaty was put into force, Dulles hoped to clear up 
this fuzziness with American allies. He spoke with New Zealand 
Ambassador Leslie Munro and British Ambassador Roger Makins 
about US willingness to commit privately to defending Quemoy and 
Matsu even with the use of nuclear weapons. To be sure, neither Munro 
nor Makins were pleased with this new American policy. Determined 
to sway allied opinion, Eisenhower went one step further and wrote to 
Churchill directly to stress the strategic usefulness of using these types 
of catastrophic weapons. Believing that the British were not properly 
seeing how effective a nuclear response could be, Eisenhower argued 
that even the tactical deployment of a dozen atomic bombs on critical 
defence infrastructure could effectively paralyse the PRC and award the 
Western powers a decisive upper hand in the Northeast Asian region.20 
It was quite a startling suggestion from the former US Chief of the Army, 
particularly because the use of nuclear weapons could provoke a Soviet 
retaliation and escalate a regional crisis into a much larger international 
war. 
Despite his vast military experience, Eisenhower failed to convince 
the Britons of the feasibility of a nuclear approach. Churchill, Eden and 
the British Foreign Office were not just concerned by the escalation of 
war in the Taiwan Straits; a nuclear attack might have provoked the 
Soviets to launch their own nuclear warheads in Europe, much closer to 
Britain and its critical strategic interests. Upon hearing about the policy, 
Eden asserted that Oracle should not be pursued until the United States 
gave up its proposal to defend Quemoy. He simply refused to entertain 
the idea of using nuclear weapons, going so far as to insist that the search 
for diplomatic solutions through the UN could not continue until the 
US abandoned these reckless ideas. Eden was also particularly critical 
of any of his own policymakers who even hinted that Britain would 
support US policy in the Taiwan Straits. After British Ambassador to the 
United Nations Anthony Nutting made several comments about Britain 
supporting the United States over Quemoy and Matsu, Eden wrote 
scornfully to Nutting that: 
20 David Watry, Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill and Eden in the Cold War 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014), 79.
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Criticism of your interview is principally directed against implications 
that United Kingdom will necessarily be involved in hostilities if China 
attacks Formosa. It is by no means certain that an attack on Formosa 
‘would no doubt call for collective action of the United Nations’ […] they 
seem cumulatively to create the impression that it was your intention to 
declare that the United Kingdom would answer the war on the side of 
the United States if the Chinese launched an attack. “Times” Washington 
correspondent in his full account of your interview today states that you 
have in fact created the impression in America, and imply that we have 
undertaken something new […] I rely on you to say as little as possible 
on this thorny subject and to limit your pubic interviews to the utmost.21
In Australia, once Eisenhower announced publicly his intention to 
defend Taiwan—and, if he thought it necessary for Taiwan’s defence, 
its “closely related territories”—Casey grew similarly concerned that a 
war over the offshore islands may eventuate. For the mindful External 
Affairs Minister, it was just as dangerous as a possible UN resolution. 
“We are considerably concerned”, Casey told Spender, “it seems equally 
foolish and dangerous to contemplate [war] in the defence of islands 
whose security value is, to say the least, doubtful.” In summation, 
he “[did] not regard these islands as worth the risk of war.”22 Casey, 
a long-time advocate of a more realistic approach to China, explored 
the alternative possibility of recognising the PRC in an effort to reduce 
tensions. He wrote to Menzies on 10 December suggesting that on 
balance, the “majority of the Australian press seemed to be in favour for 
recognition” of the PRC. He also stressed that even though free world 
nations should not condone Communist aggression, current relations 
with Beijing were not on a satisfactory basis.23
Casey continued to make a connection between recognizing the 
PRC and reducing the tensions in the Taiwan Strait. When drafting an 
announcement about the current situation in East Asia, Casey reasoned 
that “the conduct of international affairs is made more difficult so long 
as the PRC is not recognised and so it would be logical to change this 
situation.”24 Although Casey concluded that the offshore island crisis 
21 Eden to Nutting, 14 December 1954, as cited in Watry, Diplomacy at the Brink, 78.
22 Casey to Spender, 21 January 1955, NAA. A5954, 1415/3.
23 Letter from Casey to Menzies, 10 December 1954, DAFP: China, 87.
24 Letter from Brown to Menzies, 28 December 1954, DAFP: China, 91.
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should be settled first before considering “recognition later”, he clearly 
thought that recognising the PRC might in some way reduce tensions 
or prevent future Chinese aggression. This part of his statement was 
never publicised, as Menzies opposed any suggestion that Australia was 
at the time considering changing its public opposition to recognition 
of the PRC. Nevertheless, policymakers such as Casey appeared 
willing to consider the possibility of recognition far more openly than 
policymakers in the United States. 
There was strong support in Australia for Casey’s suggestion. Casey 
was encouraged by both the public and the federal opposition to pursue 
recognition in exchange for a ceasefire in the straits. For example, an 
article written by journalist John Bennetts published in the Sunday Times 
in early 1955 suggested that Australia, the United States and Nationalist 
China should abandon any interest in the offshore islands as a quid pro 
quo for recognition of the PRC. For “assurances and demonstrations of 
goodwill and peaceful intentions” in the Taiwan Straits, Bennetts wrote 
that Communist China should be “offered eventual membership of 
the United Nations and general recognition as the lawful Government 
of mainland China in return.”25 Reports emerged later that Labor 
backbencher Allan Fraser accused Casey of not “seeking to exploit 
every opportunity for negotiation with Red China” while the offshore 
island crisis remained unresolved. Casey should be “prompting the 
recognition of the Chinese mainland Government”, Fraser told the 
press, “as a means to pave the way for a long-term settlement.”26
On mainland China, Mao’s response to the recent US-ROC defence 
treaty was particularly aggressive. On 10 January 1955, he ordered an 
attack on the Tachen Islands. Eight days later, PRC forces also attacked 
and captured nearby Ichiang Island. The Tachens themselves were 
approximately 320 kilometres north of Taiwan, far outside the original 
area the US considered strategically important for defending the island. 
Nonetheless, Eisenhower and Radford thought these attacks indicated 
the PRC’s “clear intent” to capture all offshore islands, with the ultimate 
25 John Bennetts, “Australia Moves Fast to End Red China Crisis”, Sunday Times, 30 
January 1955.
26 “Casey Accused of Playing-up Hostility and Hatred”, The Canberra Times, 31 March 
1955.
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purpose of taking Taiwan and the Pescadores.27 To combat this, the 
US convinced a reluctant Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate the Tachens in 
exchange for a private commitment to defend Quemoy and Matsu in 
the event of a full scale attack. This drastic change in American policy 
confirmed that Dulles’s original plans had “backfired.” As Wilson told 
the NSC on 20 January, US “diplomatic efforts […] had failed.”28
Given this failure, military options were revisited. Earlier on 20 
January, a meeting was held between the State Department, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and several Congressmen to brief Capitol Hill on new 
developments in the Taiwan Straits. Dulles said that the situation in the 
Taiwan area was developing “in an acute way which seems to call for 
a sounder defensive concept. There is no doubt in [my] mind that the 
ultimate purpose of the Communist Chinese is to try and take Taiwan 
and the Pescadores”, Dulles stressed, “the problem had reached such 
magnitude that it had to be dealt with in a comprehensive way.” On 
the advice of Admiral Radford, Dulles said that there would be a 
regrouping of Nationalists forces and with help from the United States 
they would hold the remaining islands (Quemoy and Matsu). Hoping 
to secure Congressional support for such action, Dulles argued that “it 
would be criminal folly on our part to sit and watch these islands be 
taken which could be held with minor help on our part.” Most of the 
Congressmen agreed with this approach, but they wanted Eisenhower 
to make it extremely clear that US military action was limited only to 
reorganising Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu and defending 
these islands in the possibility that they were attacked. As Senator 
Earle Clements told Dulles, the President must make clear “what we 
are willing to defend, where we will draw the line, and where we will 
retreat no further.”29
In Canberra, the Tachen attacks presented an increasingly dangerous 
and uncertain period for Australian policymakers. Yet instead of making 
any immediate public statement, the Australian Department of External 
Affairs kept their policies behind closed doors in the belief that the State 
27 State Department Meeting, 19 January 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. II, 50. 
28 NSC Meeting, 20 January 1955, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers, NSC Series, 
Box 7, EL.
29 Meeting of Secretary with mional Leaders, 20 January 1955, John Foster Dulles 
Papers, White House Memoranda Series, Box 2, EL.
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Department was best placed to handle the crisis. The ever-tactful Casey 
reasoned that his Government’s interests were best served by simply 
staying quiet, because announcing that Australia saw a clear distinction 
between Taiwan and the offshore islands could only complicate the 
situation for the United States. “The attitude I have been taking”, Casey 
penned in his diary on 28 January, “is not to talk unless it would do more 
good than harm.” He also recommended against an ANZUS meeting on 
the crisis, thinking that at that time Australia had “nothing positive to 
suggest that had not already been considered by the US.”30
Escalating tensions, however, forced him to outline Australian 
policy publicly. In an address given almost a month after the Tachens 
were first shelled, Casey stated the Australian Government’s desire for 
“disengagement” from the offshore islands as these were clearly part of 
Chinese territory. This position sat uneasily with his US counterparts, 
who had determined so recently to hold Quemoy and Matsu. It was also 
no coincidence that Casey’s statement came after Eisenhower’s address 
to Congress on 24 January that outlined only the President had the 
power to decide whether the US would defend Taiwan’s “closely related 
territories.” Though Casey recognized in his statement that the situation 
was “in the hands of President Eisenhower more than anyone else”, his 
timing affirmed Australian discontent over defending the islands.31
Although New Zealand shared Australian concerns over the Tachen 
attacks and recent changes to American policy in the Taiwan Straits, 
the New Zealand External Affairs Department still believed that 
Oracle should be pursued rather than defending the offshore islands 
or pursuing recognition as a quid pro quo for the cessation of PRC 
aggression. “The Government has no intention of entering into any 
sort of commitment involving New Zealand in developments around 
Taiwan”, New Zealand External Affairs Minister Thomas Macdonald 
announced on 27 January. Instead, Macdonald suggested that New 
Zealand was “anxious that the threat to peace which appears to be 
developing in that area should be dealt with by the normal machinery 
of the United Nations.”32
30 Casey Diary Entry, 28 January 1955, Casey’s Diaries, 200.
31 Press Statement, 7 February 1955, CNIA Vol. 26, no. 2, 128.
32 Macdonald Statement, 27 January 1955, NZFP: SD, 377-378.
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In Washington, Munro agreed wholeheartedly with Macdonald’s 
announcement. He certainly did not agree with the US decision to secure 
a formal defence treaty for Taiwan and its efforts to create uncertainty 
over the potential American reaction to attacks on the offshore islands, 
describing both responses as the “two worst courses of action.” “I must 
say I am seriously disturbed by the American course of conduct”, he 
told Macdonald on 21 January 1955.33 Munro still believed Oracle could 
serve a useful purpose, but it could only proceed if the US and UK could 
agree to support the resolution. This seemed increasingly unlikely once 
Britain signalled its complete opposition to America’s commitment to 
defend Taiwan and possibly the offshore islands. After Dulles informed 
British Ambassador in Washington Roger Makins on 19 January that the 
United States would assist in the defence of Quemoy, Makins responded 
a day later with British views on the subject. Its message was clear: “the 
British government is disturbed by developments”, Makins told Dulles 
on 20 January, and “the Cabinet did not like the idea of a ‘provisional 
guarantee’ of Quemoy.34
Upon receiving word that Britain was unlikely to support a UN 
resolution while the United States committed privately to the defence 
of Quemoy and Matsu, Dulles backed down and agreed to reconsider 
presenting Oracle to the UN instead of committing to defend Quemoy 
and Matsu. American, British and New Zealand delegates met on 
23 January to decide how the resolution might be proposed. It was 
decided that Britain should inform Beijing and Moscow of Oracle, then 
New Zealand would invite the PRC to attend UN discussions after the 
presentation of the resolution. On 31 January the United Nations invited 
China to attend the debate on the offshore islands, but Chinese Premier 
Zhou Enlai rejected the invitation. He stated that Oracle opened the 
door to the possibility of “two China’s” and was an illegal intervention 
into Chinese internal affairs.35
33 Munro to Macdonald, 21 January 1955, Archives NZ, EA, 264/2/2 Part 2.
34 Memorandum of Conversation, 20 January 1955, NARA, RG 59, 793.5/3-2958.
35 Victor Kaufman, “Operation Oracle: The United States, Great Britain, New Zealand 
and the Offshore Island Crisis of 1954-55”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 32, no. 3 (2004), 106-124, https://doi.org/10.1080/0308653042000279687. See 
also Williamson, Separate Agendas, 121.
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Commonwealth Discussions for a Ceasefire
Once the PRC declared that it was unwilling to discuss the offshore 
island problem in the United Nations, Commonwealth countries grew 
further concerned that the United States would defend the islands if an 
invasion took place. These issues were discussed at length during the 
Prime Ministers’ Conference in London from 31 January to 8 February 
1955. Aside from discussions over the insurgence of Communist forces 
in Malaya, delegates discussed reaching an agreement on the Quemoy-
Matsu Crisis. Menzies was especially determined to influence British 
opinion when relaying at the conference that his Cabinet agreed 
unanimously that the Nationalists should disengage from the offshore 
islands. Eden agreed firmly with this policy, in line with what he 
had said to Dulles previously about the offshore islands holding “no 
conceivable strategic importance.” Feeling that this summarised neatly 
the “consensus of opinion” from the conference, Eden asked Menzies to 
write to Dulles and outline the position of the Commonwealth nations. 
The letter stressed that delegates at the Prime Ministers’ Conference 
were convinced that “further resolutions and debate in the Security 
Council at present would do harm” and that “Australia and Britain were 
very much opposed to the risk of war over the offshore islands.”36
Menzies’s letter provided the State Department with a clear warning 
that Britain and Australia were moving away from supporting a UN 
solution to the crisis. Even New Zealand Prime Minister Holland, 
who had been a strong supporter of Oracle and was concerned by 
American action in the Taiwan Straits, pledged his support to Australian 
and British efforts to at least delay Oracle.37 In response, Eisenhower 
wrote to Churchill and noted that while he appreciated British efforts 
to avoid a rift in Anglo-American relations, in his view the British did 
not understand fully the Communist’s “constant pressing on the Asian 
frontier.”38 Churchill, however, remained steadfast on his government’s 
position on China and later informed Washington that Whitehall 
36 Aldrich to Department of State, 4 February 1955, NARA, RG 59, 793.5/2-455.
37 US Embassy in London to State Department, 1 February 1955, NARA, RG 59, 
741.13/2-155.
38 Eisenhower to Churchill, 10 February 1955, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, 
Box 9, EL.
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no longer supported Oracle. As a result, the United States could not 
realistically hope to find a long-term solution or even a temporary 
ceasefire through the UN. 
During the Prime Ministers’ Conference, Spender cabled Menzies 
on 6 February to offer a more detailed assessment of the situation 
as it stood in the Taiwan Strait. Even though he was unaware of the 
importance the American JCS attached to holding the offshore islands, 
he told Menzies the problem was because of a continued Nationalist 
military presence on the islands rather than American insistence that 
protecting the islands was essential. Believing that Chiang would be 
a difficult man to convince, he proposed that in return for Nationalist 
withdrawal from the islands, Australia and other Commonwealth 
countries should declare their intention to defend Taiwan if attacked. 
Although Menzies did not take up Spender’s suggestion immediately—
like many Australians, Menzies was reluctant to commit to Chiang’s 
defence and only considered doing so in the hope that it might prevent 
a wider war with the PRC—it did form the basis for a proposal that 
Menzies submitted to the United States after the crisis came to an end.39
In any event, Spender had more pressing matters on his agenda. 
Following the Prime Ministers’ Conference, Dulles held an important 
meeting with Spender on 11 February to discuss the Australian and 
Commonwealth position on Taiwan and the offshore islands. Spender 
opened the meeting by first relaying the consensus of opinion reached 
in London. In outlining the Australian position, he stressed that:
It is causing us deep concern […] we cannot see that [the offshore islands] 
are either vital, or even important, to Taiwan-Pescadores defence. It is, 
therefore, hard for us to see why they are made a policy issue. Our view 
is that the correct aim is disengagement from the islands […] these views 
are not dissimilar to those already expressed by Canada, the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand.40
Dulles appreciated Spender’s open yet firm expression of Australian and 
Commonwealth policy. He told Spender that “none of his colleagues 
39 Menzies, Cablegram to Canberra, 17 March 1955, DAFP: China, 99; David Lee, 
“Australia and Anglo-American Disagreement over the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 
1954-55”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 23, no. 1 (January 1995), 
112, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086539508582946 
40 Spender to Canberra, 12 February 1955, NAA, A1838, TS519/3/1 Part 3. 
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had so clearly or so categorically” been as helpful on the offshore island 
issue. Australia was “more engaged in the area than others”, Dulles 
added, “Australia is not a country on the sidelines.” 
Dulles was not surprised by the Australian position. It was, as he 
pointed out, not too dissimilar from the views reached in the NSC 
meeting in mid-September 1954. Nevertheless, he told Spender that the 
US now considered that withdrawing from the offshore islands would 
have a substantial psychological effect on Taiwan and nearby areas. 
Dulles also shared with Spender that the JCS thought the islands held 
strategic importance because (1) they blocked two natural harbours 
and (2) their proximity to the Chinese mainland made them a useful 
staging area for potential counterattacks. In short, Dulles stressed that 
the United States had been “reluctantly compelled” to move from its 
original position (which generally coincided with current Australian 
policy) to its present position. 
Neither Spender nor Dulles wanted war in the strait. They both 
agreed on the strategic necessity of keeping Taiwan and the Pescadores 
out of Communist hands, but disagreed on the way that it should be 
done. For Dulles, it was important to highlight that although the US had 
determined Quemoy and Matsu be defended, there was considerable 
flexibility in any decision to do so. In his view, the decision “was entirely 
ours.” Spender—and, for that matter, almost all other Commonwealth 
nations—seemed unconvinced by this reasoning. Though Spender well 
understood Dulles’s arguments for the defence of the offshore islands 
and sympathised with his awkward position, Menzies’s recent letter 
to Washington best captured the majority of Australian opinion over 
American involvement in the strait. American Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom Winthrop Aldrich also informed Washington that Australia 
and Britain were deeply concerned that they might be dragged into an 
unwanted and unnecessary war. He told the State Department that a 
recent Walter Lippman article called “Towards a Ceasefire”—based on 
the agreements reached at the Prime Ministers’ Conference—argued 
that “sound American policy would be to do what is being done in the 
Tachens to Quemoy and Matsu.” In other words, Australia and Britain 
believed the ROC and US should evacuate all offshore islands. This, 
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according to Aldrich, summarised the Commonwealth position to an 
“extraordinarily exact degree.”41 
Consistent with the summary Aldrich gave to the State Department, 
Eden rejected flatly Dulles’s view that evacuating the offshore islands 
would seriously affect Nationalist morale. Even if it did, he told Dulles 
on 26 February that “further deterioration in morale is preferable to 
breaking up the [Anglo-American] alliance.” This presumably meant 
that if push came to shove, London would not support Washington on 
the offshore island issue.42 Fearing further rifts between Washington 
and its allies, Dulles took the opportunity to remind Casey and New 
Zealand External Affairs Minister Macdonald that “if fighting broke out 
in the future over Taiwan […] Australia and New Zealand would be 
concerned as partners of ANZUS.”43 It was a disconcerting situation for 
Australia to be in. If Canberra supported Washington, it risked isolating 
itself from Britain and the Commonwealth. It also risked placing itself on 
the frontlines of a nuclear war over islands that Australians policymakers 
had consistently determined to be strategically insignificant. However, if 
Canberra supported London, it would both marginalise its relationship 
with Washington and call into question the usefulness of ANZUS.
Prompted by these Australian-American-British divisions, Menzies 
visited Washington to discuss possibilities for bringing the crisis to 
an end. In a meeting with Dulles on 14 March, his first agenda item 
was to gather US financial and military support for the defence of 
Malaya, one of Australia’s most important strategic interests. As part 
of Australia’s forward defence policy in Southeast Asia, Australian and 
British defence talks had been moving recently towards creating a Far 
East Strategic Reserve (which came into effect later in April) that would 
entail a joint military force stationed in the region to protect Malaya 
and other Commonwealth interests. Unfortunately for Menzies, he 
convinced neither Dulles nor the American JCS to commit to Malaya’s 
defence or a broader defence scheme outside of SEATO.
Next, talks moved to the escalating situation in the Taiwan Straits. 
He first asked Dulles to explain the difference between his position and 
41 Aldrich to the Department of State, 11 February 1955, NARA, RG 59, 793.00/2-1155.
42 Glen St. John Barclay, Friends in High Places: Australian-American Diplomatic Relations 
Since 1945 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), 77.
43 Casey Diary Entry, 26 February 1955, Casey’s Diaries, 206-207.
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that of Casey and Eden’s. According to Dulles, there were two elements 
informing these differences: a misunderstanding of the US approach and 
questions of judgment as to the best way to achieve the same objective. 
Dulles stressed that the British House of Commons did not understand 
that psychological and political factors were just as important as 
military considerations and that these factors were shaping the US 
position. He also suggested that there could be no categorical assertion 
whether the US would or would not defend the islands.44 Menzies 
sympathised with Dulles’s difficult position. However, American 
ambiguity ultimately sat uneasily with Australian policy. Menzies, who 
believed that the “unconditional surrender of offshore islands would 
intensify Communist truculence”, asked Dulles about the possibility of 
a ROC withdrawal from the islands in exchange for a group of nations 
guaranteeing the defence of Taiwan (Australia, Britain, New Zealand, 
and any other Commonwealth nation willing to commit to this scheme). 
Dulles quite liked this idea. He thought the suggestion had “merit” and 
would “give further thought” to the proposition. He even told Menzies 
that he had proposed a similar idea to Eden previously, but had received 
no response.45 The unfortunate reality was that Chiang was unlikely to 
agree. The Generalissimo had already secured a guarantee from the 
United States, and any offshore island evacuation would work against 
his plans to recover the Chinese mainland.
Even if a Commonwealth guarantee could not be reached, Menzies 
wanted to make sure that Dulles understood how the Australian 
public viewed the situation. While the Australian public might support 
holding Taiwan if a broader war broke out, he told Dulles that there 
would be no support whatsoever for a war fought over the offshore 
islands. In Menzies’s view, there was only support for larger efforts 
to prevent aggressive Communist behaviour. “The Australian public 
would support a war in the defence of freedom”, Menzies stated, 
“but not of Governments per se (such as Chiang’s regime) or offshore 
islands.”46 Dulles could at least be certain of Australia’s commitment 
44 State Department Meeting, 14 March 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. II, 368-372.
45 Memorandum for the President, 27 June 1955, White House Central Files, 
Confidential File, Box 28, EL; State Department Meeting, 14 March 1955, FRUS 
1955-1957 Vol. II, 368-372.
46 Ibid., 368.
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if war eventuated, but did not find the agreement on offshore island 
policy he was looking for. 
While Spender and Menzies met with Dulles in an attempt to find a 
resolution to the crisis, New Zealand policymakers continued to debate 
whether pursuing Oracle might still serve a useful purpose despite 
Zhou’s rejection in late January. In March, Ambassador Munro wrote 
to Macdonald and explained his thoughts on the project. In his mind, 
New Zealand could either introduce the Oracle resolution on its own 
or jettison the idea entirely. Munro appeared to favour the first option, 
fearing that if New Zealand postponed Oracle and then the United States 
went ahead with the resolution it would make New Zealand’s “position 
in the operation […] very invidious.”47 Concerned by this prospect, 
Munro suggested to Dulles that while New Zealand was not prepared 
to abandon the Oracle project, it made sense to delay a decision to see 
whether tensions could be relieved on their own accord.
In response, Dulles suggested to Munro on 23 March that New 
Zealand’s role in the Oracle project was still important and that its 
presentation to the United Nations should not be delayed. He argued 
that while tensions had calmed in recent weeks there was no telling 
when the PRC might mount another attack. Moreover, in April the 
Soviet Union would assume the Security Council presidency, making it 
even more difficult to proceed with Oracle. However, this pressure from 
Dulles to introduce the resolution concerned Munro. He believed that it 
forced New Zealand to “choose between the British and American points 
of view in an area where action by the United States, our chief bulwark 
in the Pacific, might not be supported by the United Kingdom.”48
Fortunately for the Oracle sponsors, tensions eased on 23 April 1955 
when PRC Premier Zhou Enlai announced that China did not want 
war with the United States and was willing to enter into negotiations. 
Zhou’s announcement meant that Oracle would not have to be 
introduced in the United Nations in order to resolve the crisis. Though 
sceptical of Chinese intentions, the Americans agreed and entered into 
ambassadorial talks in Geneva from August 1955. Realising the weight 
of domestic and international opinion against any American action in 
47 Munro to Macdonald, 9 March 1955, Archives NZ, EA, 264/3/2 Part 3; Munro to 
Macdonald, 15 March 1955, Archives NZ, EA, 264/3/2 Part 3.
48 Munro to Macdonald, 26 March 1955, Archives NZ, EA, 264/3/2 Part 3.
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the defence of the offshore islands, President Eisenhower was surely 
relieved that he never had to decide between whether to intervene 
militarily or concede defeat to a Communist government. At least for 
now, the United States had avoided the “inevitable moment of decision 
between two unacceptable choices” in the Taiwan Straits.49
Alongside American trepidations, Menzies could not be certain 
whether Zhou’s offer to negotiate was genuine or not. Either way, he 
thought that future hostilities with the PRC were still likely. Menzies 
thought future tensions in the Taiwan Strait could be settled if the PRC 
was part of an international discussion to achieve its recognition, just as 
Casey had believed that this approach might reduce the bellicosity of 
the PRC. Menzies took this idea one step further, proposing to the State 
Department that the PRC attend a Four-Power Conference to address 
current Sino-American differences. Menzies’s proposal outlined that 
there was a clear “danger of fighting over the offshore islands [because 
it] could develop into a major war.” Recognition of the PRC should be 
reconsidered due to “the difficulty of doing anything about the offshore 
islands while an atmosphere existed of Communist threats to attack 
the offshore islands and Taiwan.”50 Washington, however, was not 
convinced that Menzies’s proposal addressed its own interests. Dulles 
first told Spender on 3 May that the idea was “unfavourable” and the 
American public would be very much opposed.51 US Ambassador to 
Australia Amos Peaslee was even more vocal about his dislike for the 
plan, stating that he was “astonished” and “disturbed.” According to 
Peaslee, the Australian Government was “180° off course” with this 
idea.52
After Menzies’s failed proposal, the Australian Joint Planning 
Committee (JPC) formally reconsidered Taiwan’s strategic importance 
for future defence planning. Offshore island policy was not in question: as 
late as May, the Australian Government continued to draw a distinction 
49 Eisenhower to Dulles, 5 April 1955, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 5, 
EL.
50 Record of Conversation between Tange, Critchley and Peterson, 5 May 1955, NAA, 
A1209, 1957/5035.
51 Cablegram to Canberra, 3 May 1955, DAFP: China, p.103.
52 Record of Conversation between Tange, Critchley and Peterson, 5 May 1955, NAA, 
A1209, 1957/5035.
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between Taiwan and the offshore islands, claiming that the latter were 
“not regarded as important.”53 Yet as far as Taiwan was concerned, the 
JPC report concluded it was now more strategically important because 
of its proximity to China and the control it afforded over the Taiwan 
Straits. More importantly for Australian strategy, the report reasoned 
that the PRC could only “concentrate their military effort at one point 
at a time.” In other words, as long as the PRC’s attention was drawn to 
Taiwan, it acted as a “constant deterrent to further Chinese Communist 
adventure in Southeast Asia.”54 These JPC findings laid out several 
reasons why Taiwan was, in fact, an important regional base that had 
to be kept out of Communist hands, but its strategic importance was 
considered only in light of Australian interests in Southeast Asia rather 
than with the intention of coordinating defence policy with the United 
States. 
Moreover, the Department of External Affairs agreed neither with 
American policy nor that continuing to defend Taiwan was in Australia’s 
best interests. Casey, for one, told Plimsoll on 13 April that “we’re not as 
convinced as the Americans are of Chiang and his forces.” He suggested 
further that American policy was based on a “lie” and that they were 
“prisoners of their past attitudes.” “For Chiang and his Taiwan forces”, 
Casey stated bluntly, “common-sense prompts one to believe that they 
must be a factor of declining importance in the scheme of things […] as 
time goes on, Taiwan will decline.”55 Convinced that the External Affairs 
Department should reconsider its China policy, Casey commissioned 
a major study for the Cabinet in June 1955 titled “The Situation in East 
Asia: Taiwan and Recognition of China.” Although the report concluded 
that Australia was not yet in a position to recognise the PRC due to the 
US position, it stated that the prospects of finding long term peace in 
the Far East through potential recognition were now greater than they 
had ever been. This was due at least in part to Beijing’s recent softer 
diplomacy, which suggested a “genuine [Chinese] desire for a policy 
of live and let live.” In other words, Casey thought that despite the 
PRC’s initiation of the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, Mao’s Government was 
53 Department Memorandum, 13 May 1955, NAA, A1209, 1957/4844.
54 Joint Planning Committee Report, 27 April 1955 NAA, A5799, 5799/15.
55 Casey to Plimsoll, 13 April 1955, NAA, A1838, TS519/3/1/ Part 4; Casey to Plimsoll, 
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beginning to act more responsibly and Western powers should award 
recognition accordingly in the short-term future. “So far as recognition 
and representation in the United Nations is concerned”, Casey’s report 
concluded, the issue was “perhaps now one of timing rather than of 
principle.”56
In the immediate aftermath of the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 
Australian, New Zealand and American policymakers were certainly 
relieved that the crisis did not escalate into a wider war. Nevertheless, 
there were heightened concerns in these countries that their respective 
relationships with Beijing were not working and that opposing 
recognition might in fact be encouraging further aggression in East 
Asia. This was especially true in Canberra and Wellington, where 
recognition was discussed before, during and after the Quemoy-Matsu 
Crisis despite much stronger opposition to recognising the PRC in the 
United States. Even then, trans-Tasman views vis-à-vis China were by 
no means identical. Policy differences between the ANZUS powers, 
however, soon manifested elsewhere. In the Middle East, the trilateral 
relationship was seriously strained amidst major British strategic 
miscalculations in the region.
56 The Situation in East Asia: Formosa and Recognition of China, 29 June 1955, NAA, 
A4906, 404.
8. Suez
Shortly after an uneasy peace settlement was reached in the Taiwan Straits, 
longstanding tensions in the Middle East erupted into open conflict during 
the 1956 Suez Crisis. Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser—who had 
already overthrown the Farouk government in 1952, declared Egypt a 
republic and publicly advocated a Pan-Arab movement against the West—
nationalised the Suez Canal after Britain and the United States removed its 
support for the construction of the Aswan Dam. The canal had previously 
been under British control since the late nineteenth century and was an 
important shipping route to countries in Southern Africa and the South 
Pacific.
Before the crisis reached a climax in late 1956, the Britons and Americans 
discussed different options for subduing Nasser. Eisenhower hoped to 
encourage local and international political resistance against him through 
a secret operation called Operation Omega, which aimed to use both 
diplomacy and covert action to thwart his ambitions in the Arab world. 
Anthony Eden—who had succeeded Churchill as British Prime Minister in 
1955—instead wanted to take a much more direct approach. In conjunction 
with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Eden worked on plans to 
assassinate Nasser either covertly or through a large-scale invasion. In his 
eyes, Nasser was comparable to Hitler and needed to be eliminated as soon 
as possible. In letters to Eisenhower and in discussions with the SIS, he made 
frequent comparisons between Nasser, Hitler and Mussolini.1 “I feel myself 
that we can no longer safely wait on Nasser”, Eden wrote to Eisenhower in 
1 Eden to Eisenhower, 5 March 1956, in The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955-1957, 
Peter Boyle ed. (hereafter Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence) (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2005), 119; Eden to Eisenhower, 5 August 1956, Eden-Eisenhower 
Correspondence, 113; David Nichols, Eisenhower 1956 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2011), 164.
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early March, “a policy of appeasement will bring us nothing in Egypt.”2 
Eden was particularly convinced of the ineffectiveness of appeasement, 
as he had previously resigned as foreign secretary during the Neville 
Chamberlain government in 1938 due in part to growing dissatisfaction 
over British efforts to appease Nazi Germany in the lead up to World 
War II. 
Resorting to force, however, had much deeper implications in the 
context of the larger battle between East and West during the Cold War. 
Eisenhower told Eden that he feared Nasser might work closely with 
the Soviets if Western powers pushed too aggressively in Egypt. “I share 
your current concerns over the current developments in the Middle 
East”, Eisenhower wrote on 9 March, “we face a broad challenge to our 
position in the Near East […] [as] the Soviets have made it abundantly 
clear even in their public statements their intentions toward the Near 
East.” He added that “some moves by Nasser have assisted the Soviets”, 
and under these circumstances, “it may well be that [the United States 
and Britain] shall be driven to conclude that it is impossible to do 
business with Nasser. Yet for all of his concerns, Eisenhower was not 
willing to completely dismiss finding a peaceful solution with Nasser. 
“I do not think that we should close the door yet on the possibility of 
working with him”, he argued in a letter to Eden.3 Eisenhower, in short, 
wanted to explore all options to maintain the US position in the Middle 
East in order to stop Soviet expansionism in the region and protect 
American access to regional oil reserves.
Prelude to Crisis
By mid-1956, the prospect of finding a peaceful solution with Nasser 
evaporated quickly. On 19 July, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
announced that the United States was formally withdrawing aid for 
the Aswan Dam Project. In a meeting with Egyptian Ambassador in 
Washington Ahmed Hussein, Dulles suggested that there was “little 
goodwill toward Egypt on the part of the American public”, so much 
so that Dulles doubted whether the Administration could obtain the 
funds from Congress. “For the time being”, Dulles told Hussein, “the 
2 Eden to Eisenhower, 6 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 780.5/3-656.
3 Eisenhower to Eden, 9 March 1956, in Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 122.
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Dam project should be put on the shelf while we try to develop a better 
atmosphere and better relations.”4 
One week later, Nasser announced Egyptian plans to nationalise 
the Suez Canal. Nasser declared that this was the “answer to American 
and British conspiracies against Egypt” and a response to “imperialistic 
efforts to thwart Egyptian independence.”5 Nasser’s decision greatly 
concerned Eden, who immediately began plans to intervene militarily 
in Egypt. He believed that Nasser’s action was not only a threat to 
Britain’s economic interests but it was also a provocative attack on 
British power and authority. Eden immediately established an Egypt 
Committee (an inner circle of British Cabinet members that planned for 
a Suez operation) and warned Eisenhower that Britain was prepared to 
use force in Egypt. “My colleagues and I are convinced that we must be 
ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses”, Eden 
told Eisenhower on 27 July.6
Figure 17. Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser cheered in Cairo after nationalising 
the Suez Canal. Photo by unknown (1956), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Nasser_cheered_by_supporters_in_1956.jpg, public domain.
4 Memorandum of Conversation, 19 July 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. XV, 871.
5 Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 26 July 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. 
XVI, 1.
6 Eden to Eisenhower, 27 July 1956, in Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 153-155.
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The surprising extent to which Eden was determined to retain control in 
Suez reveals much about his character and influence in British politics. 
After building an international name for himself as British foreign 
secretary during World War II, Eden worked largely in Churchill’s 
shadow during the post-war years, first as deputy opposition leader 
between 1945 and 1951, and then as his deputy prime minister during 
Churchill’s final term in office between 1951 to 1955. He did, however, 
exercise considerable influence over the conduct of British foreign 
policy—so much so that one biographer claimed he bullied Churchill 
into retreating on commitments regarding Europe and the Middle East 
that the Conservatives had made while in opposition.7 
As prime minister, Suez became Eden’s pivotal issue. He became 
fixated on Nasser and was determined not to let events in Egypt 
undermine British prestige. To be sure, while Eden did have some 
support for his actions in Suez, it was a far cry from what he told 
Eisenhower about his colleagues being convinced that force would be 
necessary as a last resort. In fact, his Egypt Committee excluded many 
top British policymakers and aimed to keep plans for an invasion secret. 
Indeed, most officials knew nothing about British plans and were 
astonished when they heard that Eden was potentially planning for an 
Anglo-French ultimatum and invasion. For one, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, 
who had been responsible for Middle Eastern policy, was not alone in 
the Foreign Office in thinking that Eden had “gone off his head.”8
For their part, the Americans were not willing to consider the use 
of force. Instead, policymakers in Washington preferred a peaceful 
diplomatic approach. US Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr. 
urged Eisenhower not to consider military action as there were “grave 
dangers” in such a response. “While [a] strong position should be taken 
in order to preserve Western status in [the] Middle East”, Hoover told 
Eisenhower on 28 July, the “confiscation of the Suez company was not 
sufficient reason for military intervention.” Hoover added that “unless 
we (the United States) can introduce an element of restraint, Eden will 
tend to move much too rapidly and without adequate cause for armed 
7 Richard Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 
1987).
8 G.C. Peden, “Suez and Britain’s Decline as a World Power”, The Historical Journal 
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intervention.”9 Eisenhower agreed with Hoover’s assessment. “I cannot 
over-emphasise the strength of my conviction”, Eisenhower wrote to 
Eden on 31 July, that all diplomatic routes must be explored “before 
action such as you contemplate should be undertaken.”10 Hoover and 
Eisenhower certainly held deep-seated concerns in Washington about 
Eden’s temperament regarding the use of force in Suez, and needed to 
garner additional diplomatic support from American allies to persuade 
Eden not to use this course of action.
To this end, four days later Eisenhower met with Australian Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies and Australian Ambassador Percy Spender 
in Washington. Eisenhower hoped that the two Australians—both of 
whom had considerable experience in dealing with Eden—might assist 
US efforts in advising London against the use of force in the Middle 
East. As Eisenhower told Menzies, he “hoped that the United Kingdom 
and France would continue to exercise restraint.” He added that London 
should be careful not to succumb to the “tyranny of the weak”, a term 
he used to describe “the difficulty that arises when weak nations are 
in a position to challenge great powers by taking advantage of certain 
situations.”11 
Attempts to talk to Menzies about the repercussions of Eden’s views 
on Egypt fell on deaf ears. Even though Australia had withdrawn from 
its defence commitments in the Middle East, Nasser’s nationalisation 
of the canal prompted Menzies to pledge his support for British efforts 
in the region. On 30 July, Menzies suggested to the External Affairs 
Department that military action might be necessary in order to ensure 
that Nasser did not “get away with such an act of brigandage.”12 One 
day later, Menzies made similar comments in a meeting with British 
Ambassador in Washington Roger Makins and US Under Secretary 
of State Herbert Hoover. “I made it clear [to Makins and Hoover] that 
in my opinion Nasser’s action was illegal”, Menzies recalled, “and 
unless his prestige could be materially diminished, [the United States 
9 Department of State to the Secretary of State, 28 July 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. 
XVI, 25.
10 Eisenhower to Eden, 31 July 1956, 31 July 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. XVI, 70.
11 Meeting between Eisenhower, Menzies and Spender, 3 August 1956, Ann Whitman 
File, International Series, Box 2, EL.
12 Menzies to Casey, Fadden and McBride, 29 July 1956, NAA, A1838, 163/4/7/3/3 Part 1.
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and Britain] would be exposed to trouble after trouble in the Middle 
East.”13 Like Eden, Menzies saw developments in Egypt as an affront 
to British prestige and steadfastly urged the Commonwealth to defend 
its economic and strategic interests in the canal region. In this instance, 
Menzies’s British “boot heels” were on clear display.
This view, however, was challenged by several policymakers in 
Canberra. Australian External Affairs Minister Richard Casey, Defence 
Minister Philip McBride and Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Fadden 
all urged Menzies against military action, suggesting that they all saw 
“substantial arguments against the use of force.” If force was used, 
they claimed that trading vessels in the region would be in danger, the 
participating powers would be brought before the UN Security Council, 
and relations with Arab and Asian countries would be jeopardised.14 
Adding to these concerns was the complete lack of consultation between 
Australia and Britain especially in relation to the possibility of resorting 
to force. “We have had nothing from the UK about their intentions in 
respect of the use of force nor their appreciation of its military and 
political effects”, Casey penned in his diary on 7 August.15
Although Casey, Fadden and McBride did not advocate the use 
of force to retain international control of the Canal, the military 
recommended that Canberra should support London if a decision was 
made to intervene. The Australian Defence Committee produced a 
report on 9 August that concluded that Western control of Suez was 
of “major importance” because Australia relied heavily on regional 
oil reserves and free access to the shipping route. The report also 
concluded that total Egyptian control of the canal would affect “the 
flow of reinforcements and supplies from the United Kingdom to the 
Far East in an emergency.”16 In this regard, Australian defence interests 
in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region became intertwined.
From a military standpoint, Australia fully supported British 
intervention despite its limited potential to contribute to military action. 
The “immediate military objective should be to seize and occupy the 
13 Robert Menzies, Afternoon Light (London: Cassell, 1969), 149-150.
14 Casey, Fadden and McBride to Menzies, 1 August 1956, NAA, A4926, 14.
15 Casey Diary Entry, 7 August 1956, Casey’s Diaries, 237.
16 Australian Strategic Interests in the Middle East, 9 August 1956, NAA, A5954, 
1410/1.
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canal”, the Defence Committee report advised Menzies, even though 
it conceded that only a token Australian force might be available for 
deployment while most of its troops were stationed in Malaya. The 
report outlined that “if the situation was to deteriorate in Southeast Asia 
or the Far East, it may be necessary to bring back any Australian forces 
deployed in the Suez Canal area.” In short, Australia was prepared to 
support Anglo-French military action in Suez. However, an Australian 
commitment to the region should “be small and limited to the navy and 
air force.”17
New Zealand reached similar conclusions. Like Australia, Wellington 
was unable to proffer any significant number of defence forces in the 
event of an armed intervention (although a New Zealand warship aptly 
called the Royalist was stationed in the Mediterranean). Diplomatically, 
Wellington was fully behind any British action in the region to protect 
Commonwealth interests. As New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney 
Holland told British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd on 30 July, “you 
may be assured that New Zealand will as always fully support any 
steps which the United Kingdom feels obliged to take to ensure that 
vital British rights are fully protected.”18 Holland’s conviction that New 
Zealand should stand fully behind Britain was no secret. He made very 
similar comments in the New Zealand Parliament eight days later. 
“Where Britain stands, we stand; where she goes we go, in good times 
and bad”, Holland announced on 7 August. In his estimation, that was 
the “mood of the New Zealand people” on the topic.19 After Holland’s 
speech, External Affairs Minister Thomas Macdonald made a similar 
speech that was particularly scathing of Egyptian action in the canal:
The manner in which the Egyptian government has acted […] has given 
Britain and other European countries no ground for comfort at all. 
Egypt has waged over the air against the United Kingdom a constant 
propaganda campaign which has at times been vicious and virulent. She 
has endeavoured to create trouble by turning neighbouring countries 
against the countries of Europe […] Egypt gives us no reassurance at 
all concerning Egyptian intentions, and the unheralded and arbitrary 
17 Defence Committee Report to Menzies, 9 August 1956, NAA, A5954, 1410/1.
18 Holland to Lloyd, 30 July 1956, Archives NZ, EA, 217/1/6 Part 1.
19 Holland Statement, 7 August 1956, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (hereafter 
NZPD), 1956 Vol. 309, 885-894.
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method of this latest seizure gives no promise of future harmony and 
can only be deplored.
For these reasons, Macdonald argued that New Zealand must stand 
wholeheartedly behind British action against Egypt, even with the 
potential use of force. “Britain has every justification for preparing to 
meet any eventuality”, Macdonald declared. “As to mobilisation”, he 
added, “I think it has been overlooked, and it should not be.”20 New 
Zealand support for the use of force, however, was not unanimous. 
Much as Casey, Fadden and McBride urged Menzies to renounce the 
use of force as a means to respond to Nasser’s nationalisation, New 
Zealand High Commissioner in London Thomas Clifton Webb hoped 
Britain would not respond with military action. “Let us hope they have 
not committed themselves to something which […] cannot be carried 
out”, Webb wrote to Macdonald on 31 July, “either because of lack of 
support from [the] USA […] or even from their own public here.”21
While Britain and France contemplated the use of force in Egypt, 
an international conference was held in London during mid-August 
in the hope that a diplomatic solution might be found to return the 
canal to international control. Before the conference, Menzies made a 
television address to the British public on 13 August to outline his views 
toward the developing crisis. Menzies, in no uncertain terms, placed 
the blame for the crisis squarely on Nasser. “Nasser’s actions in respect 
of the Suez Canal Company have created a crisis more grave [sic] than 
any since the Second World War”, Menzies concluded. Menzies did 
not trust Nasser at all and was convinced that it would be “suicidal” 
to leave the Commonwealth’s vital trading interests in Suez solely in 
his hands. Moreover, he stressed that Nasser’s nationalisation of the 
canal was illegal under international law and would encourage further 
aggression if left unchecked. By nationalising the canal and rejecting the 
1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Menzies argued that “Nasser violated the 
first principle of international law” and this grievance “will encourage 
other acts of lawlessness if not resisted.”22
20 Macdonald Statement, 7 August 1956, NZPD 1956 Vol. 309, 904-908.
21 Webb to Macdonald, 31 July 1956, Archives NZ, EA, 217/1/6 Part 1.
22 Menzies Statement, 13 August 1956, Menzies Papers, Box 423, NLA.
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At the conference, Menzies maintained that his country was 
unprepared to accept anything less than a return to international control 
of the Suez Canal. “Australia has a great interest in freedom of transit” 
in Suez, Menzies said in a speech in London. According to Menzies, the 
“essential factor” was the establishment of an efficient administrative 
body in the canal so that all nations could benefit from its free 
operation.23 New Zealand External Affairs Minister Thomas Macdonald 
made a similar statement in London. The organisation of the Suez Canal, 
Macdonald argued, “must, in our view, be on an international basis […] 
it should be able to assure free transit of the Canal, it should be efficient, 
and it should not be subject to financial instability.”24 In other words, 
both Australian and New Zealand representatives in London thought 
that international management of the canal was essential.
Even though Menzies announced that his government completely 
supported British action in Egypt, Australian External Affairs Minister 
Casey continued to urge him to renounce the use of force as an 
appropriate solution. “I recommended to Menzies that he should 
speak against the use of force to Anthony Eden, [as] it would put us 
completely in the wrong with public opinion in practically every part of 
the world”, Casey penned in his diary on 17 August. He added that “I 
recommended that he should seek to get an appreciation from the UK 
of the military side, of which we were entirely in the dark. I failed to see 
what could be achieved by action of this sort.”25
Casey’s New Zealand counterpart, Thomas Macdonald, was 
suspicious that Australia and New Zealand were purposefully “left in 
the dark” at the conference in order to prepare for Anglo-French military 
action. Suspecting a secret invasion plot, Macdonald now thought that 
military action would be disastrous for Britain and Western interests 
in the region. Writing to the New Zealand Prime Minister on 23 
August, Macdonald advised against supporting British military action. 
He suggested that the entire conference was designed to prepare an 
unacceptable proposal to offer to Nasser, which he would reject, in order 
to make the use of force appear more reasonable. This, in Macdonald’s 
23 Menzies Statement at Suez Conference in London, 18 August 1956, NAA, A1838, 
163/4/7/3/3 Part 4.
24 Macdonald Statement, 17 August 1956, NZFP: SD, 444-448.
25 Casey Diary Entry, 17 August 1956, NAA, M1153, 38.
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view, was “one of the main reasons for the conference.”26 Macdonald’s 
suspicions proved to be correct. Eden had planned to take back the 
canal regardless of the outcome of negotiations. As one British Foreign 
Service Officer Anthony Nutting recalled later about the crisis, “Eden 
hoped that the conference would produce a solution unacceptable to 
Nasser.”27 In other words, the outcome of the Suez Conference was 
destined to fail. Eden had already authorised that French troops were 
to be stationed in Cyprus and asked British subjects to leave the Middle 
East area on 29 August, days before any diplomatic approach was made 
to Nasser. 
Nonetheless a committee was appointed in London, comprised of 
representatives from Australia, Ethiopia, Iran, Sweden and the United 
States, in order to present a number of proposals to Nasser that were 
agreed upon by eighteen of the twenty-two participating powers at 
the conference. These proposals revolved around returning the canal 
to international control. On strong insistence from Dulles and Eden, 
Prime Minister Menzies agreed to lead this committee and present the 
agreed proposals to Nasser. Menzies surely felt it as a compliment that 
he might play an instrumental role in resolving a complex international 
situation. Unaware of Eden’s actual plans, Menzies was especially 
enthusiastic about leading the committee because he was concerned 
that the outbreak of war in Egypt was “an even money chance.” There 
was a “very distinct prospect”, Menzies feared, that Britain and France 
would use military force should a diplomatic solution not be reached.28
Menzies and the Suez Committee met with Nasser in Cairo on 3 
and 4 September to present the agreements reached in London. While 
making clear that there was “no spirit of hostility” about the agreements 
being proposed, Menzies emphasised to Nasser that the use of force 
was a realistic possibility should he choose to reject the proposals. As he 
warned Nasser, it would be “a mistake for you to exclude the possible 
use of force from your reckoning.” Nasser, however, did not budge in the 
face of this possibility. “President Nasser took our proposals apart, tore 
them up, and metaphorically consigned them to the wastepaper basket”, 
26 Macdonald to Holland, 23 August 1956, NAA, A5462, 118/2/4 Part 2.
27 Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (London: Constable, 1967), 53.
28 Menzies to Fadden, 22 August 1956, NAA, A4926, 13; Menzies Memorandum, 25 
August 1956, Menzies Papers, Box 423, NLA.
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Menzies recalled. Nasser then rejected the proposals formally on 9 
September, claiming that they were a form of “collective colonialism.”29 
Menzies returned to Australia disappointed and frustrated by 
Nasser’s stubbornness. Fending off media criticism that he had failed 
in his efforts to convince Nasser to agree to the committee’s proposals, 
he stressed that Nasser was uncooperative and entirely to blame for 
the crisis. “This repudiation by the President of Egypt was committed 
without notice, without consent, and in fact, by force”, Menzies said at 
a press conference in Sydney on 18 September, “those things are worth 
remembering.” “It is quite true that I was appointed as chief spokesman 
for presenting these matters to the President of Egypt”, Menzies added, 
but “I don’t think anyone could challenge the fairness or indeed the 
generosity of one item in the proposals.” He also rejected Nasser’s 
claim that the Suez Committee’s proposals were a form of collective 
colonialism. “I hope it will be remembered that under the proposals 
put forward Egypt’s position as landlord was recognised completely”, 
Menzies argued, stressing that “Egypt was to be the only nation deriving 
any profit from the Canal at all.”30
Since it paved the way for military action, Eden was surely pleased 
by Nasser’s rejection of the committee’s proposals. Eden, however, 
placed the committee’s failure squarely on Eisenhower, who during 
the conference told the media that he hoped for a peaceful solution 
to the crisis while the British were threatening Nasser with the use of 
force. This, in London’s view, completely undermined their negotiating 
position with Egypt. “We must […] show that Nasser is not going to 
get his way”, Eden urged in a letter to Eisenhower on 6 September.31 
Meanwhile, Eisenhower continued to stress publicly that he would not 
use force in order to find a resolution to the crisis. “This country will 
not got go war ever while I am occupying my present post unless the 
Congress declares such a war”, Eisenhower said at a press conference 
on 11 September. Dulles made similar remarks in a press conference 
the next day, suggesting that even if the United States had a right to 
29 Menzies, Afternoon Light, 168. See also Menzies Memorandum, 4 September 1956, 
Menzies Papers, Box 423, NLA.
30 Menzies Statement, 18 September 1956, Menzies Papers, Box 423, NLA.
31 Eden to Eisenhower, 6 September 1956, in Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 164-167.
168 ANZUS and the Early Cold War
intervene militarily “we (the United States) did not intend to shoot our 
way through.”32 
Many policymakers in New Zealand, who continued to be very 
supportive of the British during negotiations over Suez, similarly placed 
blame on Eisenhower and the Americans for doing little to support 
British diplomatic efforts. As New Zealand External Affairs Secretary 
Alister McIntosh told his former Deputy Foss Shanahan on 24 August,
How infuriating the British must find the Americans over Suez […] 
when it comes to ostriches I am sure that bigger birds never stuck their 
heads into a bigger expanse of sand than Dulles is now doing in the 
undignified spectacle they present near the Pyramids.33
In reality, there were no major differences with respect to US and British 
views about the threat Nasser posed. Anglo-American tensions were 
rather a result of differences about how they should respond to this 
threat. As Eisenhower described in a letter to Eden on 8 September, the 
United States and Britain had a “grave problem confronting Nasser’s 
reckless adventure with the Canal” and did not differ in their “estimates 
of his intentions and purposes.” The main point of Anglo-American 
disagreement, according to Eisenhower, was resorting to force and “the 
probable effects in the Arab world of the various possible reactions by the 
Western world.” The possibility of a Western military response clearly 
concerned Eisenhower, which in his estimation would be a disaster and 
hurt US prestige in the Arab world. According to Eisenhower resorting 
to war “when the world believes there are other means available for 
resolving the dispute would set in motion forces that could lead, in the 
years to come, to the most distressing results.”34 
Eisenhower and Dulles were especially fearful that after the failed 
Menzies mission, Eden was even more likely to pursue military options 
in Egypt. On 6 September, Dulles held a Congressional meeting with 
Senators Hubert Humphrey, Mike Mansfield and William Langer to 
brief them on the Suez situation and gather bipartisan approval for 
renouncing the use of force in Egypt. Dulles warned that the British and 
the French thought that it was necessary to “begin military operations to 
32 Dulles Press Statement, 12 September 1956, in Watry, Diplomacy at the Brink, 126.
33 McIntosh to Shanahan, 24 August 1956, in Unofficial Channels, 208.
34 Eisenhower to Eden, 8 September 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. XVI, 431-33.
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curb Nasser.” “The British feel that if Nasser gets away with it”, Dulles 
said, “it will start a chain of events in the Near East that will reduce 
the UK to another Netherlands or Portugal in a very few years.” Dulles 
told the Senators that he and Eisenhower were doing everything in their 
power to “strongly discourage” the use of force, as they felt it would 
be “disastrous for the French and the UK militarily to intervene at this 
point.”35 There were no criticisms or partisanship injected during the 
meeting. All three Senators agreed with Dulles’s efforts to prevent the 
use of force in Egypt.
Meanwhile, Eisenhower sent several letters directly to Eden in the 
hope he might convince him to reconsider military action. Eden was, 
however, unconvinced by Eisenhower’s reasoning. Instead, Eden argued 
that anything other than the use of force would be appeasement, a policy 
that could lead to catastrophic results. “There is no doubt in our minds 
that Nasser, whether he likes it or not, is now effectively in Russian 
hands, just as Mussolini was in Hitler’s”, Eden said to Eisenhower. He 
argued that “it would be as ineffective to show weakness to Nasser now 
in order to placate him as it was to show weakness to Mussolini […] 
that is why we must do everything we can.”36 Seemingly out of touch 
with British thinking on the matter, Dulles also turned to Australia to 
express his concerns. “I am beginning to feel concerned”, Dulles wrote 
to Menzies and Casey on 27 October, “I am not myself in close touch 
with recent British-French thinking but in view of [the] leading role 
Australia has played, I feel it appropriate to express my concern.”37
Israel Invades Egypt
Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s messages to London and Canberra could not 
prevent the escalation of the crisis in the Suez Canal. Despite American 
efforts, Eden remained inclined to use military action to topple Nasser 
and re-internationalise the Suez Canal. Tensions in Suez reached a 
35 Meeting between Dulles, Humphrey, Mansfield and Langer, 6 September 1956, John 
Foster Dulles Papers, Subject Series, Box 7, EL; Conversation between Eisenhower 
and Dulles, 7 September 1956, John Foster Dulles Papers, Subject Series, Box 7, EL.
36 Eden to Eisenhower, 1 October 1956, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 6, 
EL.
37 Dulles to Menzies and Casey, 27 October 1956, NARA, RG 59, 974.7301/10-2756.
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climax on 29 October when Israeli forces, in collusion with Britain and 
France, invaded the Sinai Peninsula. None of the ANZUS powers, nor 
other Commonwealth countries, were informed beforehand of this 
secret Anglo-French plan. “For a long time the Middle East has been 
simmering”, Eden said in a message to all Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers a day later, “now it is boiling over.”38 In the message, Eden 
detailed plans for an Anglo-French response, omitting entirely that 
London and Paris secretly supported the Israeli invasion in the first 
place. He explained that unless the Israelis and Egyptians withdrew 
within twelve hours, Anglo-French forces would seize the canal and 
overthrow Nasser. Nasser predictably rejected the ultimatum, which 
ultimately led to an Anglo-French invasion of Egypt on 5 November.
Figure 18. British Naval Carriers during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Photo by British Royal Navy 
official photographer (1956), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:British_
carriers_during_Suez_Crisis_1956.jpg, public domain.
In Washington, the Eisenhower Administration was shocked and 
angered by Anglo-French action without American consultation. “I 
think the British made a bad error”, Eisenhower told Senator William 
Knowland on 31 October, “I think it is the biggest error of our time.” In 
a meeting with Dulles, Eisenhower said he was “astonished” that Eden 
avoided informing Washington of its decision. “They are our friends 
and allies [Britain and France]”, Eisenhower said, “and suddenly they 
put us in a hole and expect us to rescue them.”39 At an NSC meeting on 
38 Eden to Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 30 October 1956, Archives NZ, EA, 
217/1/12 Part 1.
39 Eisenhower to Knowland, 30 October 1956, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, 
Box 18, EL; Eisenhower to Dulles, 30 October 1956, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary 
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1 November, Eisenhower and Dulles argued that the United States must 
do all it could to push for a peaceful resolution by exerting the greatest 
possible pressure on Britain and France. “Recent events are close to 
marking a death knell for Britain and France”, Dulles described, and the 
United States had to decide whether it would side with its oldest allies 
or the Arab world. Eisenhower made his choice clear: in his eyes, the 
action Eden had taken was “nothing short of disastrous.” “How could 
we possibly support Britain and France if in so doing we lose the whole 
Arab world”, Eisenhower asked rhetorically.40 
In discussing the international reaction, Dulles specified that there 
was so far very little support for British-French action in Egypt. He 
stressed that the “verdict of the rest of the world [was] altogether 
unanimous” in its opposition to the use of force in Egypt. There were, 
however, two exceptions to this opposition to British-French action: 
as Secretary Dulles told the NSC, approval for the attacks had only 
come from Australia and New Zealand. However, as explained, there 
were extenuating factors in their cases. In Australia there was “much 
unhappiness” amongst the public about British action. Moreover, at the 
political level, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Allen Dulles 
(John Foster Dulles’s younger brother) suggested that there was “a wide 
split of opinion between Menzies and Casey.” In New Zealand’s case, 
John Foster Dulles simply suggested that “it was virtually a colony and 
almost invariably followed the lead of the United Kingdom.”41
Meanwhile, angered by Eden’s betrayal, Eisenhower wrote to the 
British Prime Minister to express his concern about the Anglo-French 
ultimatum. “I feel I must urgently express to you my deep concern at 
the prospect of this drastic action”, he wrote, “even at the very time 
when the matter is under consideration in the United Nations Security 
Council.”42 Privately, Eisenhower followed the decisions reached at the 
NSC meeting on 1 November and put severe economic and military 
pressure on the British, hoping this would sway London to agree to a UN 
ceasefire and withdraw from the Canal area. The US Sixth Fleet harassed 
Series, Box 18, EL.
40 NSC Meeting, 1 November 1956, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 8, EL.
41 Ibid.
42 Eisenhower to Eden, 30 October 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. XVI, 866.
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the Anglo-French invasion fleet in the Mediterranean and delayed its 
arrival into Egypt, while in Washington, Eisenhower approved a series 
of economic sanctions against Britain to compel the British to withdraw.
Eisenhower likewise put diplomatic pressure on Britain and France 
through the introduction of a UN ceasefire resolution. After consultation 
with Dulles and the NSC, Eisenhower argued that the United States must 
present a ceasefire resolution to the United Nations as soon as possible. 
In his estimation, the United States must lead this ceasefire resolution 
before the Soviet Union presented its own resolution in order to prevent 
Moscow from “seizing a mantle of world leadership through a false but 
convincing exhibition of concern for smaller nations.” Overall, in an 
effort not to embarrass the British and French by specifically naming 
them, US action in the UN aimed to avoid “singling out or condemning 
any one nation, but should serve to emphasise to the world our hope 
for a quick ceasefire.”43 An emergency United Nations session was 
then called on 1 November. Dulles introduced a ceasefire resolution 
that passed by a margin of 64-5. Along with Britain, France and Israel, 
Australia and New Zealand were the only other countries to oppose the 
resolution.
As Dulles predicted, then, Australia and New Zealand both publicly 
supported British action in the Suez Canal. While disturbed by conflict 
in the Middle East, New Zealand Prime Minister Holland believed 
that the British response protected Commonwealth interests and was 
necessary to preserve Britain’s vital interests in the region. “We are 
naturally gravely concerned”, Holland wrote to the New Zealand High 
Commission in London, yet he added that “there is no need for me 
to stress New Zealand’s ties of blood and empire and our traditional 
attitude of standing by Britain in her difficulties. He added that “I can 
assure you of our deepest sympathy for the United Kingdom in the 
situation now confronting her. It is our desire, as always, to be of the 
most utmost assistance.” Holland also shared these thoughts to the New 
Zealand public. In a statement on 1 November, Holland announced 
that “I have the full confidence in the United Kingdom’s intentions in 
43 Eisenhower Memorandum, 1 November 1956, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary 
Series, Box 18, EL.
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moving forces into the Canal area” and declared New Zealand would 
do all it could to assist Eden and the Britons in their hour of need.44 
In Canberra, Menzies pledged similar public support for British 
action. Writing to Dulles, he stated that his government supported 
Anglo-French action. “Quite frankly I do not believe that it would be 
in the interests of any of us to have [the] Canal closed for weeks and 
possibly months”, Menzies said; “from this point of view my colleagues 
and I see considerable merit in police action which is involved in 
the Anglo-French ultimatum.”45 He made a similar statement to the 
Australian public on 3 November, stressing his opinion that Anglo-
French action was necessary. “The action taken by the United Kingdom 
and France was the only quick and practical means of separating the 
belligerents and protecting the Canal”, Menzies announced. He also 
argued that it was “wrong and absurd” to consider Nasser, the “author 
of the Canal confiscation and promoter of anti-British activities in the 
Middle East”, as an “innocent victim of unprovoked aggression.”46 Put 
another way, Menzies clearly thought that Nasser’s actions had caused 
military action against Egypt and on some level Nasser deserved it. 
Privately, however, policymakers in the Tasman countries expressed 
grave concerns about British action. Canberra and Wellington were also 
concerned that pledging public support for Britain compromised their 
security relationship with the United States. New Zealand reports from 
Washington confirmed these concerns shortly after the Israeli invasion 
on 29 October. As the crisis escalated, New Zealand Ambassador in 
Washington Leslie Munro met with US Assistant Secretary of State 
for Near Eastern Affairs William Rountree in Washington to discuss 
the American reaction to the crisis. He reported to Wellington on 31 
October that the situation was of the “utmost gravity, both from [the] 
point of view of [an] Anglo-American breach and in terms of general 
security in the Middle East.” Munro warned that the situation could 
develop to a point where the Western position in the Middle East 
44 Holland to the NZ High Commission in London, 1 November 1956, Archives NZ, 
EA, 217/1/12 Part 1; Holland Statement, 1 November 1956, NZFP: SD, 452.
45 Menzies to Dulles, 1 November 1956, 1 November 1956, NAA, A1838, S170 Part 5.
46 Menzies Statement, 3 November 1956, Menzies Papers, Box 423, NLA.
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became “irretrievable.”47 In a subsequent cablegram to Prime Minister 
Holland later that day, Munro stressed that Anglo-French action “put 
New Zealand in a difficult position vis-à-vis its ANZUS partner, the 
United States, and confronts us with a critical choice between British 
and American policies in the Middle East.”48
Australia was caught in a similarly difficult position. In Canberra, 
Menzies stressed that a rift in Anglo-American relations was deeply 
concerning to Australia. “I have myself urged upon both British 
and American leaders that consultations should speedily occur to 
reconcile any differences of opinion”, Menzies said to the House of 
Representatives on 1 November. He added that “it is a great misfortune 
that there have been public differences between those great democracies 
whose friendly cooperation is so vital to us all.” Nonetheless, despite 
this rift in Anglo-American relations, Menzies remained supportive of 
British action. Menzies echoed this belief in an address to Parliament 
on 3 November, stating that Anglo-French action was “the only quick 
and practical means of separating the belligerents and protecting the 
Canal.”49 He then wrote to Eden, reassuring the British Prime Minister 
that he had Australia’s full support:
You have indeed had a difficult decision to take but I am sure that you 
are right. Under these circumstances, an abandonment of operations by 
[Britain] and France would have left the Canal unprotected, would have 
given fresh heart to Egypt and would have meant a lot of destructive 
fighting around and over the Canal itself […] our support remains 
undiminished and that we think that you were and are right. It is tragic 
at a time like this you should have to encounter such intemperate and 
stupid attack.50
It is indeed telling that, even without any consultation from London, 
Australia chose to place its support behind British action. As far as 
Canberra was concerned, Britain’s vital interests came before any 
47 Munro to NZ Department of External Affairs, 31 October 1956, Archives NZ, EA, 
217/1/12 Part 1.
48 Munro to Holland, 31 October 1956, Archives NZ, EA, 217/1/12 Part 1.
49 Menzies Address to the House of Representatives, 1 November 1956, NAA, A2908, 
S170 Part 5; Menzies Statement, 3 November 1956, 1 November 1956, NAA, A1838, 
S170 Part 5.
50 Menzies to Holland, 6 November 1956, NAA, A1838, S170 Part 5.
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possible diplomatic backlash in Washington. “I believe that Anglo-
French action was correct”, Menzies later told Eisenhower, “in Australia 
I believe that approval of the British action is widespread.”51 
Even then, choosing sides between the United States and Britain 
was quite difficult for Australian policymakers. Casey, fearing the effect 
this crisis would have on Australian-American relations, did not stand 
completely beside Menzies in his support for British action. For Casey, 
it was greatly concerning that a rift in Anglo-American relations was 
so publicly exposed. During discussions for a ceasefire in the United 
Nations, Casey reported to Menzies that “I was greatly distressed by 
[the] atmosphere at [the] United Nations.” He added that “the almost 
physical cleavage between United Kingdom and United States was one 
of the most distressing things I had [sic] ever experienced.”52
Casey was not alone. Many Australian and New Zealand diplomats 
were privately concerned by an Anglo-American rift over Suez because 
it put Canberra and Wellington in a very difficult position between its 
two most important allies. To this end, Australian and New Zealand 
diplomats agreed that they faced the same dire situation. Writing about 
a meeting he had with New Zealand High Commissioner in London 
Clifton Webb as well as other British Ministers on 2 November, Casey 
recalled that:
There is a great deal of doubt, to put it mildly, in most people’s minds, 
about the wisdom of the enterprise on which the UK has launched. The 
fact is that I have met no-one (apart from senior Ministers) amongst the 
many friends with whom I have been in contact, who are in favour of it, 
and many of them are genuinely and greatly distressed. Their fears are 
not on account of the outcome of the military operation, but for the effect 
on the position and prestige of Britain and as to whether the operation 
will not have a longstanding effect the reverse of what is intended.53
In Wellington, the New Zealand External Affairs Department expressed 
deep concern about London’s decision to intervene. In a letter to Foss 
Shanahan, External Affairs Secretary Alister McIntosh compared the 
51 Menzies to Eisenhower, 20 November 1956, DDE Diary Papers, International Series, 
Box 2, EL.
52 Casey to Menzies, 22 November 1956, NAA, A1838, S170 Part 5.
53 Casey Diary Entry, 2 November 1956, NAA, M1153, 49D.
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Suez Crisis to the outbreak of the Second World War. “The last few days 
have been all too reminiscent of 1939”, McIntosh told Shanahan; “we in 
the Department have been horrified at the implications of British action, 
but Cabinet as a whole and the Prime Minister have been thoroughly in 
favour of backing the United Kingdom.”54
McIntosh was particularly alarmed by British action. Writing to 
New Zealand’s Deputy High Commissioner in London Frank Corner, 
McIntosh described Eden’s decision to intervene in the Suez area as 
“criminal.” “In my view”, McIntosh concluded, “he [Eden] ought 
to be impeached.” He was particularly concerned that the crisis had 
developed so suddenly and without any consultation with Wellington. 
In another letter to Corner, McIntosh wrote that “one of the features 
about this Middle East Crisis that has shaken me most is not only the 
lack of consultation between the United Kingdom and the Dominions 
but also the slackening flow of information as the crisis has proceeded.” 
Corner agreed with McIntosh’s grim assessment of the deteriorating 
situation and criticised the lack of information that came from London, 
suggesting that Eden must be quite mad. “It is said that the Arabs have 
enormous respect for madmen”, Corner said memorably, “because 
Allah is supposed to reveal himself through them. If only the doctors 
would confirm the diagnosis of Whitehall and certify Eden.”55 Corner’s 
comments were particularly intriguing because rumours about Eden’s 
health and its impact on his decision-making had been circulating for 
quite some time. Many historical studies have also raised this concern 
in analyses of British policy during the Suez Crisis.56
In the end, enormous diplomatic, economic and military pressure 
eventually forced Britain and France to agree to another UN ceasefire 
and an emergency peacekeeping operation on 6 November, enabling 
an Anglo-French withdraw from the canal. London and Paris 
had nothing to show for all their efforts in Suez except failure and 
54 McIntosh to Shanahan, 8 November 1956, in Unofficial Channels, 209.
55 Corner to McIntosh, 23 November 1956, in Unofficial Channels, 212-215. 
56 See, for example, The Rt Hon Lord Owen CH, “The Effect of Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden’s Illness on his Decision-making During the Suez Crisis”, QJM: An 
International Journal of Medicine 98, No. 6 (2005), 387–402, https://doi.org/10.1093/
qjmed/hci071; Eamon Hamilton, Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis of 1956: The 
Anatomy of a Flawed Personality, MA Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2015.
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embarrassment. As the US Embassy in Cairo reported to Washington, 
the British and French “gained nothing except loss of prestige and 
increased hatred of Arabs.”57 Shouldering the brunt of the blame and 
embarrassment for the crisis—as well as struggling with several health 
issues—Eden resigned as Prime Minister on 9 January 1957. For all 
the shock and surprise surrounding events in Suez, his resignation 
was predicted. “Eden has had a physical breakdown and will have 
to go on vacation immediately […] this will lead to his retirement”, 
the US Embassy in London cabled Washington on 19 November. His 
replacement, Harold Macmillan, quickly asked the United States to 
provide a “fig leaf to cover our nakedness” in early January so that 
British troops could finally withdraw from Egypt.58 As Anglo-French 
forces withdrew, even those in Australia and New Zealand who 
wholeheartedly supported British policy recognised that the crisis 
signalled the end of Britain’s claim to major power status. As New 
Zealand External Affairs Officer Frank Corner told Secretary Alister 
McIntosh “the centre of effective power and decision has, I think, 
passed away from London. Washington and New York are likely to be 
the most interesting places from now on.”59 
Since the invasion of the Sinai Peninsula failed due to American 
diplomatic, economic and military pressure, the end of the 1956 Suez 
Crisis publicly exposed a bitter rift in Anglo-American relations and 
essentially confirmed the end of British world leadership. It also exposed 
noticeable differences between Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States over the control of the Suez Canal, defence policy in the region, 
and Britain’s role in world affairs. While each of the ANZUS powers 
had defence interests in the Middle East, both the Australian and New 
Zealand prime ministers declared their support for British action during 
the 1956 Suez Crisis despite strong private reservations in their respective 
Cabinets and External Affairs Ministries. The United States, in contrast, 
bitterly opposed British action and forced their withdrawal from Egypt. 
57 US Embassy in Cairo to the Department of State, 10 November 1956, Dulles-Herter 
Series, Box 8, EL.
58 US Ambassador in London to Eisenhower and Dulles 19 November 1956, Ann 
Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 18, EL.
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Defence interests in the Middle East and responses to the Suez Crisis 
demonstrated clear policy differences between the ANZUS powers that 
stemmed from trans-Tasman British ties and views surrounding US 
leadership. It also demonstrated a critical point in alliance diplomacy 
for both Canberra and Wellington. During the Suez Crisis, Australia and 
New Zealand held similar views and were not prepared to defer to US 
leadership when vital British interests were at stake. In short, five years 
after the conclusion of ANZUS, Australia and New Zealand were still 
prepared to pledge support for vital British interests instead of aligning 
all strategic policies with their chief protector, the United States. For 
Canberra and Wellington, Suez starkly exposed the limitations of British 
power when London’s views were at odds with those in Washington.
Conclusion
The eleven years between the end of World War II and the end of the Suez 
Crisis wrought many changes in how Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States worked with one another in response to issues of mutual 
concern. After their wartime alliance during World War II, these countries 
shared common interests in defending themselves against Communist 
expansion, preventing a revival of Japanese aggression and broadly 
preserving the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region. In practice, 
however, the ANZUS countries struggled to act in a united fashion during 
the early years of the Cold War.
For Australia, the alliance provided formal protection and was viewed 
as a necessary security measure to offset Britain’s inability to meet 
Australian defence requirements. Policymakers in Canberra also hoped 
ANZUS would be a gateway to access information on US global strategic 
planning and influence world affairs. Across the Tasman, New Zealand also 
accepted that their country must rely on US protection but policymakers in 
Wellington wanted a less formal arrangement. A non-binding agreement 
with the United States, in short, was less likely to jeopardise New Zealand’s 
relationship with Britain; a critical issue for policymakers in Wellington. 
For the United States, the conclusion of ANZUS was a trade-off to ensure 
Australian and New Zealand acquiescence to the Japanese Peace Treaty. It 
also served as further support for the American position in Northeast Asia.
After Eisenhower entered the White House, the alliance began to evolve 
into a more complex and meaningful relationship, despite continued 
strategic disagreement. The alliance became especially important once a 
series of crises broke out in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions, such 
as those in Indochina, the Taiwan Straits, and the Suez Canal. Each response 
by Australia, New Zealand and the US provides interesting insights into the 
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contrasting views of the ANZUS powers as well as their differing ideas 
about Britain’s post-war role in world affairs. The United States saw no 
major role for Britain without American cooperation, whereas Australia 
and New Zealand tended to favour the British position in these conflicts 
and erroneously thought that Britain was still capable of wielding 
enough influence to act without American support (particularly during 
the Suez Crisis). By 1956, events in Egypt ultimately demonstrated 
a critical point in alliance diplomacy in Canberra and Wellington: 
Australia and New Zealand were still prepared to pledge support for 
vital British interests instead of aligning all strategic policies with their 
chief protector, the United States. 
As with any alliance, the extent to which a treaty such as ANZUS 
comes into fruition and works in practice often depends on the impact of 
individuals. Regardless of whether their impact was ultimately positive 
or negative, many diplomats played a critical role in the development 
of the ANZUS relationship. For instance, Australian External Affairs 
Minister Herbert Evatt loomed as a large yet divisive figure in trilateral 
relations during the late 1940s. Evatt caused more problems than he 
solved in regard to managing Australia’s relationships with New Zealand 
and the United States, especially when it came to his abrasive and non-
consultative diplomatic style about matters relating to the Japanese 
occupation and the post-war control of the Pacific islands. Percy Spender, 
Evatt’s replacement as External Affairs Minister, then led the way in 
arguing for the conclusion of a mutual defence arrangement, despite 
pushback from his pro-British Prime Minister, Robert Menzies. Once 
Spender moved on to serve as Australian Ambassador in Washington, 
he and his replacement as External Affairs Minister, Richard Casey, 
charted a more active role for Australia during consultations with their 
US, New Zealand and British counterparts during the international 
crises of the 1950s. 
Across the Tasman, Alister McIntosh—Head of the joint New 
Zealand Prime Minister’s and External Affairs Departments—was 
instrumental in shaping New Zealand’s post-war foreign policy with 
Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Britain, at the same 
time as steering a slow but noticeable movement toward establishing 
closer relations with the United States. In this endeavour, McIntosh was 
supported by other key New Zealand diplomats such as Carl Berendsen, 
Walter Nash, and Frank Corner, all of whom provided unique insights 
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into their frequent distaste for Australian diplomats and their respective 
foreign policy agendas, the usefulness of ANZUS, and a continued 
affinity toward creating international policies through the lens of the 
British Commonwealth.
More well-known figures also played key roles, but not always to the 
benefit of establishing a closer trilateral relationship. John Foster Dulles, 
who served as chief US negotiator for the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, had 
a somewhat chequered record of dealing with the British Dominions. 
While he successfully negotiated an ANZUS Treaty draft that was 
acceptable for US plans in Japan and the wider region, he was unable 
to secure the inclusion of the Philippines to avoid negative perceptions 
of a “White Man’s Club” in Asia. Then, during his term as Secretary of 
State in the Eisenhower Administration, he consulted frequently with 
the Australians and New Zealanders to garner multilateral support 
for US policy vis-à-vis Indochina, the Taiwan Straits and Suez. Despite 
his wealth of experience in international affairs, Dulles was largely 
unsuccessful in securing trans-Tasman support in the face of contrasting 
British and American views on the most appropriate course of action. 
In an episode that epitomised the challenge Dulles faced in securing 
Australian and New Zealand support for US policies, Robert Menzies 
and his New Zealand counterpart Sidney Holland severely strained 
their countries’ relations with the US when they both publicly declared 
support for British efforts in Suez despite widespread international 
condemnation (as well as private criticism from inside their respective 
Cabinets and External Affairs Departments). A mention must also go to 
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, whose push for the use of force 
in Suez made him a chief instigator of frosty Anglo-American relations, 
and by extension, Australian-New Zealand-American-British relations.
The early Cold War period was certainly one of great change and 
consequence for the future of relations between Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States. For instance, Australia and New Zealand began 
to agree more consistently over defence and foreign policies in their 
region, highlighted by their joint participation in the Vietnam War 
during the 1960s and 1970s despite British non-participation. Later, 
after New Zealand formally adopted a nuclear-free policy in response 
to protestations over harbouring American nuclear vessels during the 
mid-1980s, the United States suspended its security guarantee to New 
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Zealand in 1985. There were complicated reasons for this suspension, 
yet it was perhaps fitting that New Zealand, the country that often 
questioned its close relationship with the United States during the 
early Cold War, was later suspended from the treaty that neither 
country had initially wanted. Meanwhile Australia, the country that 
had been most eager to conclude a security arrangement in the first 
place, became the first signatory to formally invoke ANZUS in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New 
York on 11 September 2001. Taking future developments into account, 
major strategic and diplomatic issues between Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States throughout the following decades can certainly 
be traced to the post-war period. The early ANZUS Alliance, in short, 
had a decisive impact on the future of the relationship between these 
countries and their interactions with the wider world.
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